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ABSTRACT
PLAYING TH E MAN: M ASCULINITY, PERFO RM A N CE, AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1901-1920
by
Kim Brinck-Johnsen
University o f New Hampshire, D ecem ber, 2004

“Playing the M an”: Masculinity. Performance, and US Foreign Policy. 1901-1920
argues that early twentieth century conceptions of m asculinity played a significant role in
constructing US foreign policy and in creating a new sense of national identity. It
focuses on five public figures (Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Reed, Theodore
Roosevelt, and W oodrow Wilson). Although their conceptions of m asculinity varied,
each of these central historical figures based his or her US foreign policy position on the
idea that in the conduct of US foreign relations, the United States needed to “play the
m an.” Similarly, even when their policy prescriptions differed, all argued for foreign
policies that reinforced masculinity in the US, and that equated this m asculinity with
A m erican national character.
The dissertation begins with a discussion of the cultural and historical roots o f the
nineteenth century. The next chapters focus on Theodore Roosevelt and his circle, and
the men who codified the dominant construction of Am erican m asculinity at the
beginning of the tw entieth century. The following chapters trace some of the opposition
to the Rooseveltian construction o f a strenuous national masculinity. These differing
approaches to domestic and international politics, expressed by individuals such as John
vii
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Reed, Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, and W oodrow W ilson, sought to refram e the
connection between masculinity and foreign policy. Though these individuals agreed
with the Rooseveltian equation of manhood and national identity, they had differing
conceptions of ideal American manhood, and so they differed in their prescriptions for
US foreign policy.
The conclusion discusses the ways that the G reat W ar affected the central figures,
and the ways in which the passage o f the Nineteenth A m endm ent affected the nature of
politics, and political rhetoric in America. Finally, it traces som e o f the legacies of the
combination o f m asculinity and foreign policy, and points out some o f the many aspects
of US foreign policy that still bear the stamp of the Rooseveltian construction of
masculinity.

viii
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IN TRODUCTION

PLAYING T H E MAN:
M ASCULINITY A ND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1901-1920

U.S. foreign policy is shaped and determ ined by ideals o f manliness. One o f the
best articulations of the link is Theodore R oosevelt’s speech at the M innesota State fair
on Septem ber 2, 1901, ju st a few weeks before the assassination of W illiam M cKinley
made him President of the United States. In the speech, titled “ National Duties,”
Roosevelt used a m etaphor that would become defining for A m erican foreign policy in
the 20th century. He com pared the United States to a man, and argued that international
action should be manly action. “ Exactly as each man, while doing first his duty to his
wife and the children within his home, must yet, if he hopes to am ount to much, strive
mightily in the world outside his home, so our nation, while first of all seeing to its own
domestic well-being, must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations
without.” In this speech, as in hundreds of speeches and articles, R oosevelt explicitly
linked the masculinity o f Am erican men with the conduct of A m erican foreign policy.
W ith this simple analogy, Roosevelt argued that as men are to their society, so is the
nation to the world. Furtherm ore, the code o f conduct that governs both men and nations
is identical. Both m ust "play [their] part," - that is perform - with manly resolve in order

1
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to take their rightful place in American society, and in the world. The perform ance of
manliness is the key to international success.1
But how does a nation perform m anliness? In 1901, as now, m anliness was very
difficult to define. People debated the meaning of manhood and cam e up with very
different answ ers; w hat it meant to be a man varied a lot depending on who was doing the
defining. W hile Teddy Roosevelt offered one paradigm for masculinity, many o f the
figures discussed in this m anuscript offered alternative paradigms. W hat is most
interesting, however, is that everyone seems to have accepted R oosevelt’s metaphoric
premise; all agreed that the United States should play a m an’s part in w orld affairs, even
if their beliefs about how “ real men” should behave were radically different.
R oosevelt’s own masculine ideology was influential and powerful. The speech he
delivered at the M innesota State Fair was but one exam ple of his frequent exhortations to
live what he described as “ the strenuous life,” a phrase that sums up R oosevelt’s
approach to masculinity. Roosevelt believed that a man should live his life as if he were
in a boxing ring or a wrestling match. Ideal men should grapple with life, engage with it
energetically, and wrest from it material success, spiritual well-being, and personal
satisfaction. Roosevelt scorned the life of ease, and admired the men (and women) who
strove “ mightily in the world.”
R oosevelt’s construction of the manly “ strenuous life” created a paradigm for
manly behavior that was very influential in American culture. But few men today
consciously model their behavior on R oosevelt’s strenuous paradigm. Even in 1901,
many A m erican rejected his model of manliness. Since the m eaning of m asculinity was

1 Theodore Roosevelt, “ National Duties,” in Am erican Ideals. The W orks of Theodore

2
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so fiercely contested in the period (as it is today), it is surprising that there was strong
consensus that m asculinity must shape U.S. foreign policy. This dissertation examines
that paradox.
A lthough masculinity was (and is) a fluid concept which can be defined in many
radically different ways, it nonetheless shaped and determ ined U.S. foreign policy at the
beginning of the tw entieth century. Regardless o f their political purposes or their beliefs
about masculinity, no one in the period challenged the fundam ental premise that the
U nited States must act like a man; instead, the argum ent always centered on the
(seem ingly unrelated) question of how a man should, ideally, perform his masculinity.
The consequences o f this nearly indestructible link between masculinity and U.S.
foreign policy are one subject of this dissertation. The more central subject, however, is
the link itself. I am exam ining the ways that com peting models for international relations
became limited to com peting models of masculinity.
Before we exam ine the contradictions, let us exam ine Roosevelt’s 1901 speech
more closely. In the speech, the nation is actually a man - Roosevelt pushes his
m etaphor to its biological limit, describing the Unites States as one heroic male, with
national loins that must be girded up for battle. “ We gird up our loins as a nation,” he
said, “ with the stern purpose to play our part manfully in winning the ultimate triumph;
and therefore we turn scornfully away from the paths of mere idleness, and with
unfaltering steps tread the rough road of endeavor, sm iting down the wrong and battling
for the rig h t...”2

R oosevelt, vol. XIII, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. P. 474
2 O nce again, note the language here: Roosevelt wants A m ericans “to play [their] part.”
A large part of m asculinity during this time appears to be rooted in “ playing” a role, or in
3
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Stirring language is common in R oosevelt’s speeches and writings, but this turn
of phrase is particularly notable both because it describes masculinity in terms of
perform ance (Roosevelt urges Americans to “play our part manfully”) and also because it
attempts to ground national performance of m asculinity in an abstract male national body
by discussing the national “loins.” The word “loins” is an archaic euphem ism for
genitalia; a m an’s children were described as the "fruit o f his loins" for example, while
"loin-cloths" covered only their genitals. “Girding up o n e’s loins” is, as Roosevelt used
it, an expression o f preparation for a task that is difficult and dangerous, but the phrase
refers literally to the binding of genitalia to prevent their injury during the course of
battle.
The use of the word “loins” makes clear in a very graphic way the extent to which
masculinity and national identity were intertwined in R oosevelt’s mind. This powerful
image of national masculinity needs to be taken seriously, and literally, because this trope
illustrates R oosevelt’s conception of the United States, and perhaps more importantly, his
view of the way that the United States should take part in the world.
The modern reader of Roosevelt’s bombastic oratory may be tempted to
im mediately discount this masculine language as mere rhetoric. But since his entire
speech, 16 pages o f text, is built upon this analogy, it is difficult to ignore. In light of the
fact that this is also the speech that introduced the phrase “speak softly and carry a big
stick” to the Am erican political lexicon, the male metaphors dem and serious attention.

the performance of a particular gendered stereotype. G ender theorists such as Judith
Butler have begun to focus more attention on this aspect o f gender identity. See, for
exam ple Judith Butler, G ender T rouble. New York: Routledge, 1999. The Roosevelt
quote is from Theodore Roosevelt, “National Duties,” p. 480.
4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O f course, the “big stick” itself is a crude phallic metaphor. M y point is that this is not a
coincidence or a simple joke: big stick diplomacy is actually originally described as
manly diplom acy, even phallic diplomacy. The nation that carries the big stick is the
very nation that has girded up its loins and left its wife and family hom e as it goes out to
play the man on the global stage.
Because Roosevelt frequently used masculine language, it is essential to
interrogate his concept of masculinity. W hat was Roosevelt’s goal in pushing the
m asculine analogy nearly to the breaking point?

Why did he use m asculine language so

often, when it is clear that the United States, a huge geographic territory of earth, water
and rock, a nation of 45 states populated in 1900 with nearly 76 million women, children
and men, was not a “m an” in any real sense at all? Why did Roosevelt, and so many
other politicians, critics, and intellectuals, use the masculine model so frequently when
discussing the United States’ role in world affairs during the first decades of the twentieth
century?
These questions are crucial to understanding U.S. foreign policy during the early
tw entieth century. There is more to the conjunction of masculine discourse and foreign
policy than ju st the felicitous turn of a phrase. Roosevelt and many of his contemporaries
believed in the essential truth of the national manhood model. Nations were like men,
they argued, and international relations, in an age when Charles D arw in’s evolutionary
theories were influential, were conceived of in terms of com petition, survival and

elimination. The world was the arena where these nations contested their comparative
worth, and the key to national power and prestige, Roosevelt and other like-minded

5
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individuals believed, lay in the manhood of its citizens, which served as the blueprint for
the perform ance of national masculinity on the world stage.
The goal o f this work is to explore the effects of conceptions o f A m erican
national m asculinity upon U.S. foreign policy. The com bination o f w hat Theodore
Roosevelt once described as “M anhood and Statehood” helped to shape American
foreign relations during the first decades of the 20th Century. Because the dialectic
interaction of masculinity and foreign affairs coincided with the em ergence of the United
States as a world power, an understanding o f the gendered language o f foreign policy, as
expressed in speeches, documents, essays and other writings is essential to an
understanding o f how the United States became a world power.
A lthough masculine language is im portant to many aspects o f U.S. culture, the
language of national masculinity is notably dominant in the field of foreign policy,
particularly in the early twentieth century. In the foreign policy arena, masculine
conceptions of American identity were laid out very explicitly. Speeches and writings
com posed during this time debated the future role of the United States in world affairs,
but they did not debate Roosevelt’s equation of manhood with statehood. To the
contrary, the following chapters will show that the different approaches to U.S. foreign
policy during the first twenty years of the twentieth century shared a com m on assumption
o f the connection between national manliness and international action. This consensus is
remarkable, and indicates that the trope of masculinity was more than merely a rhetorical
flourish.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a shared awareness that the
United States was in a period of transformation from a regional pow er focused primarily

6
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on its internal and regional issues, to a world power with global am bitions and interests.
During this time period, participants in the foreign policy debate shaped their arguments
about American foreign policies in terms of m asculinity regardless of viewpoint (liberal,
conservative, Republican, Democrat, male, female, white, black). Critics as well as
proponents of particular foreign policies argued their cases in term s o f the behavior of the
ideal man. Since the nation was universally understood as a man, the question revolved
around how a man should behave. Though there was a great deal o f difference on this
point, the main assumption of the masculinity of the A m erican nation remained
unchallenged.
Early twentieth-century efforts to enact American national masculinity on the
world stage have had wide-ranging consequences. Like the rest o f the American political
system, U. S. foreign policy is rooted in arguments of precedent; policy decisions based
on notions of Gilded Age masculine behavior are still very much with us. In many ways,
these precedents continue to limit the options available to contem porary foreign policy
analysts to those options that appear to be the most in line with their own interpretations
of masculinity (the need to be “tough on com m unism ” during the Cold W ar, is a good
exam ple here). In addition, because the masculine language of the G ilded Age was
prevalent during the decisive period when the United States first stepped onto the world
stage, current Am erican foreign policy still relies on the language and attitudes of the
early twentieth century.3

3 A case in point is President George W. B ush’s address to the nation where he promised
that Osama bin Laden would be apprehended “dead or alive.” B ush was relying on the
language of the western, a uniquely American genre o f fdm and literature that pits good
versus evil in small towns in the W estern United States. In his use o f the language of the
fictional frontier lawman, Bush was referring back to The V irginian, the definitive
7
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The point here is that the masculine model of an idealized male United States,
which replaced the pre-Civil W ar model of state-based Am erican identity, provided the
organizing fram ew ork for A m erican foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth
century, and continues to do so to this day. Framers o f U. S. foreign policy still use
Gilded A ge ideals of m anliness as a measure of viability. “Strength” and “w eakness” in
foreign policy are still viewed as if the Am erican nation were a man, and opposition to
“tough” policies is m et with allegations of “ w im piness,” “feebleness,” and other coded
language that impugn the masculinity of both the policies and their critics. Therefore, an
analysis of the foreign policy language, and the attitudes behind it, can help to reveal the
unexam ined gender ideology that serves as the basis for much U.S. foreign policy. This
analysis may also help to shift considerations of national security and well-being from the
main street of Dodge City to a location where outm oded notions of m asculine behavior
no longer shape world affairs.

In this exploration of the effects of the com bination of m asculinity and national
identity on U.S. foreign policy, I employ some o f the approaches used by scholars who
practice what has com e to be known as cultural studies.4 By questioning the ways that
gender, class, race, and ethnicity have affected U.S. foreign policy form ation, I am using

western novel written by Owen Wister, that was published in 1902 and dedicated to
Theodore Roosevelt. Bush, whether he knew it or not, was viewing the conflict with bin
Laden, al Qaeda and eventually the Taliban government in Afghanistan, through the lens
of a Gilded Age conception of masculine heroism. For B ush’s speech, see the N ew York
Times, Septem ber 18, 2001, A 1.
4 There are too many cultural studies texts to list here, but an excellent overview of
cultural studies writers and approaches can be found in Lawrence G rossberg, et al., eds.,
Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 1992. Soon to be reissued in a revised edition,

8
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approaches that are increasingly being brought to bear on the study o f the history of
Am erican foreign relations.
To begin with, I understand gender to be a socially constructed concept that has
changed greatly over time and that has differed from place to place. A lthough the
physiology and biology o f sex have remained relatively constant, the m eanings of words
like “m an” and “ w om an,” not to mention “hom osexual,” “transgendered,” “gay,”
“ lesbian,” and “straight,” are continually being redefined. Following current usage, I use
“ sex” to refer to bodies, “ gender” to describe socially shaped identities, and “ sexuality”
to refer to identities defined in terms of sexual desire. In exam ining gender issues, I am
following a path originally staked out by gender theorists such as Joan Scott, while Judith
B utler’s more recent discussions of gender as “perform ance” also shapes my ap p ro ach .5
In addition, I have sought to come to an understanding of the ways that class, race
and ethnicity are linked. M uch recent work has focused on the late nineteenth century
and the ways that these three invidious categories played themselves out in American
political and social life. The work of David Roediger, Theodore Allen, Dana Nelson, and
Noel Ignatiev, among others, has shown that definitions for concepts like “ m an” and
“w hite,” far from being static, and hence normative, have fluctuated greatly and have
been bitterly contested.6

the book includes articles by such prominent cultural theorists as Homi Bhabha, Jam es
Clifford, Andrew Ross, Cornel W est, and bell hooks, in addition to many others.
5 See Joan Scott’s influential article “Gender: A useful Category o f Historical A nalysis,”
in Am erican H istorical Review, No. 91, (Dec. 1986), pp. 1053-1075, as well as her
G ender and the Politics o f H istory. New York: Colum bia Univ. Press, 1988; I mention,
once again, Judith B utler’s G ender Trouble as well.
6 See David Roediger. The W ages of Whiteness: Race and the M aking o f the American
W orking C lass. New York: Verso, 1993; Theodore Allen, The Invention o f the White
Race. Vol. 1: Racial Oppression and Social C ontrol. New York: Verso, 1994; Dana
9
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In general, by exploring American political culture during the early twentieth
centu ry - in getting to know the individuals, their political discourse and their personal
values, the political institutions and the debates that echoed in their corridors - I have
sought to understand the conceptions of nation and self, world and other, as well as the
hopes for the future and the global visions as delineated during that era.
To this end, I focus a great deal o f attention on the language em ployed by the
individuals that make up the central personae in this work. I aim, literally, to take the
individuals at their word - my goal is to allow individuals such as Jane Addams and John
Reed to speak for themselves and to illuminate some of the argum ents that their speeches
and writings made regarding masculinity and foreign policy. The m asculine language
used by these individuals expressed their approach to foreign policy, and to the world.
But more im portantly the discourse o f masculinity shaped their foreign policy actions.
Each o f the figures I exam ine accepted the analogy between m anhood and statehood (as
Roosevelt framed it); more than this, each individual conceived and described foreign
relations in the same language as they described human relations, more specifically, in
the language of manly interaction. Because of this, all of the figures discussed here
argued for national actions based on his or her masculine ideals. A close analysis of the
gendered language em ployed by these individuals will yield great insight into the time
and thought of the era, with a specific illumination of the debates surrounding the
construction of U. S. foreign policy. The better we understand each author’s concept of

Nelson, National M anhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Im agined Fraternity of W hite
M en. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became
W hite. New York: Routledge, 1996

10
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masculinity, the better we can understand his or her attitude tow ard the U.S. as a national
actor on the world stage.
Recently, there have been many historians who have begun to mine these veins,
and to explore the intersection of m asculinity and Am erican culture in the late nineteenth
and early tw entieth centuries. Works such as Anthony R otundo’s A m erican M anhood.
Kim T ow nsend’s M anhood at H arvard. M ichael K im m el’s M anhood in A m erica.
M angan and W alvin’s M anliness and Morality. Dana N elson’s, National M anhood , and
Kaplan and Pease’s Cultures of United States Im perialism , are excellent exam ples of this
kind o f scholarship. These works, o f course, are ju st a few am ong many in a growing
literature that explores the relationship between gender and A m erican history in general,
and its role in the form ulation of foreign policy in particular.7

7 Some of this literature includes Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease. Cultures of United
States Im perialism . Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1983; Ronald Hyam, Empire and
Sexuality. Manchester: M anchester Univ. Press, 1990; M ichael Kimmel, M anhood in
America: A Cultural H istory. New York: Free Press, 1996; J. A. M angan and James
W alvin, eds., M anliness and Morality: M iddle Class M asculinity in Britain and America.
1800-1940. M anchester: M anchester Univ. Press, 1987; Clare M idgeley, ed., G ender and
Im perialism . M anchester: M anchester Univ. Press, 1998; Anthony Rotundo, American
M anhood: Transform ations in M asculinity from the Revolution to the Modern E ra. New
York: Basic Books, 1993; Kim Townsend. M anhood at Harvard: W illiam Jam es and
O thers. New York: W.W. Norton, 1996. In addition, Edward C. C rapol’s W omen and
A m erican Foreign Policy: Lobbyists. Critics, and Insiders. Second Ed., (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, 1992), Cynthia E nloe’s Bananas. Beaches and Bases: M aking
Fem inist Sense o f International Politics. (Berkeley: Univ. of C alifornia Press, 1990), have
been very helpful. Among the many im portant articles, see Frank Costigliola,
“ ’Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology and Em otion in George
K ennan’s Form ulation of the Cold War, Journal o f Am erican History, 83 (M arch, 1997);
G erald Horne, “ ’Race From Pow er:’ U.S. Foreign Policy and the General Crisis of
‘W hite Suprem acy,” ’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sum m er 1999), pp. 437-461;
A kira Iriye, “C ulture,” in The Journal o f Am erican History, vol. 77, No. 1 (June 1990),
pp. 99-107; Emily S. Rosenberg, “G ender,” in The Journal o f Am erican History, vol. 77,
No. 1 (June 1990), pp. 116-124; Andrew J. Rotter, “G ender Relations, Foreign Relations:
The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964,” in The Journal o f Am erican History, vol.
11
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In term s o f my own project, I am following in the wake o f three im portant works
that deserve special mention, not only because they share a similar theoretical approach,
but also because they share a similar topical focus.
Gail B ederm an’s M anliness and Civilization: A Cultural History o f G ender and
Race in the United States. 1880-1917. focuses on the way that conceptions o f white
middle-class masculinity, particularly notions of white supremacy, were defined in terms
of opposition to other races.8 Bederm an’s book explores the connection between
m asculinity and race, and argues that, during the time period between 1890 and 1917,
white middle-class men developed the idea of “civilization” as a means o f justifying their
continued social and political pre-eminence. “During these years,” Bederm an writes, “a
variety o f social and cultural factors encouraged white middle-class men to develop new
explanations o f why they, as men, ought to wield power and authority.”9 B ederm an’s
book has helped me to explore the linkage between constructions o f m asculinity and
American culture in this time period. At the same time, however, there are differences
between our work, for where Bederman focuses on the way gender issues played
themselves out within the United States, I am more interested in the way the same issues
have affected American foreign relations, and the way that foreign relations contribute to
a sense of A m erican national identity.
K ristin H oganson’s Fighting for American M anhood: How G ender Politics
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars illuminates the

81, no. 2 (Sep. 1994), pp. 518-54; John Shy, “The Cultural A pproach to the History of
W ar,” , in Journal o f M ilitary History, No. 57, (Oct. 1993), pp. 13-26.
8 Gail Bederm an, M anliness and Civilization: A Cultural History o f G ender and Race in
the United States. 1880-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
9 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, p. 5.

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

intersection between Gilded Age masculinity and U.S. foreign policy.10 H oganson’s
book exam ines how this combination led to a particularly vehem ent resurgence of white
middle-class m asculinity and argues that this m asculinity contributed to the clam or for
w ar in 1898. Hoganson addresses the social and political background to the conflict and
describes the gender anxiety that led to the belief in war as a means o f saving American
men from decline. Her w ork is very convincing when discussing the jin g o ist discourse of
the time, explaining how the jingos’ language was rooted in their fears o f white middleclass male decline, and the relationship between that anxiety and the surge in wartime
masculinity.
My project is similar to Hoganson's in that we both explore m asculinity and U.S.
foreign policy, but there are many differences between our work. H oganson focuses
primarily on the years from 1898 to 1901, while my study concentrates on the years
between 1901 and 1921, from when Roosevelt became President, to the end of W ilson’s
Second Administration. I am interested in seeing what happens after the masculinization
of U.S. foreign policy that Hoganson describes has occurred, and m asculinity has become
determinative. I explore the arguments that were made about m asculinity and U. S.
foreign policy in the decades after 1898, when all of the actors accepted a basic
connection between masculinity and national action.
Both Hoganson and Bederman focus on white male m asculinity at the turn of the
previous century and both examine the ways in which this identity was constructed and
shaped by social, cultural, and political forces. W hile the traditional view had seen

10 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American M anhood: How G ender Politics Provoked the
Spanish-Am erican and Philippine-American W ars. New Haven: Y ale U niversity Press,
1998.
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gender and sexuality as permanent and im mutable, new er approaches such as those used
by Bederman and Hoganson have gone a long way tow ard show ing that gender is a social
construction that develops as a result o f particular influences at particular times; as a
result, there is a great deal more that needs to be considered when exam ining gender
identification than mere biology.
One of the more interesting (and useful) approaches to gender is that developed
by Judith Butler in her groundbreaking book G ender Trouble.11 Beginning with an
exam ination of the debate on the nature o f gender (is it som ething you are, or something
you have?), Butler draws on the work of fem inists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Julia
Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, among others, who argue against the definition and the
positioning of women in society by means o f their relationship to men. W here de
Beauvoir believes that women are “the second sex” as a result o f the conflation of the
universal with the male gender, Irigaray goes further and argues that women do not even
make it as a “second sex.” Where de Beauvoir sees the construction of w om en’s gender
as a response to the male universal, Irigaray argues that the male conception of “ men and
women,” constructed as a discourse of “self and other,” in effect leaves women out - as
Irigaray states, “ woman does not have a sex.” 12 This is echoed, and strengthened, by
Julia Kristeva, who adds that, "strictly speaking, women cannot be said to exist.” The
traditional gender argument, Butler points out, has been that there are but tw o gender
categories: “ men,” and “ not men.” In this definitional circle, male gender is still
universal, in both its positive and negative aspects. The problem with this definition is

11 Judith Butler, G ender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f Identity. Routledge:
New York, 1990.
12 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other W om an, page xxx.
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that women are not “not m en”. As a result o f this logical fallacy, both gender and the
origins o f gender must be understood as fundam entally problem atic, or troubled.13
B utler’s solution to this gender trouble grows out of her reading o f the works of
M ichel Foucault, in particular his writing about the herm aphrodite Herculine Barbin.
Barbin, by his/her very nature, does not fit into the binary gendered system, and as such
is the perfect contradiction to the entire system o f gender construction. As Butler
explains, B arbin’s duality forces us to dispense with the traditional approaches to
thinking about, and defining, gender:
Once we dispense with the priority of “man” and “w om an” as abiding substances,
then it is no longer possible to subordinate dissonant gendered features as so
many secondary and accidental ch aracteristics...14

In other words, once “man” and “ w om an” are no longer thought of as
unchanging, perm anent entities, then it is no longer possible or even necessary to force
individuals who do not match those categories into tightly defined gender identities.
W hen traditional gender definitions are dispensed with, the problems of gender adherence
are also eliminated. W hat remains, then, is a definition of gender that also grows out of
the experience of Herculine Barbin: if she/he em bodies both genders, then what defines
her/him is the way she/he behaves; when clothed as woman, and moving with “fem inine”
motion, Barbin is a woman. Conversely, when dressed as a man, and moving with
“m asculine” m ovements, Barbin is a man. Butler: “In this sense, gender is not a noun,
but neither is it a set o f free floating attributes, for we have seen that the substantive

effect of gender is performatively produced and com pelled by the regulatory practice of

13 Butler, G ender T rouble, pages 3-33.
14 Butler, G ender T rouble, p. 32.
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gender coherence.” Barbin becomes a man precisely because he/she acts like one, and
she/he is a w om an because o f her/his performance in that role as well. In sum, Butler
writes that “ [t]here is no gender identity behind the expressions of g e n d e r;... identity is
perform atively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results.” 15
The definition of gender as performance is very useful for this attem pt to com e to
terms with turn-of-the-century masculinity and U.S. foreign policy. But applying the
perform ance model o f masculinity to public policy is a significant leap from Butler’s own
work, w hich is focused primarily on private persons and their identity as individuals. In
this study, I exam ine the wide-ranging effects of masculine ideology on public policy. I
argue that policy makers framed policies with the purpose of making the United States
perform a m asculine gender identity on the world stage.
In discussions o f masculinity, it is very difficult to untangle the public from the
private. No one understands gender as a completely abstract or impersonal conceptual
fram ew ork; each person’s ideas about the masculine and the fem inine are shaped by
private experiences and personal and family history as well as by broad cultural forces.
W hen public figures attem pt to fram e their policies in terms of gender ideologies, they
draw on private experience as they attem pt to shape public culture and to determine
national action.
In each of the chapters of this dissertation, I focus on a particular person and
discuss his or her private experiences o f gender form ation as the basis for his or her adult
articulations of national masculinity. In the second part of each chapter, I turn to the
effects that particular conception o f national m asculinity had on the policy positions of

15 Butler, G ender T rouble, p. 33.
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each figure. But it is often difficult to separate the private from the public. For example,
several of the men I discuss here entered manhood when they entered Harvard; their own
private experiences o f learning to enact adult American m asculinity took place in a
som ew hat public collective institution. Their experiences were both personal and shared.
Further, although the dom inant models of masculinity do change over time and
there is often a single dom inant model, United States culture has never adhered to a
single model of m asculinity with total unanimity. There are always alternatives. One
factor that com plicates the structure o f the argum ent presented here is that W oodrow
W ilson was born before Teddy Roosevelt, but became president many years after him.
Because o f his personal history and his experience of boyhood, W ilson’s model of
m asculinity aligns with the nineteenth century rather than the tw entieth; and yet his actual
presidency took place after Roosevelt had thoroughly redefined A m erica’s national
masculinity.
If this were a history of masculinity, it would begin with a discussion of
W oodrow W ilson’s ideas about manliness and proceed toward Theodore Roosevelt’s
refram ing of those ideas; then it would discuss a few of the policy makers whose
particular policy decisions enacted R oosevelt’s strenuous m asculinity model. Finally, it
would turn to John Reed, Jane Addams, and W.E.B. Du Bois, who expanded upon and
sought to change the dom inant Gilded Age model.
But this is a history of U.S. foreign policy entwined with a history of masculinity.
Its narrative follow s the twists and turns of actual history, while tracing the progression
o f cultural concepts. Therefore, we must start with Roosevelt, w hose model was
dom inant in 1901, at the beginning of the twentieth century, and w ork toward Woodrow
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W ilson, whose presidency a decade later was fram ed around a much earlier idea of
masculinity.

If we consider Theodore Roosevelt in light of the performance model of
m asculinity, certain aspects of his career become easier to understand. Roosevelt
structured his personal life and his public life around masculine performance, as the
following exam ples illustrate. W hen he was young and asthmatic, his father told him that
he had to “make his body” work, an exhortation he took to heart, em barking on a rigorous
course o f body building that transformed him from a sickly, scrawny boy to healthy man
with the body of a wrestler. Another transformation occurred after a stint in the New
York State Assem bly (where he was mocked for his effem inacy and his dandyism) when,
in a custom made buckskin suit, he took up ranching in the Dakotas. Dressing like Natty
Bumppo became tantam ount to being Natty Bumppo, the “deerstalker” of James
Fenimore C ooper’s novels. Yet another transformation occurred in 1898, this time at
Brooks Brothers, where TR acquired a uniform befitting a Colonel in a volunteer
regim ent about to fight in Cuba. This costume went a long way tow ard creating
Roosevelt as a “ Rough Rider,” the role that helped him to win national office. 16

16 See Edm und Morris, The Rise of Theodore R oosevelt. New York: Coward, M cCann
& Geoghegan, 1979, for an excellent overview of R oosevelt’s life. For the “ make your
body” speech, see Corinne Roosevelt Robinson, My Brother Theodore Roosevelt. New
York: Scribner's, 1921, p. 50; for descriptions o f Roosevelt's dandyism , see Morris, Rise
o f Theodore Roosevelt, p. 161-162; for an actual image of Roosevelt in his custom made
buckskin suit, see the frontispiece of Roosevelt, Hunting Trips o f a Ranchm an. New
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1885; for background on the suit itself, see Morris, Rise of
Theodore Roosevelt, p. 283; Roosevelt telegraphed the order for the uniform he used in
Cuba to Brooks Brothers directly, thus predicting mail order by some 80 years. The
telegram is in Elting Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore R oosevelt. Vol. 2,
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1951, p. 822. p. 613.
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Roosevelt is fascinating both because of his personal transform ations and because
o f his m asculine ideology. If we think o f Roosevelt in terms of his perform ances, his
costum es, his many ‘roles,’ and his gendered speech help us to understand his political
processes and his policies. His role-playing and speeches can be understood as attempts
to convince his audience of his place in a particular gender location, and ju st as
importantly, as attem pts to structure and to regulate definitions o f gender.
R oosevelt’s performances were not lost on many of his contem poraries, who
could see through them to the individual beneath the role-playing. As Edm und Morris
points out, “those who know him well are quick enough to catch the subtle messages
Roosevelt sends forth.” 17 Perhaps most telling is the com ment by W illiam Allen White
that he saw the “inner shadow of some inner femininity deeply suppressed.” 18 This
com m ent would bear out Butler's theory - that even in the heart of the most rampantly
masculine heterosexual man is a deeper femininity that has been shoved to the bottom.
Additional validation of the idea that R oosevelt’s masculinity was a (bravura)
performance is Henry A dam s’ assertion that Roosevelt was “pure act.” 19 Roosevelt was
pure act - he was the creation of his own mind, and a person who loved to perform, a
man who, according to his own children, longed to be “the bride at every wedding, and
the corpse at every funeral.”20 O f course, Roosevelt never put on a big white dress or a

17 Morris. Rise o f Theodore Roosevelt, p. 21.
18 W illiam A llen W hite, St. Louis Censor, Decem ber 27, 1906; quoted in M orris, Rise of
Theodore Roosevelt, p. 21
19 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry A dam s. Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1961.
Page 417.
20 See Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life. New York: W illiam M orrow, 1992,
p. 11. See also M orris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 17
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shroud, but his buckskin suit is best understood as a sim ilar costum e, a prop in a carefully
tailored performance of American virility.
B utler’s theory of gender as performance is helpful in m aking sense o f
Roosevelt’s personal history, but it works even better as an explanation o f the
construction o f gender on the national plane. Because nations do not have physiological
bodies, their gender assignment is the result of performance only; if the nation “acts like a
m an,” it is, ipso facto , “m anly,” a man. If Roosevelt’s analogy is taken as a model, and
the man is to the nation as the nation is to the world, then the nation serves as a masculine
entity, provided it acts like a man. Nations aren’t men, o f course - nations have no sex.
Y et because people think o f political entities in physical terms (by using term s such as
“the body politic” and “governmental bodies,” for exam ple) there is often a conflation of
the term with the attribute - because people think of a nation's citizens as a “ body
politic,” it is an easy move to assign that body with gendered attributes. These gender
assignments, of course, come about as a result of evaluations of behavior. Citizens can
act “m anly,” for example, or “like a bunch of w om en.” W hat is more interesting,
however, for a discussion of U.S. foreign policy, is that nations them selves become
gendered through their performance, their behavior.
As Kristin Hoganson and Amy Kaplan have shown, the Spanish-A m erican W ar of
1898 (which made Theodore Roosevelt a national figure) was marked by a rem arkable
com bination of masculine discourse and militarism, and created an enduring connection
between manliness and foreign policy. The connection persisted in the following
decades; indeed, it has persisted ever since. Though many have tried to redefine
masculinity itself in order to redefine U.S. foreign policy, no one has been successful in
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separating Theodore R oosevelt’s linkage of manly behavior and national action. The
most they could do was to offer alternative constructions of manly behavior.
This project considers the enduring dom inance o f the linkage between manhood
and statehood, as well as a variety of attempts to reconstruct m asculinity in order to
refram e U.S. foreign policy. In sum, I argue that the individuals discussed here made
their cases for their visions of foreign policy in terms o f national masculinity. Even when
they had alternate foreign policy goals or different conceptions o f manliness, they all
accepted the linkage between national behavior and manly behavior, and they all agreed
that the United States should “play the man” on the w orld stage. The model of national
m asculinity has shaped U. S. foreign policy visions for more than a century. Further,
because the United States has been confined to “playing the m an,” the range of foreign
policy options has been severely limited, and this has led the United States to act in
particularly fateful ways.
A consideration of the challenges to R oosevelt’s model of national masculinity is
necessary, for it indicates the strength and persistence o f the discourse of masculinity.
Though many of the foreign policy alternatives that were presented between the years
1901 and 1920 challenged strenuous Rooseveltian masculinity, none challenged the link
between man and nation. Instead, the determinative consensus remained that the U.S.
should continue to “play the m an.”
*

*

*

Before focusing on the foreign policy history that structures this dissertation, it is
necessary to consider the construction of nineteenth-century m asculinity in America. To
understand what it meant to be a man in the nineteenth century we m ust begin with an
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earlier ideal o f American manliness, namely the minister. Christian ministers had played
an im portant role in the developm ent of Am erican political and cultural life ever since the
arrival o f the European colonists in the early seventeenth century, but as the influence of
churches on American society began to wane, male involvem ent in the church declined.
As a result, by the early nineteenth century many clergymen worked primarily in a world
of women. In The Feminization o f A merican Culture. Ann Douglas argues that during
this period American religion grew feminized, sermons began to lose their sting, and the
angry, vengeful god of the Puritans grew softer, gentler, and more womanly.21 Douglas
has quite a bit of evidence to support her argument. For exam ple, she cites Joel Hawes, a
Congregational minister, who com plained in 1862 that “ [t]he sword of the spirit is ... so
muffled up and decked out with flowers and ribbons as no longer to show what it is.”22
No one paid attention to religion “except women and superstitious men.” Henry James,
Sr. even pointed out that “Religion in the old virile sense has disappeared, and been
replaced by a feeble Unitarian sentim entality.”23
In this light it is unsurprising that portrayals of Jesus himself, in paintings and
engravings, also become feminized. M ichael Kimmel points out that the depictions of
Jesus that appeared during the nineteenth century portrayed him as
a thin reedy man with long bony fingers and a lean face, with soft doe-like eyes
and a beatific countenance - a man who could advise his congregations to turn the
other cheek, while gazing dream ily heavenward.24
21 For discussions of this phenom enon, and its link to conceptions o f gender, see Ann
D ouglas’ important The Feminization of Am erican C ulture. New York: Knopf, 1977;
John Demos, A Little Com m onwealth. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999; Anthony
Rotundo, Am erican M anhood, pp. 10-30.
22 Douglas. Feminization o f Am erican Culture, p. 113
23 Douglas, Feminization o f American C ulture, p 17. See also Kimm el, M anhood in
A m erica, p. 176.
24 Kimmel, M anhood in A m erica, p. 176.
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This image was em braced by the women who increasingly made up the majority of
church congregations, and was thereby passed on to their sons. In this way, the gentle
Jesus became the ideal for Am erican manhood in the years before the Civil War.
By the time of the Civil War, religion had become firm ly linked to women and
fem ininity, and the restraints that religion placed on male behavior were beginning to
chafe. During the second half o f the nineteenth century, therefore, there was a push by
men and women, ministers and lay-people, to transform the way that religion was
marketed to young men. As Michael Kimmel explains, “Religion had been w om en’s
domain, and the sentimental piety and obsessive moralism were experienced by men as a
brake on manly exuberance...” 25
The end of the Civil War, furtherm ore, marked the beginning o f a new America,
and the construction of a new ideal of masculinity. After more than 600,000 soldiers had
died fighting over Union, the words “ United States” had changed their meaning. Earlier
American regional and state based identities began to be replaced by a growing sense of
the United States as a collective entity. President Abraham Lincoln’s language reflected
this shift. Before the war, Lincoln had described the nation in the plural, as befitting a
national collective of member states - the United States are - but towards the end of the

25 M ichael Kim m el, M anhood in America: A Cultural H istory, New York: Free Press,
1996. Page 175-176,
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war, he began to use the formulation “the United States is,” an indication o f his
conviction that the war was both creating and defending a single Union.26
In order for the U.S. to become com pletely unified, however, the anim osities and
the sectionalism o f pre-W ar American politics needed to be eliminated. The end of
Reconstruction w ent a long way to easing North-South tensions and helped to bring about
a rapprochem ent; in fact, it was the difficulties and frustrations o f m anaging the
Reconstruction project that finally led the North to give in to Southern intransigence.
W ith the ending of Federal attempts to legislate A frican-Am erican equality, the way was
clear for a new unity among Americans. Among White Am erican m en, that is, for while
Northern and Southern unity was achieved through the agreem ent to drop attempts to
force A frican American political and cultural equality, blacks were not the only groups
left out of the political spectrum. In the years between the end of Reconstruction in 1877
and the enfranchisem ent of women in 1920, American masculinity was defined in terms
of opposition to a whole series of others—Native Americans during the Indians wars of
the 1870s and 1880s, the decadent Spaniard or the com ely Cuban lass, Chinese coolies
and Irish im m igrants—in addition to the wage slave and the m other.27
As a result of this growing definition through opposition, the idea o f American
male identity began to change. Before the war, American men had viewed themselves

26 Jam es M. M cPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second Am erican R evolution. (New
York: Oxford UP, 1991), p. viii. Gary Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The W ords that
Remade A m erica. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), is also excellent.
27 For an extended discussion of the contested nature of Am erican citizenship, and how
definitions of patriotism were debated in the post-Civil W ar United States, see Cecilia
Elizabeth O 'Leary's To Die For: The Paradox of Am erican Patriotism . Princeton:
Princeton U niversity Press, 1999. For an excellent discussion o f im ages o f the “other” in
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sectionally; during the war they had gone off to fight in regiments organized by state;
now, a different organizing principle was required if national unity was to be achieved.
W hat developed in the years after the Civil W ar was a new definition o f American
identity that shifted the notion of citizenship from a regional, locational definition, to one
rooted in the body, specifically the male body.
The 14th Amendm ent, ratified in 1868, illustrates this connection. W hile the
language of Section 1 o f the Am endm ent grants citizenship to "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States," the language o f Section 2 of the 14th A m endm ent refers
specifically to "male citizens twenty-one years of age." This language marks the first
place in the Constitution where political representation and voting rights are linked to
masculinity, and serves as an indication of the increasingly strong linkage between
masculinity and national identity.28
The Gilded Age code of masculinity grew as a result of a num ber o f factors. The
increasing industrialization and urbanization of the United States led to a quickening of
American business life, which in turn led to the increasing absence o f fathers from the
home, the result of long work hours and increasingly longer com m utes to rapidly
developing business centers. This meant that Am erican boys, for the first tim e in history,
were being raised by women almost exclusively. As a result, A m erican boys, through

U.S. foreign policy ideology, see M ichael H. H unt’s Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
28 See Linda K. K erber. No Constitutional Right To Be Ladies: W om en and the
Obligations o f Citizenship. New York: Hill and W ang, 1998, for an extended discussion
of women's citizenship.
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what Anthony Rotundo has called ‘boy culture,’ developed and reinforced a code of
masculinity that would serve to separate them from their mothers and sisters.29
The actions which marked boy culture were activities which gave the boy and his
comrades ample opportunity to prove their strength, courage and em otional self-control.
Football, baseball, and other team sports; hiking, swimming, riding, rowing and general
exploring which could be done singly or in small groups; and fighting, wrestling, and
“many activities which set [boys] head-to-head in hostile com bat.”30 T he elem ents of boy
culture experienced by Theodore Roosevelt and his peers laid the foundations for the new
masculinity that came to the fore in the late 19th century.
The first chapter o f this dissertation, therefore, focuses on Theodore Roosevelt,
while the second exam ines a few members o f his circle who helped to codify the new
dominant conception of American masculinity at the beginning of the tw entieth century.
Roosevelt presented him self as the very exam ple of boy culture grown up, and the chief
proponent of what he described as “the Strenuous Life.” He served as a popular
incarnation of the new American masculinity, and he will be considered as the ideal of
what became a dom inant construction o f Am erican masculinity. Roosevelt went on from
boyhood to become a hero during the Spanish Am erican W ar and President in 1901.
Roosevelt’s conception of masculinity was widely promoted through his own
speeches, writings and actions, but it was also supported by those of many o f his
colleagues, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and A lbert Beveridge,

29 Rotundo, American M anhood, p. 27, and Douglas, The Fem inization of Am erican
Culture, p. 74.
30 Anthony Rotundo, "Boy Culture," in M ark Carnes and Clyde Griffen, eds., M eanings
for Manhood: Constructions of M asculinity in V ictorian A m erica. Chicago: Univ. of
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who are discussed in the second chapter. The tenets o f this m asculinity becam e encoded
in the Boy Scouts of America, in the YM CA, in the U.S. Army and other branches of the
military, and in the myriad fraternal organizations that flow ered during the G ilded Age,
such as the Elks, M oose, Eagles, Red Men, and Odd Fellows Lodges that sought to bring
Am erican men together in manly fellowship.31
As this upper- and middle-class m asculinity found a wide audience and a great
num ber o f proponents across the nation (in both the country and the city), and as the
bonds o f national fellowship were strengthened (through the end o f Reconstruction and
the end o f Northern attempts to assist A frican Americans), views o f Am erican
involvem ent abroad began to shift. W here A m ericans had earlier seen distractions, they
saw opportunity; and where they had seen a corrupt, decadent Europe, they saw
com petitors who were already bringing vast regions of the globe under their econom ic
and political control.32
Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan, and others who saw the world in term s of struggle,
com petition, and “the strenuous life,” saw this new era of global com petition as an
opportunity for the United States, and for American men, to prove their worth. For these

Chicago Press, 1990, p. 17.
31 On boys’ groups, see David I. M acleod, Building Character in the A m erican Bov: The
Boy Scouts. Y M CA . and Their Forerunners. 1870-1920. Madison: University of
W isconsin Press, 1983; on the military, see, for exam ple, Donald J. M rozek, “The Habit
o f Victory: The American Military and the C ult o f M anliness”, in Mangan and W alvin,
eds., M anliness and M orality, pp. 220-239; see Carnes and G riffen's M eanings for
M anhood, for an extensive look at fraternal societies and the conceptions of masculinity
that provided their foundation, as well as C arnes’s own Secret Ritual and M anhood in
V ictorian A m erica. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991.
32 For two excellent overviews o f the diplomacy o f this period, see Robert Beisner's
From the Old Diplom acy to the N ew . Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1986, and
W alter LaFeber's The New Em pire. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1963.
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men, the United States and American men were one and the same. They all adhered to
the logic that Roosevelt had articulated in M innesota, agreeing that since men entered the
world to com pete for their livelihoods, “ so our nation ... must not shrink from playing its
part am ong the great nations without.”33 The conjunction of m asculinity and nation was
not linked to the body, but instead the em phasis on collective national masculinity
“playing its part am ong the great nations” makes it clear that a perform ance model
operates here. Roosevelt again expressed it best: “No nation can achieve real greatness if
its people are not both essentially moral and essentially manly; both sets o f qualities are
necessary.”34
By the time Roosevelt had becom e President in 1901, there was a broad
consensus on the connection between the role the United States played in world affairs
and the masculinity of American men. Roosevelt's exhortations, such as his comment
that “[i]f either man or nation wishes to play a great part in the world, there must be no
dallying with the life of lazy ease,”35 made perfect sense; the em phatic combination of the
discourse of performance, that is “ playing a part,” and the need for the rejection of a life
of "ease" were common. Adherents o f Roosevelt's national masculinity believed that the
“strenuous life” applied to nations as well as to men, with the correlation that nations that
exhibited laziness rather than the strenuous performance of their masculinity, were
doom ed to decline and fall.

33 Theodore Roosevelt, “National Duties,” in Am erican Ideals. The W orks o f Theodore
R oosevelt, vol. XIII, New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1926. P. 474.
34 Theodore Roosevelt, “The M onroe D octrine,” A m erican Ideals, p. 259 [March 1896],
35 Theodore Roosevelt, “M anhood and Statehood,” in A m erican Ideals. P. 211.
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T he popularity of the connection between m asculinity and national identity,
between “m anhood and statehood” as Roosevelt put it, rested not only on its powerful
unifying factor (the gender that voters had in com m on was masculinity, after all36), but
also on its lack o f specificity. M ost members o f the foreign policy com munity might
agree that the United States should “act like a m an,” but within that consensus, it was
very possible to disagree on what manly behavior actually was. It should be no surprise,
then, that in the years following R oosevelt’s Presidency, and in particular during the
1910s, the debate concerning a manly foreign policy broke along lines that reflected
divergent strands o f political thought.
The follow ing chapters trace the opposition to the Rooseveltian construction of a
strenuous national masculinity. These differing approaches to domestic and international
politics, expressed by individuals such as John Reed, Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, and
W oodrow W ilson, sought to utilize the connection between masculinity and foreign
policy, but in a markedly different way than Roosevelt and his colleagues. Examining
the views of each of these individuals will serve to delineate the com plications inherent in
the use of the trope of masculinity.
The third chapter focuses on John Reed, the New York socialist who was later to
achieve lasting literary fame as the author o f Ten Days that Shook the W orld (and
through the film Reds where he was played by W arren Beatty). As a socialist, Reed

36 W ith the exception of four states that granted women the right to vote before the 19th
A m endm ent passed in 1920: W yoming, which granted women suffrage in 1890,
Colorado in 1893, and Utah and Idaho in 1896. For an overview o f the W om en’s
Suffrage M ovem ent see Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the W om en’s Suffrage
M ovement. 1890-1920. New York: W. W. Norton, 1981, pp. 4-5.
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believed in international solidarity and “brotherhood,” and those beliefs, I argue, shaped
his views o f how the United States should behave on the international stage.37
Like Roosevelt, Reed was a graduate o f Harvard College, and was fam iliar with
the m asculine ideals of R oosevelt’s milieu. But although robust m asculinity was central
for Reed, his view o f manliness was rooted in a rather romantic view of socialist
brotherhood. Reed had become politicized through his reporting for the socialist
magazine The M asses, and in particular through his experiences covering the labor strikes
in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1913. On the basis of his success in New Jersey, Reed was
sent to cover the rebellion in Mexico. In his reporting from M exico, later collected in the
book Insurgent M exico. Reed laid stress on the essential m anliness o f the soldiers he rode
with, a unit under the com m and o f Francisco 'Pancho' Villa. These men, through their
military socialist brotherhood, were the very exam ple of democracy: fighters for the rule
of the people, against the rule of corporations and large land-owners. Reed argued that
the United States should fight for true dem ocratic ideals and support other nations
through socialist policies.
The U.S. should act like a man, Reed believed, but not necessarily like a Harvard
man. Instead, the model for United States national masculinity should come from Pancho
V illa’s brotherly band. The United States should treat other nations as brothers. R eed’s

37 For a good biography o f Reed, though there are several, see Romantic Revolutionary:

A Biography of John R eed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. Page 150. For
an interesting, though com plem entary view o f Reed, see Mary D earborn’s Queen of
Bohemia: The Life o f Louise B ryant. Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1996, which focuses on
Reed’s partner Louise Bryant. A nother interesting view of Reed is contained in Christine
Stansell ’s A m erican M oderns: Bohemian New Y ork and the Creation o f a New Century.
New York: M etropolitan Books, 2000, which exam ines Reed in the context of his
Greenwich V illage associates.
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view o f the M exican Revolution needs to be understood through the lens o f m asculine
developm ent; in R eed’s view, the struggle for M exican independence was the same as the
process by which a boy became a man. As R eed’s biographer points out, “ [t]he question
raised in [his writing about the unit] is central to his whole experience in M exico; indeed
it had hovered unspoken in his mind for years: how does one become a m an?” 38
The question for Reed, therefore, and the question I exam ine in the chapter, is
how does the U.S. act like a man in a socialist cause? Is it possible for the U.S. to act like
a man, without acting out the strenuous masculinity o f Roosevelt? These questions gather
greater w eight and currency as they are picked up and debated by other opponents of
Rooseveltian masculinty.
The fourth chapter extends the analysis to Jane Addams and other women of the
many groups dedicated to world peace during the years leading up to W orld W ar I.
Many o f the women active in the anti-war m ovement shaped their arguments against
m ilitarism in terms of an ideal masculinity that was very different from the prevailing
model. These women hoped to use alternative conceptions of masculinity to com bat the
Rooseveltian em phasis on com bat and struggle. By em phasizing other m asculine
attributes, Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Lucia Ames Mead and others sought to
instill other m asculine qualities into A m erica’s future leaders.
Because most women lacked the vote before 1920, women who wanted to affect
public policies staked out political positions for themselves as “w om en” and “ m others,”
arguing that their voices should be heard because of their gender. Consequently, they

38 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150.
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succeeded in establishing themselves as the conscience of the nation.39 Using their
com bined roles of mothers and political activists, women attempted to change American
militarism through directing a change in the Am erican man, thereby redefining the nature
o f Am erican manhood. By contradicting directly the notion of how a man should behave,
women were challenging the powerful militaristic discourse of Theodore Roosevelt, the
“m uscular Christianity” of Billy Sunday, and the physical fitness regimes o f Dudley
Sargent (who stated that sports, particularly those which pitted man against man such as
boxing and wrestling, were necessary because “they counteract the enervating tendency
of the times ... and develop courage, manliness, and self-control”).40
Many women contributed to this challenge to Roosevelt’s com bination of
manliness and national performance. Among them was Jane Addams, a founder o f Hull
House in Chicago and one of the most prominent and respected women in America. Her
experience with Hull House led her to the conclusion that international conflict, and the
social problems she was combating in the immigrant neighborhoods of Chicago, had the
same root. Both international peace and inner city harmony could be promoted by
programs that stressed the essential commonalities of the human experience. Peace and
understanding came as a result of education, and conflict, therefore, was the result of a
childish ignorance, an ignorance that was essentially male. Education would prove to

39 There has been a lot of work done on the U.S. peace movement, and w om en’s role
within it. See, for exam ple, Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American
H istory. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1980; M arie Louise Degen, A History o f the
W om en’s Peace Party. New York: Garland Press, 1972; and for a study that focuses
specifically on WW I, see Barbara J. Steinson. American W om en’s A ctivism in W orld
W ar I. New York: Garland, 1982. for an excellent overview of the tactics, ideas, and the
people, that shaped the w om en’s suffrage movement, see Aileen Kraditor, The Ideas of
the W om en’s Suffrage M ovement. New York: W.W. Norton, 1965.
40 See Kimmel, M anhood in America, p. 137.
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young men “that adventure is not only to be found in going forth into new lands and
shooting,” but can also be found in other, more beneficial activities. Once young men
were aw are o f these alternatives, their “childish notions of power,” their “ boyish ideas of
adventure,” and their “conceptions of what pleasure and manliness and courage consist
in, will fall away from them as the garments o f a child are dropped off from his growing
form .”41
Addams, therefore, aimed to disconnect the link between m ilitarism and
masculinity. By arguing that military conflict was a “boyish” or “childish” stage, she
hoped to convince grown men who had left other childish habits behind, in the same way
that they grew out o f their clothes, that they should no longer resort to arm ed conflict as a
tool of policy. Addams thereby hoped to shame men into taking the next step in
development, that is, in continuing what Addams believed was the next step in the
inevitable progression of humanity. In the same way that boys grow into men, Addams
believed, societies grew and developed, leaving primitive behavior behind. Though war
often called forth the best in people (a sense of selfless duty, national cohesion, and
patriotism), these benefits could be called forth by a modern, and more civilized,
equivalent o f war that, instead of destroying the lives of the com batants, actually
transformed American society for the better. Addams would have appreciated the logic
behind a “war on poverty,” and a “war on drugs,” for exam ple (even though she would
undoubtedly have had problems with the way these wars have been carried out).

41 Official Report o f the Thirteenth Universal Peace C ongress. (Boston: 1904), pp. 261262. Linda Schott’s article “Jane Addams and W illiam James on A lternatives to W ar,”
Journal o f the History o f Ideas, Vol. 54, No. 2, (Apr., 1993), pp. 241-254, led me to this
source.
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Similarly, A nna Howard Shaw, a prominent m ember o f the w om en’s suffrage
movem ent and a respected and popular lecturer, argued that A m erica, through its rampant
militaristic culture, “ was teaching the wrong idea of w hat constitutes m anliness.”
Contradicting the prevailing view that males are genetically inclined to fight, Shaw
argued that “nine boys out of ten fight simply because they are cow ards...They don’t dare
not to fight.” This point was made often in the years leading up to W orld W ar I. As
Judith Papachristou points out, “ [t]he assertion that real heroes were to be found ... in
homes, and not on the battlefields, was a frequent refrain among fem ale speakers and
writers at this tim e.”42
A fter the United States entered the First W orld W ar in 1917, the line of argument
that attempted to separate masculinity from military performance had dangerous
consequences, as a lack of military fervor came to be interpreted as a lack o f patriotism.
Jane Addams continued to argue against militarism, and vehem ently argued against the
prevailing idea of patriotism that associated pacifism with cowardice and disloyalty. As a
result, Addams was pilloried in the press. Roosevelt him self joined in the attacks, writing
that pacifists opposed to the War were “really most influenced by physical cowardice.
They fear death, or pain, or discomfort, and like to hide their fear behind high sounding
w ords.”43 Addams and her allies found that the conjunction o f strenuous masculinity and
national identity was too strong to be co-opted, particularly during the W ar, and it was
many years before her reputation as a loyal American recovered.

42 National Council of W omen, Fourth Triennial Report. 1902. pp. 52-53. The quotes
from Shaw, as well as the argument about her typicality, can be found in Papachristou,
“A m erican W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 504.
43 Degen, A History of the W om en’s Peace Party, p. 71.
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Other attempts to challenge or alter the Rooseveltian conception o f a strenuous
national masculinity also failed. Chapter Five exam ines the position o f W.E.B. Du Bois, a
founder o f the NAACP, and the editor o f its journal, The Crisis. Taking R oosevelt’s
construction at face value, Du Bois accepted the challenge and urged his readers to
become active in the W ar effort, and thereby help African A m ericans to win what he
called “the full stature of [their] manhood.”44 Du Bois saw the G reat W ar as an
opportunity for African American men to prove their “m anhood” in the classic
Rooseveltian sense, by risking their lives in battle. Du Bois believed in the combination
o f manly endeavor and national identity, and he had hoped to earn a better place for
African A m ericans in America through service in the War.
This belief grew out of a longstanding concern that Du Bois had with the
intersection of masculinity, patriotism and American citizenship. In 1912, his “I Am
Resolved” editorial stressed the importance of masculinity in the public sphere.
Recalling some of its language, in particular “ I am resolved in this New Year to play the
man - to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye,” and “I am resolved to be
satisfied with no treatm ent which ignores my manhood and my right to be counted as
one am ong men,” it is interesting how Du B ois’s vision of masculinity neatly parallels
that o f Roosevelt, in its conjunction of a personal and an international m asculinity ,45
M asculine language that equates political stances with biological stances, the multiple
meanings inherent in the resolution to avoid slouching and shuffling, make clear the
connection between Roosevelt’s form ulation of national m asculinity and Du B ois’s
editorial argument.

44 W.E.B. Du Bois, “A Philosophy in Tim e o f W ar,” The Crisis, August, 1918, p. 164.
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Du Bois had seen the beginning of the First W orld W ar as an outgrow th of
imperialism, the direct result o f the subjugation of Africa in particular. As an African
American, Du Bois had a particular interest in the condition o f A frica and Africans, and
the War, in his eyes, provided African A m ericans with the opportunity to correct a
number of wrongs.
In an editorial in The Crisis in Septem ber 1916, Du Bois argued that “civilization
has met its W aterloo.” Then, turning from Europe to look at the United States, Du Bois
wrote that
The civilization by which A m erica insists on measuring us and to which we must
conform our natural tastes and inclinations is the daughter o f that European
civilization which is now rushing furiously to its doom ... Brothers, the war has
shown us the cruelty of the civilization o f the West. History has taught us the
futility of the civilization of the East. Let ours be the civilization of no m an, but
of all men. This is the truth that sets us free.46

Du Bois believed that through participation in the war, Americans, and African
Americans in particular, would strike a blow at the heart of the imperial system; by
fighting for W ilson’s 14 Points, in particular the right to self determination, American
soldiers would be fighting to free the colonized o f the world from their European yokes
of oppression.
Even more important, though, was the opportunity that the w ar provided for
African A m ericans at home. By signing up and fighting in France, Du Bois believed,
African A m ericans would earn the respect of the nation, and finally reach what he called

45 W. E. B. Du Bois, “I Am Resolved,” The Crisis, January, 1912, p. 113.
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“the full stature o f our m anhood.” Du Bois articulated this com bination of victory over
imperialism abroad with victory over Jim Crow at home as a “double victory.” It is
ironic, though, that his belief in the necessity of African American participation in WWI
led to involvem ent in a segregated Army led by a racist and actively segregationist
president.
It is clear that Du Bois believed rather too strongly in the Rooseveltian conception
o f masculinity. Though he turned the constructed link between “manhood and statehood”
on its head by arguing that African American men could achieve citizenship through a
model that was predicated on the exclusion of women and any one of color, he was
unable to make it work. During the Great War, African American men served
predominantly in service units, cooking, cleaning, transporting other troops, and
performing other non-com bat roles. Though those African American units that saw
com bat did frequently dem onstrate exceptional v alo r,47 it was not enough. The net
result was an increasing bitterness, and an increase in racial tensions when African
American soldiers returned home after the war, and were denied the respect that they so
richly deserved.
The final chapter turns to W oodrow Wilson, and examines how his older model of
masculinity played out in the post-Roosevelt world. This study exam ines W oodrow

46 W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Battle of Europe,” The Crisis, No. 12, Sep. 1916, pp. 216-217.
47 Perhaps the best exam ple o f African American valor in the First World War is the
369th Infantry, the "Harlem Hellfighters," which earned 11 citations for bravery. The unit
is also credited with introducing jazz to Europe; their regimental band, under the
direction o f Jam es Reese Europe, became fam ous for their jazz and ragtime inflected
versions o f military band music. For more on the 369th, see Bill Harris, The Hellfighters
of H arlem . New York: Carrol and Graf, 2002; for their musical influence, see Glenn
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W ilson in light o f nineteenth-century constructions o f masculinity that shaped his own
understandings, as well as later Gilded Age ideals. Wilson, who was to becom e President
in 1913, em braced the early nineteenth century m asculinity o f the m inister and the
professor, a m asculine role that had been provided by his fam ily background. W ilson
was born in Virginia in 1856, the son, grandson, and nephew of prom inent Presbyterian
ministers. A t the same time, W ilson was also very close to his m other, and in later years
he even described him self as somewhat of a “m am m a’s boy.” In a letter to his wife, Ellen
Axson W ilson in 1888, W ilson wrote “I remember how I clung to her (a laughed at
‘m am m a’s boy’) till I was a great big fellow: but love of the best w om anhood cam e to me
and entered my heart through those apron strings.”48 Still later, while he was President,
W ilson stated that “ I seem to feel still the touch of her hand, and the sweet steadying
influence o f her wonderful character. I thank God to have had such a m other!”49
W ilson identified with both his mother and his father, and this double
identification was not problematic in the context of his own mid nineteenth-century
concepts of masculinity. Through his emulation of his ministerial father (the
em bodim ent of the masculine ideal o f the previous generation), W ilson m aintained his
allegiance to the older masculine model, despite the critique of ministerial m anliness
made by men such as Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Seton, Daniel C arter Beard and other
advocates o f the strenuous life. W hen Sigmund Freud wrote of W ilson that, “ his

W atkins, Proof Through The Night: Music and the G reat W ar. Berkeley: U niversity of
California Press, 2002.
48 Link, et al, eds., The Papers of W oodrow W ilson. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966 - 1994 ; Volume 5, p. 719.
49 Ray Stannard Baker, W oodrow Wilson: Life and Letters. G arden City: Doubleday,
1927-1939. Volume 1, p. 34.
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masculinity was feeble,”50 Freud was relying on tw entieth-century understandings o f the
masculine, and ignoring W ilson’s historical and cultural position.
I argue that W ilson’s foreign policy model bears the hallm arks o f an older
m asculinity; W ilson’s penchant for constitutions, for collective action, idealistic foreign
policy statements, and finally the League o f Nations are the result o f a belief in a code of
manly behavior that was rooted in his belief in the m inister as an ideal man. Despite the
popularity of many of his ideas, including the League o f Nations, W ilson was never able
to muster enough support for them because they ran counter to the m asculine ethos of
independent action championed by Roosevelt and Lodge.
The final chapter expands on this argum ent by exam ining developm ents in the
construction o f masculinity and their effects on foreign policy. W ilson’s foreign policy
ideas, as I trace in detail in the chapter, were marked by the older model of ministerial
masculinity, which resulted in a som ewhat stunning com bination o f righteousness and
condescension. As a result of what he him self called his “ m issionary diplom acy,”
W ilson was quick to intervene in Latin A m erica, perhaps most prom inently in Mexico,
when he saw the M exican upheavals in the 1910s as a threat to A m erican interests. It
may seem odd that a sanctimonious parson like W ilson was an active interventionist, but
the interventions in Latin America were entirely consistent with his model of masculine

50 Sigmund Freud and W illiam C. Bullitt, Thom as W oodrow W ilson: A Psychological
Study. New York: Avon Books, 1967. Page 97. Freud himself, o f course, had a fram e of
reference rooted in the Victorian era, and his psychological theories are built upon a
dated notion of sexuality; it is true, however, that in the context o f those tim es, that
W ilson was out of step, and that the m anliness he projected was o f a different nature than
that of Roosevelt.
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endeavor. As W ilson stated at the time, “every nation needs to be draw n into the tutelage
of A m erica.”51
This attitude can be seen most clearly in w hat W ilson considered his greatest
foreign policy achievement, the Versailles Peace Treaty, with its League o f Nations
Covenant. The chapter focuses on close readings of the arguments that W ilson made in
his swing through the western part o f the United States, the exhausting trip that all but
killed him. W ilson’s discourse, I argue, explicitly counters R ooseveltian masculinity
with a clearly stated and defined model of A m erican manhood that replaces armed
conflict with the rule o f law. There is no “girding o f loins” for W ilson, no desire to smite
down the wrong and battle for the right. Instead, W ilson proposes to replace the
“physical force” of the Rough Rider, with the m asculine “moral force” o f the minister
and the upright law abiding citizen.52
W ilson, then, like Du Bois, Reed, Addams, and others, sought to work within the
dom inant trope of national masculinity established by Theodore R oosevelt and his circle,
but the net result was not a transform ation o f the dynam ic, but a strengthening of its
primary characteristics. By accepting the definition of foreign policy as the performance

51 The phrase com es from a speech W ilson delivered on March 17, 1909 in New York
City. The speech, and hence the phrase, did not become widely publicized until W ilson
became the D emocratic Presidential nom inee in 1912. See “Gov. W ilson’s View o f the
Presidency,” New York Times, July 4, 1912, p. 2.
52 The “physical force” vs. “moral force” argum ent was made in a speech at the
Coliseum, in Sioux Falls, SD, on Septem ber 8, 1919. Som ewhat contradictorily, he goes
on to point out that despite the "barbarous” nature o f guns, no-one ever hangs a ledger or
a yardstick or a spade over the mantle “ because they do not represent self-sacrifice. They
do not glorify you.” W ilson would rather have men who sacrifice them selves in a manly
fashion (ie with a musket in hand) than men who are only interested in making a profit
for themselves. His masculine model is not that different from R oosevelt’s, in other
words, though it plays out in very different ways. The speech is in A ddresses of
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of national masculinity, these diverse leaders o f Am erican society at the turn o f the
previous century found themselves arguing against the popular model o f m asculinity as
defined by R oosevelt and his com rades and limited in their options for an alternative
model for A m erican foreign relations.
It was finally the carnage o f W orld W ar One that appeared to doom the Gilded
Age conception o f manliness. O ut of a longing for the glory that their fathers’ generation
had won in the Civil W ar, the men of Theodore R oosevelt’s generation had adm ired the
military virtues, equated those virtues with ideal manliness, and looked upon those
veterans of the Blue and Grey as exam plars of A m erican masculinity. R oosevelt him self
had taken to the field in 1898 in an attem pt “to live up to [his] preaching” ; the SpanishAmerican W ar, however, served as the dem arcation between the old and the new modes
of war. W hile R oosevelt’s “charge” in 1898 was certainly a courageous and dangerous
act, that kind of military adventurism was not possible in the fields of Flanders. There,
am ongst the trenches, tanks, poison gas and wholesale slaughter, the discourse of
masculinity that had seemed universally true for so many years began to be seen as a
dangerous myth that was used to lure young men to their deaths.
For the individuals upon whom I have focused, the Great W ar brought great
changes as well. Theodore Roosevelt, the aging imperialist, suffered from a depression
brought about by the death of his son, Quentin, who was shot down over the German
lines shortly before the end of the war. R oosevelt’s friend and biographer, Herman

President W ilson. W ashington: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1919; the quotes are on pp.
88-89.
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Hagedorn, observed o f T R that with the death o f Quentin, “the boy in him had died.”53
His own death, in January of 1919, followed not too long after.
A ware of the major upheavals happening in the fall o f 1917, John Reed went to
Russia to cover the Russian Revolution. Reed spent the last months o f his life urging the
rest of the world to “unite with the Russian workers and peasants who overthrew their
capitalists,” though he had become increasingly disillusioned by the political
m achinations of the Comintern. Reed eventually died in Russia in 1920, unable to bring
about his vision o f international brotherhood.
W.E.B. Du Bois did not see his vision becom e reality either. T he African
Am erican soldiers that Du Bois had encouraged to enlist returned from France, filled with
pride and confidence, only to face a Jim Crow nation that was not interested in extending
them their “full manhood rights.” In fact, the race riots that occurred during the sum m er
of 1919 are some of the worst on record, as African Americans, intent on claiming their
rightful position in American society, clashed with whites intent on denying them equal
status. Du Bois realized then that citizenship for blacks could not be achieved through a
system invented by whites, and his disillusion with white America was complete. Du
Bois proceeded to lay the groundwork for what became the civil rights movement, as his
determ ination to take the prize that had been won in France in 1918 em braced a different
tactic.
W oodrow W ilson worked him self to exhaustion in an attem pt to get the American
people, as well as Congress, to accept his brainchild, the Versailles Peace Treaty and the

53 Quoted in Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life. New York: W illiam M orrow,
1992. Page 562.
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League of Nations covenant. The League was eventually rejected, and W ilson along with
it. The stroke that he suffered in O ctober of 1919 paralyzed W ilson physically, but it was
the rejection of the League in M arch of 1920 that really hurt. W ilson died in 1924
w ithout having recovered spiritually or physically.
For Jane Addams and the women of the various Peace movements opposed to the
G reat War, there was a happier ending. W om en finally gained the vote in 1920, in large
m easure because they were able to define themselves as representatives of a moral force
that would im prove the United States. W om en did not get the vote because they were
perceived to be the same as men; they won the vote because o f their “essential” gender
difference, through a political fem ininity that they had proved in part in their opposition
to the war, by their patriotic work during the conflict, and through their focus on
dom estic and social issues.
The social and political changes wrought by the G reat W ar changed the United
States greatly. But while much of the most explicit masculine rhetoric slipped from view
or moderated, the values that were expressed by that discourse did not. They were
perpetuated dom estically by Gilded Age institutions such as the American Legion, the
Boy Scouts, m ost fraternal organizations, and by m en’s sports such as (American)
football and baseball.34
On the global stage, fundamental foreign policy principles such as Roosevelt’s
interpretation o f the M onroe Doctrine, and W ilson’s use of force in the Caribbean and

54 For a discussion of the survival of the discourse of masculinity, and its cultivation by
the Am erican Legion, see David M. Kennedy's O ver Here: The First W orld W ar and
A m erican Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); pp. 217-218, for
exam ple, discusses Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.'s role in the Legion's creation.
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Central A m erica, remain in place. Furthermore, the United States’ reliance on the
unilateral use o f force, and its related abhorrence of arbitration, negotiation and collective
action, has its roots in Gilded Age notions of how men, and nations, should behave. But
before we discuss the legacies of the combination of masculinity, foreign policy and
manly behavior, we need to begin with the construction and developm ent o f the powerful
need to “play the m an.”
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CHAPTER I

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND TH E
RECREATION O F A M ERICAN M ANHOOD

Theodore Roosevelt is an obvious choice for any exam ination of manliness at the
turn o f the tw entieth century. Roosevelt played many cultural roles: wealthy easterner,
D akota rancher, state representative, big game hunter, governor, dashing com bat soldier,
W ashington bureaucrat, and President of the United States. Not only did he lead an
active life, but he led that life within a larger, self-created ideal o f w hat a man's life
should be; he played an active role in the creation of his own legend. The events which
Teddy R oosevelt are most frequently associated with, the Spanish-Am erican W ar and the
acquisition of the Panama Canal, have become the stuff of legend and popular
misperception; "the charge up San Juan Hill," for example, made fam ous by The Rough
Riders, his story of the Spanish-American War, was neither a charge nor on San Juan
H ill.1 In spite o f this, these actions became fam ous because they were rooted in manly
action; as a result of this manly action TR became an ideal male figure for generations of

1 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.
For an exam ination of Roosevelt's experiences and the way his description of them in
The Rough Riders functioned in the United States at that time, see Amy Kaplan, The
A narchy o f Em pire in the Making of U.S. Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002, pp. 121-145. For other contemporary accounts o f R oosevelt’s actions, see that by
Richard Harding Davis, The Cuban and Porto Rican C am paigns. New York: Scribner’s,
1899, as well as Stephen Crane’s account which is collected in Fredson Bowers and
Jam es B. Colvert, eds., Stephen Crane: Reports of W ar. (Charlottesville: University of
V irginia Press, 1971) pp. 154-65.
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Am erican boys. Needless to say, these influential actions grew directly out of
Roosevelt's own conceptions o f Am erican manliness.
Roosevelt’s book The Rough Riders (retitled famously, and perhaps not
inaccurately, as “Alone in Cubia” by Finlay Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley" 2) was not
unique in its promotion o f American manly virtues. Roosevelt's writings are peppered
with references to manliness, manly virtues and American ideals; he actively and publicly
urged the promotion of American manliness. "American Ideals" (1895), "True
Americanism" (1894), "The American Boy" (1900), "Manhood and Statehood" (1901),
"Brotherhood and the Heroic Virtues" (1901), and "The Manly Virtues and Practical
Politics" (1894), all stress the combination of specific attributes and attitudes which
together lay the foundation for an ideal Am erican citizen. These qualities, with their
mental, physical and spiritual aspects, can be, and should be, taught, Roosevelt argues,
for their propagation is of vital concern to the United States.
Roosevelt claimed in his Autobiography that the manly lessons he learned as a
boy

taught me much more than any o f my text books ... a teaching in which I now
believe as sincerely as ever, for all the laws that the wit of man can devise will
never make a man a worthy citizen unless he has within him self the right stuff,
unless he has self-reliance, energy, courage, the power of insisting on his own
rights and the sympathy that makes him regardful of the rights o f others.3

This chapter takes that statement seriously, and exam ines the education o f Theodore
Roosevelt in an attempt to come to an understanding o f what shaped his conception of
2 Finley Peter Dunne, "A Book Review," in Mr. Dooley's Philosophy. New York: R.H.
Russell, 1900, pp. 13-18; quote is on p. 18.
3 Theodore Roosevelt, An A utobiography. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920.
Page 25.
46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

masculinity, and how he came to believe in a code of manly conduct that broke with the
masculinity o f the previous generation.
Roosevelt’s vision of American manliness was new for its tim e, one that
developed from his own unique experiences, and which was intentionally constructed.
Roosevelt’s masculinity, shaped by experience and refined through the repeated telling of
his story, was representative of a new approach to boyhood that sought to preserve the
boisterousness o f ‘boy culture’ and apply it to the modern world. Unlike W oodrow
W ilson, who sought continuity with his father’s ideal of masculinity, Roosevelt sought to
move beyond his father's ideal of masculinity and create a new model of manly behavior,
that o f the “strenuous life.” Roosevelt applied this new m asculine model to the realm of
foreign policy, and he created a precedent that had serious im plications for American
foreign policy.
Roosevelt’s construction o f m asculinity was incredibly powerful; as John Milton
Cooper has pointed out, “by the time he became President in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt
had already begun to enjoy the legend of the most famous childhood in American
history.”4 It was a fam ous childhood; it became the stuff of legend because it was
repeated over and over again in speeches, in books, and in stories, and was consciously
shaped through retelling and rewriting so as to serve as a model for a new type of
masculinity.
An exam ination of Roosevelt's early experiences reveals a childhood that was
very different from that of his contemporaries. His personal experiences in boyhood
adventures, travel, struggles with disease and, last and perhaps least, traditional
scholastics, all gave R oosevelt a varied and extensive pool o f experiences which

contributed to the creation of a new system of manly values. This conception o f how
men should act was firm ly in place before he went to Harvard in 1876. By looking at his
4 John M ilton Cooper, The W arrior and the Priest: W oodrow W ilson and Theodore
Roosevelt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. Page 5.
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boyhood and his education, then, we can see what created the man that shaped the new
standard for American manliness.
In his essay "The American Boy," Theodore Roosevelt wrote

we have a right to expect o f the American boy ... that he shall turn out to be a
good American man. Now, the chances are strong that he w on't be m uch o f a
man unless he is a good deal of a boy. He must not be a coward or a weakling, a
bully, a shirk, or a prig. He m ust work hard and play hard. He m ust be cleanminded and clean-lived, and able to handle his own under all circum stances and
against all comers. It is only on these conditions that he will grow into the kind of
A m erican man o f whom Am erica can really be proud. 5

Roosevelt explicitly linked boyhood, manliness, and Am erican ideals. This powerful
com bination is what Roosevelt believed was essential to the form ation of the character of
the American man. W hat brings about the transform ation of males from callow youth to
the kind o f man "of whom America can really be proud" is education.
The inculcation of American and masculine values, Roosevelt argued, m ust occur
in the classroom and on the playing fields if the boy's education is going to help him and
his nation in the larger adult world. Roosevelt’s belief in the im portance of an education
that would prepare boys to become American men grew out o f personal experience. His
poor health, which led to his removal from the schoolroom, and effectively led to his
im m ersion in what one historian calls 'boy culture,' profoundly shaped R oosevelt’s
conception of manly behavior, and hence his view of the world.
Roosevelt was born into a wealthy New Y ork family, the second child and eldest
son o f Theodore and M artha Roosevelt. Roosevelt's mother, a 'Southern Belle' if ever
there was one, was renowned for her beauty, her wit, and the fact that she wore only
white muslin. Actively involved in her children's lives, 'M ittie' contributed greatly to the
warmth and conviviality of the Roosevelt home. Teddy's father m anaged to com bine

5 Theodore Roosevelt, "The American Boy," in The Strenuous Life. New York: P.F.
Collier and
Son, 1900. Page 128.
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great wealth and a sincere and active concern for the poor and less fortunate,
concentrating his efforts on helping children. The founder o f the Children's Aid Society,
Roosevelt Senior would spend Sundays "teaching in mission schools, distributing tracts,
and interviewing wayward children. Long after dark he would com e after dinner at some
such institution as the Newsboys' Lodging House, or Mrs. Sattery's Night School for
Little Italians."6
By the time young Teddy Roosevelt developed asthma, his father knew enough
about sickly children to know that he must play an active role in his welfare. Theodore
Senior closely monitored his children's health, whisking them away to healthier climes if
the need arose. He was also tender and gentle, and provided a great deal o f physical and
em otional contact with his children. As TR recalls in his A utobiography. "I was a sickly,
delicate boy, suffered much from asthm a, and frequently had to be taken away on trips to
find a place where I could breathe. One of my memories is of my father walking up and
down the room with me in his arms at night when I was a very small person, and of
sitting up in bed gasping, with my father and mother trying to help me."7
Teddy's asthma was problematic, and frequently very severe. Consequently,
Teddy suffered a lack of organized schooling and was taken on frequent trips abroad.
Accordingly, TR was educated by tutors and through direct experience. The diaries that
he kept on his travels reflect the experiences that taught him as much as his tutors did;
they detail the growth of a sickly young boy who was observant, curious, and fascinated
by the natural world. Roosevelt’s biographer points out that the diaries show us a boy
much like the man he would become; "[t]he spelling, in these cheap, battered notebooks,
is that o f a child, but the density of remembered detail would be extraordinary even in an

6 Edmund M orris, The Rise o f Theodore R oosevelt. New York: Coward, M cCann and
Geoghegan, 1979. Page 34.
7 Roosevelt, An A utobiography, p. 13.
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adult. Some entries read like miniature museum catalogs. Evidently the [sights]
aw akened his faculty of near-total recall."8
T he Roosevelt fam ily's travels to Europe and the Nile were occasions that not
only helped Teddy's asthma; they also took Teddy away from his tutors. O n the long
trips Teddy and his siblings would be tutored by their aunt, Bamie, but this was not quite
the same - though she did her best, the young Roosevelt proved a quick learner, reapidly
outpacing his aunt's ability to teach him. W hen they did return home, Theodore's
education by tutors was erratic at best, being dependent on the state o f his h ealth .9
The use o f tutors for Teddy's education, though born o f necessity, was becoming
rarer than it had been in the past. E. Digby Baltzell, in Philadelphia G entlem en, explains
that tutorial education at home, while the norm for sons o f the wealthy for many years,
was becom ing increasingly uncommon as the United States entered the last half of the
nineteenth century. The spread o f Am erican wealth, and the transform ation of American
society, led increasing numbers o f families to educate their sons at schools such as
Groton, Phillips Exeter and St. Paul's, where they were taught Latin, Greek, History and
Literature, and made lasting friendships in the dormitories and on the playing fields.
Indeed, it was at this time that the idea that a prep school education could determine one's
future life became cem ented among the upper classes; boarding school connections
became increasingly important to members of the social Register and the stewards of the
more exclusive club m embership rolls.10
As more and more social stresses were brought to bear on fam ily through
industrialization, the growth of the urban (and suburban) environment, and a more
frenetic pace o f life, fam ily relationships began to shift, and increasingly, boarding

8 M orris, Rise o f T R . p. 50.
9 See Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life. New York: W illiam M orrow, 1992,
pp. 42-44 and 50-60; M orris, Rise of T R . p. 67.
10 E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The M aking of a National Upper C lass.
G lencoe, IL: T he Free Press, 1958.
50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

schools began to supply a stable family relationship (the idea o f the school being in loco
parentis). Accordingly, school headmasters would frequently stress their m arried status
as a selling point to wealthy parents.11 Baltzell confirms that "the im portance of a private
school education varies directly with the decline of the strength o f the fam ily."12
Teddy Roosevelt did not attend a boarding school; because o f his health, he did
not attend any school at all. Furthermore, Teddy was surrounded by a close and loving
family, one which gave him all the support he needed to deal with his asthm a and,
eventually, to overcom e it. The reason to consider the role o f the boarding school, or
private schools in general, was because o f their socializing effect on boys. The role of
the boarding school was to prepare boys for college, and to prepare them to be men; this
was done was by separating them from their families and, having separated them from
their roles within their families, seeking to make them self-reliant. In this way, boarding
schools effectively marked the beginning of manhood for many o f the sons o f America's
elite, and it is in this regard that Teddy's lack of a private school education is interesting;
unlike the majority of his fellow Harvard students, for example, Roosevelt had not
entered manhood in that fashion. He had not made prep school social connections, nor
had he distanced him self from his family.
The effect of Roosevelt's family on his development as a boy and a man was
great. His father supported him, emotionally and financially, in his drive to improve his
health and his physique, encouraging him and purchasing enough equipm ent to fill a
small gymnasium. His father's encouragement, as well as his brother's and cousin's
participation, led to the creation of a "Roosevelt M useum of Natural History," where
hundreds o f anim al specimens were identified, stuffed, exam ined and stored. Brothers
and cousins also joined in outdoor adventures such as mock battles, hiking, fishing,
hunting and canoe trips, as well as the family trips to Europe and the M iddle East.
11 See Baltzell. Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 296-312.
12 Baltzell, Philadelphia G entlem en, page 294.
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Though private day and boarding schools were becom ing more and more
prevalent, and though their social importance was increasing, Teddy Roosevelt did not
lose out by not attending an exclusive boarding school. Far from it, argues E. Anthony
Rotundo, an historian of manliness and masculinity, and him self a teacher at Phillips
A cadem y in Andover, Massachusetts. Rotundo argues that prior to the
institutionalization of education, with its age-defined hierarchies and grades, boys
developed a culture of their own through activities such as outdoor play, team sports and
other collective actions.
The historical roots of the 'boy culture' o f the late nineteenth century can be found
in the "emergence of a commercial society and a middle class culture," Rotundo writes,
which resulted in a shift in the interpersonal dynam ics of the home. W om en, who took
on more of the responsibilities of child-rearing as their husbands worked farther from
home, cam e to have a closer relationship with their sons than did their fathers.
Simultaneously, "middle-class men, whether urban or rural, became more isolated from
their sons both physically and em otionally."13
As Rotundo explains, "this was a peculiar combination of influences. A boy grew
up in one social world that contrasted sharply with the world he w ould inhabit as an
adult. He was raised by a woman to become a man. He lived in an environm ent of
restraint and interdependence, but he was bound for a world o f independence and
aggression. Some kind of social space - intermediate between the wom en's world of
boyhood and the men's world of manhood - was perhaps inevitable." 14
It is undeniable that Teddy moved in a 'boy culture.' His seem ingly endless
energy, his love o f the outdoors and o f physical activity, made him a perfect leader for

13 E. Anthony Rotundo, "Boy Culture: M iddle-Class Boyhood in Nineteenth-Century
America," in M ark Carnes and Clyde Griffen, eds., M eanings for M anhood:
Constructions o f M asculinity in Victorian A m erica. Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1990. Page 32.
14 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," pp. 33-34.
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childhood adventures. A biographer o f Roosevelt has pointed out that "[d]espite his frail
physique and asthma, he seemed to have an inexhaustable fund o f nervous energy. This,
com bined with the ability to im provise countless stories about his environm ent, caused
him to be accepted as an unquestioned leader by [his sister] Corinne and [his brother]
Elliott, and such family friends as cam e to stay."15
The actions that marked 'boy culture ' were activities that gave the boy and his
comrades ample opportunity to prove their strength, courage and em otional self-control.
Football, baseball, and other team sports; hiking, swimming, riding, rowing and general
exploring which could be done singly or in small groups; and fighting, wrestling, and any
other activities which set the boys against each other in com petition or combat. All of
these were activities in which young Teddy loved to lose himself.
Boxing in particular came to play an im portant part in Teddy's personal
development. On a vacation trip to M oosehead Lake in M aine, R oosevelt was teased by
some boys. Describing the event many years later, it is clear that R oosevelt was still
haunted by the experience.
"They found that I was a foreordained and predestined victim, and industriously
proceeded to make life miserable for me. The worst feature was that when I
finally tried to fight them I discovered that either one singly could not only handle
me with easy contempt, but handle me so as not to hurt me much and yet prevent
my doing any damage whatever in return."16
Having learned a bitter lesson, Roosevelt resolved to do something about it: " [t]he
experience taught me what probably no am ount o f good advice could have taught me ...
having become quickly and bitterly conscious that I did not have the natural prowess to
hold my own, I decided that I would try to supply its place by training. Accordingly,
with my father's hearty approval, I started to learn to box."17

15 Morris, Rise of T R . pp. 45-46. See also M iller, TR: A Life, p. 55.
16 Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 28.
17 ibid., p. 28.
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Boxing and physical fitness became ingrained in young Teddy's daily life, and,
indeed, in his personal character. The two pursuits, though frequently difficult, and often
boring, com bined to finally dispel the asthm a that had plagued him. As his sister Corinne
wrote years later, "[f]or many years, one of my m ost vivid recollections is seeing him
between horizontal bars, w idening his chest by regular, m onotonous motion - drudgery
indeed."18 Roosevelt would continue to box his whole life, even sparring with a partner
while in the W hite House. This habit, with its man-to-man, confrontational overtones, is
rooted in the 'boy culture' to which Roosevelt belonged. The desire to prove him self in
the ring became both a reality and a metaphor; when he declared him self a candidate for
President in 1912, Roosevelt crowed "My hat is in the ring!" Though rooted in the wish
to stand up to those two boys in M aine, Teddy's developm ent made boxing central to his
physical and mental life.
The struggle against asthm a, and his effort to make him self as strong as other
boys his age, later took on the aspect of myth. Roosevelt "made his struggle against poor
health into the equivalent o f [Abraham] Lincoln's rise from poverty. The m etamorphosis
from sickly, scrawny boy into masterful man became a lifelong model and standard of
m easurem ent of men, social groups, and nations."19 Roosevelt's boyhood experiences
became intertwined with the actions o f the adult man, in addition to becom ing an
experience that would later be enshrined as the model to follow for boys who wanted to
become American men.
In addition to boxing and wrestling, playing at w ar was a frequent pastime, with
re-enactm ents of the Indians W ars a constant. As Rotundo points out “The most popular
imitation o f war was the struggle between settlers and Indians. Boys even relished the
role o f the Indian - assumed by them all to be the more barbarous and aggressive ...

18 Corinne Roosevelt Robinson, M y Brother Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Scribner's,
1921. Page 50.
19 Miller, TR: A Life, p. 48.
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Settler-and-Indian games allowed boys to enter and imagine roles that were played by
real adult m ales."20
"Real adult males" in the late nineteenth century, of course, were involved in
conflicts with Native Americans. Little Big Horn was in 1876; the massacre at W ounded
Knee occurred in late 1890. Teddy him self was not immune to playing at being an Indian
or being a cowboy; as an adult, he spent a great deal o f time in the west, part of it as a
"ranchman" on a ranch he owned in the Dakota badlands, and he cam e to identify him self
as much as a westerner as an easterner. His western experiences led him to feel a kinship
with those A m ericans who had lived on the frontier earlier. As he wrote in the preface to
his four-volum e W inning o f the W est. "[t]he men who have shared in the fast vanishing
frontier life o f the present feel a peculiar sympathy with the already long-vanished
frontier life of the past."21
Roosevelt's relationship with the west was not unique; Am ericans were proud of
the W est, and felt it to be representative of their national culture. M ore specifically, they
believed that American culture was shaped by the A nglo-European frontier experience.
Indeed, as Roosevelt’s close friend Frederick Jackson Turner wrote, "the wilderness
masters the c o lo n ist... It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the
hunting shirt and the m occasin."22 In an interesting confirm ation of T urner’s thesis, TR
had moccasins and a full hunting suit made out of deerskin in the traditional
cow boy/Indian manner; as he told the N ew York Tribune in 1884, when he was 26, "It
would electrify some of my friends ... if they could see me galloping over the plains, day
in and day out, clad in a buckskin shirt..."23
20 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 18.
21 Theodore Roosevelt, The W inning o f the W est. V olum e 1, New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1889. Page 13.
22 Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in Am erican History," in
T he Frontier in Am erican H istory. Tucson: University of A rizona Press, 1986. Page 4.
23 From interview with Roosevelt published in New York Tribune, July 28, 1884.
Q uoted in M orris, Rise of T R . p. 281.
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Roosevelt's western experience was clearly linked to his experience as a boy.
Indeed, his interest in, and desire to go out west was rooted in the knowledge that his
father sent newsboys (from the Newsboy's Lodging House) out west to work on ranches
in order to im prove their health and get them away from the insalubrious city. After the
death o f his first wife, Roosevelt also escaped from the unhealthy East (which had just
claim ed the life of his mother as well), and proceeded to remake him self on a western
ranch.24
W hile out west, Roosevelt continued to transform him self into the man he
believed he needed to be, and to act the way he believed men should behave. A good
exam ple is a fam ous fight he had one night in a saloon, a fight that has since been
enshrined in countless movies and western novels. Out late after lost horses, Roosevelt
stopped in a saloon to get out of the wind. A cowboy, with pistols in each hand, was
firing random shots in the bar, aim ed primarily at the clock. "But," as Teddy writes,
"there was nowhere else to go, and it was a cold night."
As soon as he saw me he hailed me as "Four Eyes,' in reference to my spectacles,
and said 'Four Eyes is going to treat.' I joined in the laugh and got behind the
stove and sat down, thinking to escape notice. He followed me, however, and
though I tried to pass it off as a je st this merely made him more offensive, and he
stood leaning over me, a gun in each hand, using very foul language ... In
response to his reiterated com m and that I should set up the drinks, I said 'Well, if
I've got to, I've got to,' and rose, looking past him. As I rose, I struck quick and
hard with my right ju st to one side of the point of his jaw , hitting with my left as I
straightened out, and then again with my right... W hen he went down he struck
the corner of the bar with his head ... he was senseless. I took away his guns, and
the other people in the room ... hustled him out and put him in the shed. 25

O ther sources testify to the veracity o f Roosevelt's account26; otherwise, this story
would be hard to believe. At the same tim e, though, the tale clearly illustrates how
24 See Miller, TR: A Life, pp. 41, and 162-182, as well as M orris, Rise of T R . pp. 34.
25 Roosevelt, An A utobiography, p. 122.
26 See M orris, Rise o f TR. pp. 2 8 3 -2 8 4 a n d p. 790, n o tes 64 a n d 65. M orris
u n co v ere d in d e p e n d e n t c o rro b o ra tio n o f th e sto ry in an u n p u b lish e d
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Roosevelt altered his character to conform to a specific ideal o f masculinity. The
com bination of boxing, which Roosevelt learned in response to the tauntings of boys
from M aine, and the manly aura of the cowboy which marked his western transformation,
illustrate how the values of 'boy culture' shaped the adult TR.
A nother crucial part of R oosevelt’s relationship with the W est, as well as a central
part o f 'boy culture,' is the fascination with hunting. Roosevelt had an abiding interest in
natural history ; he also had an inordinate fondness for killing animals. The roots of this
extend all the way back to his childhood; the "Roosevelt Museum of Natural History,"
created while Theodore and his siblings were young, was the result o f an attem pt to
master the natural world. Boys like Teddy "who hunted in order to enlarge their animal
collections were learning to subordinate nature to their own acquisitive impulses. These
collections, com m on among Victorian boys, served the habit o f mastery in still another
way. For when a boy named and classified the animals he killed, he was learning to
make nature serve the cause of science."27
In fact, at the time Roosevelt started at Harvard, he had determined that he wanted
to be a scientist, concentrating primarily on natural history; the "Roosevelt Museum" had
become much more than ju st a pastime. In fact Roosevelt's interest had become so
serious, so adult, that his collection numbered in the hundreds, and his biographer writes
that

[e]ven in these early years, his knowledge of natural history was a b n o rm a l... it
was supplem ented, every summer, by long hours of observation of the flora and
fauna around him. The other children noticed that their leader "also led a life
apart from us, seriously studying birds, their habits and their notes."28

a u to b io g ra p h y by W. Roy H offm an in th e collections o f th e T h eo d o re R oosevelt
B irthplace. H offm an was living in th e tow n o f M ingusville, now W ibaux, M ontana
a t th e tim e.
27 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 23.
28 M orris, Rise o f T R . p. 46.
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The shift from natural history as am usem ent to a possible profession was an
indication of Roosevelt's growing maturity, and of the fact that he was leaving boyhood
behind. By his late teens, Roosevelt had become increasingly focused on the life that lay
beyond boyhood, and was prepared for his Harvard entrance exams by a private tutor.
Arthur Ham ilton Cutler, him self a recent Harvard grad, liked "the alert, vigorous
character o f young Roosevelt's mind...[t]he young man never seemed to know what
idleness was ... every leisure moment would find the last novel, some English classic, or
some abstruse book on Natural History in his hand."29
The studying, an intense endeavor that prepared Teddy for exam ination in eight
subjects, naturally cut into the adventures that he and his siblings, cousins and friends
would have. This was also part of "boy culture." "The cares and com m itm ents of
manhood now loomed up before teenage boys. And at first sight, boys approached
manhood eagerly; they were suddenly eager to leave behind them the separate world that
they had guarded so jealously. "30
It is clear that there was an awareness on the part of Roosevelt that 'boy culture'
was evanescent, and that manhood awaited. As Rotundo points out, "boy culture - as
viewed in a certain way - provided a course of training for manhood. It aped many
activities o f adult men, it taught aggressive, self-reliant qualities needed for men's work,
and it helped to provide experience at making constant transitions between the gentle
restraint o f home and the competitive exertions of the all-male world outside."31 This is a
clear echo of the argum ent that Roosevelt made in “The American Boy” - that boyhood
activities "taught me much more than any of my text books,” and taught him what it
meant to be a man.

29 M em orandum by Arthur H. Cutler, in Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Harvard
University. Q uoted in M orris, Rise of T R . p. 75.
30 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 31.
31 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 31.
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In R oosevelt’s case this was true quite literally - Roosevelt did not have an
education like that of W oodrow Wilson, an education in school that was based on the
textbook. Roosevelt mentions the textbook and school experience, how ever, because he
knew that for most young men what finally brought about an end to 'boy culture' was the
school. W hen Roosevelt describes his conception of what the A m erican boy should be,
and how the American boy should behave, he is describing his ow n unique experience to
young men who had a completely different relationship to school and to education.
The prescriptions that Teddy Roosevelt makes at the beginning o f "The American
Boy," then, can be seen as the result of Roosevelt's own experiences - the enduring legacy
o f w hat E. Anthony Rotundo has labeled 'boy culture.' His play with brothers, sisters and
cousins, his physical struggle and final victory over asthma, as well as the com bination of
private tutorials and extensive travel com bined to give him an education he was eager to
have other boys share. In the same way that he com bined the wildness o f the w est with
the refinement of the east in his later political life, in his youth and education Theodore
Roosevelt was able to maintain the rugged collectivist attributes o f 'boy culture' while
climbing the "age-graded ladder of ascent." In this combination, the boy and the man, we
see the genesis of Theodore Roosevelt.
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“To Stand Up M anfully:” Roosevelt And The M onroe Doctrine
The boyhood of Theodore Roosevelt would be of marginal interest if he had not
gone on to become a war hero and President of the United States; while interesting, his
experiences would have served merely as a slightly anom alous case of late-nineteenth
century childhood, a variation on the them e of classic American boyhood.
But Roosevelt did go on to serve as President, and accordingly his boyhood has
been scrutinized for information that can shed light on the form ation o f his policies, both
foreign and domestic. Roosevelt is probably m ost fam ous for his actions in Cuba during
the Spanish American W ar of 1898, and for his larger-than-life role as politician and
President after the “splendid little war” ended. Before he became a household name,
however, Roosevelt was equally interested in politics, and passionate about the foreign
relations of the United States. Roosevelt understood both politics and foreign affairs in
terms o f the code of manly behavior that he had developed as a boy; in fact, this ethic of
manliness extended beyond the personal for Roosevelt. He believed that nations were
like individuals, in their behavior and in their relationships, and should be held
accountable for their actions in the same way that men were.
This relationship between the personal and the national, between foreign policy
and manly behavior can be seen clearly in his writings on foreign policy, which draw on
the same rhetoric of manliness as the essays listed at the beginning o f this chapter.
Plentiful examples o f Roosevelt’s manly policies towards foreign countries can be seen in
his arguments about how the US should deal with the nations o f the Caribbean.
Furtherm ore, an examination of T R ’s Caribbean policies show the lasting im pact that
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R oosevelt’s use o f national masculinity to shape attitudes toward foreign policy have had
on Am erican foreign relations.
R oosevelt’s approach to the M onroe Doctrine m ost clearly illustrates his
intersection of m asculine performance and foreign policy. R oosevelt’s interest in the
M onroe Doctrine as a functional late-nineteenth foreign policy instrum ent dated back to
1895, when Roosevelt was in the beginning of his term as Police Com m issioner of New
Y ork City. Roosevelt had taken the position after serving nearly six years as Civil
Service Com m issioner for the Harrison and Cleveland administrations. During his tenure
in W ashington, Roosevelt had earned the reputation of a hardworking, honest and capable
Com m issioner who would do whatever it took to end governm ent graft.32
On Decem ber 17, 1895 President Grover Cleveland delivered “a message that
ranks as one o f the greatest bombshells ever tossed into the halls C ongress.”33 Infuriated
by British smugness and intransigence regarding a boundary dispute between Venezuela
and British Guiana, Cleveland insisted on the American right to get involved in the
dispute, citing the M onroe Doctrine as his authority. In a message sent to the British
governm ent on July 20, 1895, C leveland’s Secretary of State Richard Olney had stated
that British refusal to arbitrate the dispute was the same as holding territory illegally and
by force, which should be “ regarded as amounting, in substance, to an invasion and
conquest of V enezuelan Territory.”34 Cleveland had him self insisted on highlighting the

32 For a detailed description of this period, see M orris, The Rise o f TR. pp. 395-479; See
also M iller, TR: A Life, pp. 203-227.
33 Robert Beisner, From the Old Diplom acy to the New: 1865-1900. A rlington Heights:
Harlan Davidson, 1986. Page 111.
34 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1895. W ashington: G overnm ent Printing
Office, 1896. Page 562.
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M onroe Doctrine, in order to have a justification to take to the electorate should a war
result and had, prior to its dispatch, copy -edited O lney’s message. 35
The British response arrived on Decem ber 7, and outraged Cleveland. W ith an
arrogant tone, British Prime M inister Salisbury denied the validity of the M onroe
Doctrine, denied its legal standing in international law, and rejected the American
dem and for arbitration.36 Ten days later, an angry Cleveland sent to Congress a request
for authorization to com pose his own boundary commission, for A m erica needed “to
resist by every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests the
appropriation by G reat Britain o f any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction
over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to
V enezuela.” 37
C leveland’s bombshell had immediate repercussions; one o f the im mediate
consequences was a sympathetic explosion of bellicose patriotism from Theodore
Roosevelt. Three days after C leveland’s message, TR wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge that
I am very much pleased with the President’s or rather with O ln ey ’s message; I
think the immense majority of our people will back him. I earnestly hope he will
receive full support from both houses o f Congress ... I do hope there will not be
any back down am ong our people. Let the fight com e if it must; I d o n ’t care
whether our seacoast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.38

35 Beisner. From the Old Diplom acy to the New, p. 110.
36 Beisner. From the Old Diplomacy to the New , p. 111.
37 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1895. p. 545.
38 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, Dec 20, 1895, in Elting E. M orison, ed.,
The Letters o f Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
Page 500.
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R oosevelt also wrote to his brother-in-law, W illiam Sheffield Cowles, a Captain
in the U.S. Navy, who at the time was a naval attache at the Am erican em bassy in
London.
W e are much interested in the outcome of the V enezuelan matter. I earnestly
hope our governm ent d o ’n’t back down. If there is a muss I shall try to have a
hand in it myself! T hey’ll have to employ a lot o f men ju st as green as I am even
for the conquest o f Canada; our regular army is ’n ’t big enough. It seems to me
that if England were wise she would fight now; we could’n ’t get at Canada until
M ay, and meanwhile she could play havoc with our coast cities and sh ipping.39

Clearly, R oosevelt’s first analysis of the situation was that it was one that could
provoke a war; his immediate response, im perialist that he was, was to try and take
Canada. His letter to Cowles is interesting to read, for it was written by Roosevelt, in
America, to an American in England. The use of the word “w e,” for instance, probably
refers to Americans in general, or to the United States. That “ we” includes Roosevelt is
certain - the thirty-seven year old Roosevelt’s discussion of joining the fray him self is
indicative of his enthusiasm for a possible conflict, and foreshadows his own service in
the Spanish-American War three years later.
Roosevelt was moved to write to Cowles to thank him for the gift of four volumes
by Richard Hakluyt; interestingly enough, Hakluyt, who lived from 1551 to 1616, was
the author of The Principal Navigations o f the English Nation, a book that was “often
enough found to be on private bookshelves years ago when England thought o f herself as
im perial.”40 The book has a section on the discovery o f Guiana, by Sir W alter Raleigh in
1595, three hundred years before the current imbroglio. Roosevelt could have had the

39 TR to W illiam Sheffield Cowles, Decem ber 22, 1895, in M orison, ed., Letters of T R .
vol. 1, p. 501.
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book in mind when he wrote, in both letters, o f the British N avy’s presence off the coast
of America.
Though R oosevelt’s first response was an immediate and bellicose patriotism, his
reaction reflected underlying beliefs that he expressed often, namely the im portance of
m asculine performance. Roosevelt's anxiety about the government backing down, and
his desire for action in Canada is evidence o f the importance o f manly behavior on the
international level in Roosevelt's view o f foreign affairs.
R oosevelt makes this clearer in a letter he wrote to the H arvard Crimson on the
same subject. Roosevelt decided to write to the Crimson because of w hat he perceived to
be its lack o f support for Olney and Cleveland. Roosevelt had graduated from Harvard in
1880 and was strongly attached to the college; he had, in fact, ju st attended his 15th
reunion with his friend Henry Cabot Lodge.41 The lack of support for the adm inistration
from Harvard made Roosevelt anxious for the manliness o f the college.
Raising the m atter with Lodge, TR wrote, “I am more indignant than I can say at
the action of the Harvard people. Do you think there would be any harm in my writing to
the Crim son a smashing letter ... giving my views and saying a word for Patriotism and
Americanism; unless I hear from you to the contrary I think I shall send this on. I wish to
at least do what I can to save Harvard from degradation.”42

40 Richard Hakluyt, Voyages and D iscoveries, edited by Jack Beeching, New York:
Penguin Books, 1985. The quote is from B eeching’s Introduction, page 9.
41 See, for example, T R to Lodge, June 16, 1895, in Morison, ed. Letters of T R . vol. 1,
p. 462.
42 TR to Lodge, Decem ber 27, 1895, in Morison, ed., Letters of T R . vol. 1, p. 504.
Roosevelt w asn’t the only one concerned about the masculinity o f H arvard’s students;
see Kim Townsend, M anhood at Harvard: W illiam James and Others. New York: W.W.
Norton and Co., 1996, for a full discussion.
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W hile he may not have been able to save Harvard from degradation, he certainly
gave it the old college try. Arguing that the M onroe Doctrine was applicable to the
current political situation, Roosevelt began to describe the Doctrine itself:
T he M onroe Doctrine had for its first exponent W ashington. In its present shape
it was in reality formulated by a Harvard man, afterwards President o f the United
States, John Quincy Adams. John Quincy Adams did much to earn the gratitude
o f all Americans. Not the least of his services was his positive refusal to side with
the m ajority of the cultivated people of New England and the N ortheast in the
period ju st before the war of 1812, when these cultivated people advised the same
spiritless submission to improper English demands that some o f their intellectual
descendants are now advising. 43

The key, o f course, is that Adams was a “Harvard m an;” the point o f the letter is
to reiterate the connections between the Ivy League, and Harvard in particular, and manly
action in foreign affairs. In this regard, the fact that John Quincy Adams was a Harvard
grad is very much the point - he, at least, knew what it meant to be a man, and he knew
w hat a m an’s foreign policy should be.
Roosevelt continued his letter by making clear what actions should be taken in the
V enezuela affair:

Nothing will more certainly in the end produce war than to invite European
aggressions on American states by abject surrender o f our principles ... If Harvard
men wish peace with honor they will heartily support the national executive and
national legislature in the Venezuela matter; will demand that our representatives
insist upon the strictest application of the Monroe Doctrine; and will farther
dem and that immediate preparation be made to build a really first-class navy. 44

43 T R to the H arvard Crimson, January 2, 1896, in M orison, ed., Letters o f T R . vol. 1, p.
505.
44 ibid, p. 506.
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This letter to the Crimson shows early versions of principles that Roosevelt held
and acted upon when he was Assistant Secretary o f the Navy and then President. In
R oosevelt’s estimation, the Monroe Doctrine was the organizing principle o f Am erican
foreign policy. Enforcement of the M onroe Doctrine would serve as the m eans by which
peace and prosperity would be secured for the United States, in R oosevelt’s view, as well
as serving as the basis for American relations with Europe. As Richard Collin has
pointed out, American diplomacy may have carried weight in foreign capitols, but only
with regard its ow n backyard; the Venezuelan boundary crisis bears this out. The United
States was not a world power when it cam e to having an influence on intra-European
diplomacy. 45
A nother principle Roosevelt stressed in his M onroe Doctrine piece was the need
for a “really first-class navy.” As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt acted, along
with Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan and others, to construct, strengthen and refurbish the
American Navy, in an attempt to develop a tool to aid the achievem ent of American
policy goals. In this regard Roosevelt was successful, accelerating policies that had
begun the Naval build-up before he took his post, and making sure that they were
continued after he left for Cuba.46
A third recurring theme in T R ’s political philosophy, expressed in the M onroe
Doctrine article, was his belief in the importance of A m erican patriotism . Roosevelt was

45 Richard Collin, Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panam a Canal, the M onroe
Doctrine, and the Latin American Context. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1990. Pages 545-546.
46 M uch has been written about Roosevelt and the US Navy; see, fo r exam ple, Kenneth
W immel, Theodore Roosevelt and the G reat White Fleet. W ashington: Brassey's, 1998;
James R. Reckner, Teddv Roosevelt's G reat White Fleet. Annapolis: Naval Institute
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quite vocal about his disdain for what he called “hyphenated A m ericans” who maintained
a cultural allegiance to the nations they had originally em igrated from. As he wrote in
the essay “T rue A mericanism,” R oosevelt welcom ed im m igration, but the im migrant
must “become thoroughly Americanized. M oreover, from our standpoint, we have a
right to dem and i t ... He must revere only our flag; not only m ust it com e first, but no
other flag should even come second.” 47
The initial response to this attem pt at expressing his interpretation o f the M onroe
Doctrine was evidently not what T R had hoped for; it appeared that H arvard’s
degeneracy continued unabated. As Roosevelt wrote to Lodge, “The H arvard
G raduate’s M agazine is now assailing me with the ineffective bitterness proper to beings
whose cult is nonvirility.”48 Roosevelt believed explicitly in the im portance of a
vigorous foreign policy; there was a very strong connection between a policy that
em phasized the importance of the American Monroe Doctrine and manly behavior; proEnglish sympathies, on the other hand grew out of a lack of virility. As an honors
classics student at Harvard, Roosevelt was undoubtedly able to make the connection
between the words virtue and virility; they both stem from the Latin root for man.
A nd then, as quickly as it had blown up, the storm passed; on January 11th, 1896,
the British agreed to negotiation 49 Even as the crisis began to abate, Roosevelt was still
developing his approach to the M onroe Doctrine, and he was as exercised as ever about

Press, 1988; Donald Yerxa, Admirals and Empire: the United States Navy and the
Caribbean. 1898-1945. Columbia: U niversity o f South Carolina Press, 1991.
47 Theodore Roosevelt, “True A m ericanism ,” in American Ideals. New York: G.P.
Putnam and Sons, 1897. The article was originally printed in The Forum, in February
1895.
48 TR to Lodge, January 19, 1896, in M orison, ed., Letters o f T R . vol. 1, p. 509.
49 Beisner, From the Old Diplom acy to the N ew , p. 112
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what he perceived to be the im portance o f the adherence to A m erican foreign policy
principles. As he wrote to Cow les on February 11, 1896,

I agree with you about the V enezuela question. The lesson has been taught by us,
and I think it has been learned by England. If the Englishmen either accept
arbitration or com e to a peaceful settlem ent with V enezuela our point is made,
and hereafter European nations will recognize that the M onroe Doctrine is a living
entity. 50

Roosevelt recognized an im portant point about the establishm ent o f precedent in
international relations. C leveland’s “bom bshell” was the result o f his irritation at the Old
W orld arrogance o f Lord Salisbury; Salisbury had refused to recognize the validity of the
M onroe Doctrine in international law, describing it rather as “a novel principle which was
never recognized before, and which has not been accepted” by any governm ent.51
Roosevelt, however, had perceived accurately that once the M onroe Doctrine was
recognized by a European power, a precedent would be established and the United States
would have scored a major diplomatic victory.
During the month of February, Roosevelt worked on his argum ent, refining his
articulation of the relationship between manly performance and foreign policy; and in
M arch o f 1896 his article “The Monroe D octrine” ran in the m agazine Bachelor o f Arts.
This lengthier exposition of Roosevelt’s views on the Monroe Doctrine bears close
exam ination, for it showed the origins o f what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary
nearly ten years later.

50 TR to Cowles, February 11, 1896, in M orison, ed., Letters of T R . vol. 1, p. 512.
51 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1895. p. 566.
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The article shows the progression of Roosevelt’s com bination o f m anliness and
foreign policy; in his article there is less bellicose warmongering, and a greater emphasis
on individual virtue and responsibility. Roosevelt began the article by stating “ [t]he
M onroe Doctrine should not be considered from any purely academ ic standpoint, but as a
broad, general principle of living policy.” Clearly, Roosevelt saw that the Monroe
Doctrine had a great deal of utility for the future, and that its im portance was not limited
to its history. “ If the M onroe Doctrine did not already exist it w ould be necessary
forthw ith to create it,” Roosevelt continued, for the Doctrine was an essential part of
United States foreign policy. 52 It served to preserve American interests as well as
preventing European meddling in the affairs of nations in the W estern hemisphere. In
this sense, R oosevelt served notice that American policy makers should not be bound by
traditional interpretations o f the M onroe Doctrine, and that other nations would do well to
take it seriously.
The im portance o f the policy aspect of the Doctrine is its separation from
questions o f legal semantics; law and policy, Roosevelt argued, have nothing to do with
one another. “The M onroe Doctrine is not a question of law at all. It is a question of
policy. It is a question to be considered not only by statesmen, but by all good citizens.
Lawyers, as lawyers, have nothing w hatever to say about it.” 53
In addition to separating the species “lawyer” from “all good citizens,” Roosevelt
was also responding to Lord Salisbury’s com m ent that the Monroe Doctrine had not been

52 Theodore Roosevelt, “The M onroe Doctrine,” in American Ideals, pp 246 to 264.
Page 246.
53 ibid., p. 248.
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“ inscribed by any adequate authority in the code o f international law.” 54 The separation
o f law from policy is important, for law is codified and developed, through a legal
process, but policy, as Roosevelt wrote, “is based on national self interest.” 55
A ccordingly, “ [t]o argue that [The M onroe Doctrine] can not be recognized as a principle
o f international law, is a mere waste o f breath.” 56 International law was secondary to a
nation’s ability to promote its national interest; Roosevelt believed that the United States
had the moral right to state the doctrine as policy, as well as the responsibility to back it
up with force, if necessary. This principle would be restated later as “speak softly, but
carry a big stick.”
Roosevelt believed that “ [h istorically ... the position of our representatives in the
Venezuela question is com pletely justified.” The point of the boundary dispute, and the
reason for the political emphasis that was being laid on the Monroe Doctrine, was not
primarily to establish the Monroe Doctrine as an international code. The establishm ent of
precedent has always been important, but Roosevelt believed that the biggest threat was
not the external threat but the internal threat to national security. This threat was posed
by the lack o f national manliness. Standing up to the British, and putting a stop to their
territorial aggrandizem ent, demonstrated that the United States was able to stand up for
itself and was ready to maintain its hemispheric hegem ony; in short to act like a man.
T he political will to prevent the British from acquiring V enezuelan territory rested on the
manly patriotism o f the American citizen; if that manly resolve and love o f country was
lacking, the United States was in trouble.

54 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1895. p. 566.
55 Theodore Roosevelt, “The M onroe Doctrine,” in American Ideals, p. 251.
56 ibid., p. 248.
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“A certain limited number o f persons,” Roosevelt wrote, “ are fond of decrying
patriotism as a selfish virtue, and strive with all their feeble m ight to inculcate in its place
a kind o f m ilk-and-w ater cosmopolitanism. These good people are never men o f robust
character or of imposing personality, and the plea itself is not worth considering.” 57
Roosevelt equated patriotism with virtue, and the love of country with a m an’s love for a
woman. Responding to those who argue that patriotism “will become a needless and
obsolete virtue,” Roosevelt replied that “the man who loves other countries as much as he
does his ow n is quite as noxious a m em ber of society as the man who loves other women
as much as he loves his w ife.” 58
Roosevelt believed that there was a direct relationship between manly behavior
and national behavior; if a nation had citizens who were manly, then that nation was
bound for greatness in the world. A t the same time there was a relationship that can be
expressed in terms more like an analogy. The direct relationship rested on Roosevelt’s
som ewhat Puritan views of democracy, that personal virtue translates into national virtue.
The analogy, on the other hand, argued that in the same way that the best citizen is a man
who is cognizant of his rights and his duty to provide and care for his family, so the best
nation is that which “ is thoroughly saturated with the national idea,” the “most useful
member o f the brotherhood of nations,” and the most responsible to its citizens.59
The use of m asculine and manly imagery in R oosevelt’s writing was not there by
accident; m anliness lay at the heart of his conception of the national mission. The
language o f masculinity as em ployed by Roosevelt was centralContinuing his discussion

57 ibid., p. 251.
58 ibid., p. 251.
59 ibid., p. 252.
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o f the M onroe Doctrine, Roosevelt stressed the importance o f being manly. “No nation
can achieve real greatness,” he wrote, “if its people are not both essentially moral and
essentially manly; both sets o f qualities are necessary.” Roosevelt continued:
It is an adm irable thing to possess refinement and cultivation, but the price
is too dear if they must be paid for at the cost of the rugged fighting qualities
which make a man able to do a m an’s work in the world, and w hich make
his heart beat with that kind o f love o f country which is shown not only in
readiness to try to make her civic life better, but also to stand up manfully
when her honor and influence are at stake in a dispute with a foreign
power. 60
Roosevelt applied this combination of manliness and morality to foreign policy,
and to the M onroe Doctrine in particular, when he wrote that
[t]here are many upright and honorable men who take the wrong side, that is, the
anti-Am erican side, of the Monroe Doctrine ... They are generally men who
undervalue the great fighting qualities, without which no nation can ever rise to
the first rank. 61

R oosevelt’s belief in the importance of manly behavior and physical struggle to
national security was not ju st a rhetorical creation to combat the anonym ous caricatures,
the ‘straw m en,’ that he argued against. He believed in specific manly ideals, ideals that
were pushed at colleges such as Harvard, ideals that grew out of the playing fields o f Ivy
League institutions, but which proved their ultimate worth in rationalizing a vigorous
foreign policy. Though he despaired o f the timid nature of American manhood, he found
it “a relief to remember that the leaders on the side of manliness and o f love of country”
were Ivy League graduates. As Roosevelt wrote in the last paragraph o f his article on the
Monroe Doctrine,

60 ibid., p. 259.
61 ibid., p. 260.
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every believer in the robust qualities o f heart, mind, and body w ithout
which cultivation are o f no avail, must rejoice to think that, in the present
crisis, college men have been prominent among the leaders whose
farsighted statesmanship and resolute love of country have made those of us
who are really Americans proud o f the nation. Secretary O lney is a graduate
o f Brown; Senator Lodge, who took the lead in the Senate on this matter, is
a graduate o f Harvard; and no less than three members o f the Boundary
Com m ission are graduates of Yale. 62
It is hard to imagine that an article that focused on the im portance o f the M onroe
D octrine to American foreign policy would conclude with a listing o f the Ivy League
pedigrees o f American diplomats, yet at the turn o f the century, at Harvard, Yale and
other elite institutions, the academic mission was being revised to include a new stress on
manliness, masculinity and virility.
These qualities were stressed because their importance in their application to
national service. Kim Townsend argues that in the late nineteenth century a new ideal of
manliness cam e to the fore, an ideal that was refined and promoted at Harvard, and to a
lesser extent, at other colleges. In his study M anhood at Harvard. Tow nsend locates a
cadre o f men who went on to play an influential role in the developm ent of the cultural
and political life o f the United States. Among these men is Theodore Roosevelt.
According to Townsend, Roosevelt drank deeply from the well o f manliness
while he was at Harvard, a code that was expressed by H arvard’s President Eliot: “ [t]he
real road to success is through scholarship, and the acquisition o f the power to work hard,
and to endure fatigue and have a steady nerve under intellectual and moral stress.” 63 In
fact, the college had just recently constructed a gymnasium for the promotion o f scientific

62 ibid., p. 264.
63 Townsend, M anhood at Harvard, p. 22.
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physical improvement, but the im provement of the students’ physiques was to go hand in
hand with intellectual and moral improvements.
Theodore Roosevelt took this advice to heart - literally. R oosevelt’s workouts at
the new gymnasium were so strenuous that the athletic director, Dudley Sargent warned
him of the potential damage to his heart. Roosevelt, however, was trying to make himself
a man, a H arvard man, with a specific code of values and a specific code o f behavior.
The legacy of these values can be seen in the manly pronouncem ents that lie behind his
early thinking on the Monroe Doctrine.
For Roosevelt, manly behavior, political leadership and foreign policy were
inextricably linked - one led directly to the other. Just as the Harvard G ym nasium would
help to make Harvard men more manly, national manly action would make the United
States more secure. Harvard reinforced Roosevelt's already strong conviction that
physical exertion, in particular com bat sports such as boxing, were necessary for the
perfection of manliness. On the basis of this education, it makes sense that years later
Roosevelt would embrace the Venezuelan crisis as an opportunity to repair the sorry state
of American manhood. As Roosevelt explained to Will Cowles, his M onroe Doctrine
article “was not aimed at England at all, but at our wretched fellow countrym en who lack
patriotism.” 64
In Roosevelt’s view, the important aspect o f the Venezuelan crisis was not the
boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, and it was not the sudden increase in
tensions between the United States and G reat Britain ; it was the threat posed to

64 TR to Cowles, April 5, 1896, in M orison, ed., Letters of T R . vol. 1, p. 630.
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American national security by “feeble,” “anaemic” and “unmanly” men. 65 Roosevelt’s
gendered language (the US is feminine, political leaders are m asculine), his use of
analogies based on male/female relationships, and his equation o f a vigorous foreign
policy with manly virtue all embody his preoccupation with newly developed codes of
masculine behavior.
Roosevelt was not done with the M onroe Doctrine, though. Years later, after
serving in the Spanish-American W ar and having succeeded W illiam M cKinley as
President, Roosevelt had the occasion to elaborate in 1904 what became known as the
“Roosevelt C orollary” to the M onroe Doctrine, an interpretation that has remained a
cornerstone of US foreign policy.
Speaking to Congress on Decem ber 6, 1904, Roosevelt denied that the United
States had im perialist ambitions in the Caribbean, and stated, “all that this country desires
is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous.” Reiterating the
themes that he had developed nearly ten years before, Roosevelt described those nations
in terms of manly responsibility: “ If a nation shows that it knows how to act with
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and
pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States.” In terms of
Roosevelt’s conception of manliness, if a nation acts like a man it need not fear American
intervention.66
If it does not act like a man should, that is with “decency in social and political
m atters,” if it acts with “chronic w rongdoing,” or an “ impotence which results in a

65 Theodore Roosevelt, “The M onroe D octrine,” in American Ideals, pp. 263, 262.
66 Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates o f the 58th Congress. 3rd Session.
Vol. 39, Part I, p. 19.
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general loosening o f the ties of civilized society” will bring on A m erican intervention. In
fact, R oosevelt stated, A m erican adherence to the M onroe Doctrine dictates that in
“flagrant cases o f wrongdoing or im potence” the US might need to exercise an
“international police pow er.”67
In sum, the “Roosevelt Corollary” holds that if a nation in the W estern
Hem isphere does not act the way that Theodore Roosevelt believed a man should act, the
United States claimed the right to enforce a code of international m asculine behavior, to
shore up the unmanly "impotence" o f the offending nation, and thereby set international
relations on the proper footing again. In short, the United States reserved the right to act
as a manly policeman in order to enforce adherence to Roosevelt's conception of national
manliness.
The m anly performance at stake is identical with the description o f m anliness that
Roosevelt described in his article on the Monroe Doctrine. In 1895, Roosevelt wrote,
“No country will accomplish very much unless it elevates itself. The useful member of a
com munity is the man who first and forem ost attends to his own rights and his own
duties, and who therefore becomes better fitted to do his share in the com m on duties of
all.”68
In 1904 he wrote, “every nation ... which desires its independence, must
ultim ately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the
responsibility o f making good use of it.”69 The two statements, nearly ten years apart, are
connected by the exact same logic: nations are like men, and should therefore behave like

67 ibid., p. 19
68 Theodore Roosevelt, “The M onroe Doctrine,” in American Ideals, p. 261.
69 Congressional Record. Vol. 39, Part I, p. 19.
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men. If they do not behave like men, and act in an “ im potent” manner, or engage in
“w rongdoing,” then the police will need to intervene. The system o f international
relations based on the performance o f national manliness must be upheld.
For Theodore Roosevelt there was no difference between individual manliness
and national behavior. Roosevelt had taken his childhood experiences in ‘boy culture’ to
heart, and they had shaped not ju st his view o f manly behavior, but also his view o f the
world. R oosevelt’s construction o f international relations as manly action writ large
proved to be very powerful. Seductive in its simplicity, its virility, and in its power, the
Rooseveltian model of national manhood soon had many adherents. The next chapter
will discuss some of these advocates of international manly action.
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CH APTER II

“VIRILE, AM BITIOUS, IM PATIENT, M ILITANT M A N H O O D :”
M AHAN, LODGE, BEVERIDGE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY

Theodore Roosevelt was not alone in believing that the tim e was ripe for the
expansion o f American econom ic and political influence, nor in his belief in the
im portance of combining manly behavior with foreign policy. Alfred T hayer M ahan,
Henry Cabot Lodge, and A lbert Beveridge were am ong the many influential individuals
who saw American opportunities in the late 1800s and early 1900s in the same way. This
chapter will exam ine the views of these men and the ways that they argued for a foreign
policy based on a strenuous international masculinity.
Lloyd Gardner, W alter LaFeber, and Thom as M cCormick have described
Roosevelt’s colleagues Lodge, M ahan and Beveridge as “ large-policy im perialists.” By
this label, these historians meant those individuals who believed
that the days of free trade im perialism were o v e r ;... [and] who took the ideology
o f Social Darwinism literally and seriously... Such men lam ented what they
perceived to be the drift to a shopkeeper society, primarily acquisitive, and
dedicated to the cultivation o f the almighty dollar; to a nation that no longer
valued martial valor and national honor, or any other higher purposes; to a nation
gone soft. To them, imperialism (and if need be war) was the kind o f national
purpose to which the whole society could com m it itself, at once uniting the nation
in a com mon cause and stiffening its b ack b o n e.1

1 Lloyd Gardner, W alter LaFeber, Thom as M cCormick, Creation o f the American
Em pire. Chicago: Rand M cNally, 1973. Pages 228-229.
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The acquisition o f an American em pire, these historians believed, satisfied both the
economic and the spiritual, the international and the domestic. M any A mericans,
Beveridge, Lodge and M ahan among them, thought that A m erican im perialism was good
for the world, as well as for the United States, and it was especially good for American
manhood. A closer look at the views o f these men will show that the belief in
im perialism and in American manhood went hand in hand, and that their m asculinist
approach to United States foreign policy was widespread.
The exam ination of these three men is based on several factors. First, all three
were influential members o f the im perialist movement, men who argued passionately and
articulately for the expansion of Am erican influence, military power, econom ic
opportunity and civilization. Second, all three argued for im perialism in the language of
masculinity; they attempted to persuade their listeners with the rhetoric o f manly
performance. Finally, the three men have been chosen because they represent different
generations and hence afford a look at arguments for a foreign policy based on manly
national performance as they change over time.
Alfred Thayer M ahan was born in 1840, and articulated the argum ent for a
powerful U. S. Navy that would enable the creation and maintenance o f an American
Empire. Henry Cabot Lodge was born ten years later, but was a contem porary of
Theodore Roosevelt, and W oodrow W ilson's main opposition during the First W orld War
and the debate over the League of Nations. A lbert Jerem iah Beveridge was born in 1862,
and was a younger advocate o f manly imperialism, and a man who had been influenced
by Roosevelt's articulations of national performance.
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These three men serve as a representative selection of advocates o f a foreign
policy based on the performance of national masculinity. Further, their views help to
illustrate the breadth o f support for the performance model o f international relations, and
the ways in which arguments for such a foreign policy were developed and articulated.
The follow ing chapter will examine the individuals in chronological order.

Alfred Thayer M ahan and the U.S. Navy
A lfred Thayer M ahan was a naval strategist whose rationale for Am erican
imperialism was extremely influential. In his early works, M ahan justified United States
imperialism using the rhetoric of “civilization.” But, as Gail Bederm an has shown, late
nineteenth-century ideas of civilization were often linked to white m asculinity, and in
M ahan’s influential policy papers this link became more and more explicit. In the last
years o f the nineteenth century, M ahan’s rhetoric was replete with the discourse of
national masculinity. M ahan was an ally of Roosevelt’s, though he was much older. By
tracing out the developm ent of an ever more explicit rhetoric of m asculinity in M ahan’s
otherwise unchanging calls for United States expansion, we also trace the developm ent of
the national masculinity that governed twentieth century foreign policy.
Alfred Thayer M ahan was born in 1840 on the campus of W est Point. The son of
the Dean o f Faculty, Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, Alfred grew up in a m ixed academic
and military environm ent, and never really left it. After having spent tw o unhappy years
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at Columbia College, Alfred began at the US Naval A cadem y in Annapolis MD, in 1856
at the age o f 16.2
M ahan did not thrive at Annapolis; indeed, he did not thrive in the Navy at all,
which is rather remarkable for someone who spent his life within its ranks. M ahan was a
dyspeptic individual, given to strong dislikes, mixed with an overbearing arrogance. As
biographer Robert Seager points out, this com bination made M ahan a difficult person to
deal with:

A t the heart of M ahan’s problems at the Naval academy, and at the root of his
later unpopularity among his service peers, was his ill-concealed vanity. The fact
o f the m atter is that he considered his appearance, his mentality, his morality, and
all his own works, ideas, and attitudes to be vastly superior to those o f the
com m on run o f mankind, particularly that segm ent of m ankind he observed in
attendance at the Naval Academy. He could neither understand nor tolerate
anyone who disagreed with him.3

This attitude only grew worse following his graduation from Annapolis in 1859,
for Mahan did not prove him self to be a normal Naval officer. W ith the exception of a
few anxious minutes at the beginning o f the Civil W ar in April, 1861, M ahan was never
involved in a military conflict, and never fired a gun in anger. He was a poor sailor who
“ grounded, collided, or otherwise em barrassed every ship ... he ever com manded. As

2 Here, and elsewhere, I have relied on Robert Seager's definitive biography. Seager has
also edited a three volume collection o f his letters. Both are indispensable for anyone
wanting to write on Mahan. For the biography, see Robert Seager, A lfred Thaver Mahan:
The M an and his Letters. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. See pages 5-12 for his
early childhood.
3 Seager, M ahan, page 27.
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one o f his shipmates in the Chicago later wrote, ‘M ahan had one navigational obsession fear o f collision.’”4
Instead o f learning how to sail, M ahan wrote books on the history and strategy of
naval affairs. This focus set him apart from the rest o f the Navy, and led to the first of
many conflicts with higher-ranking officers which were to dog his career for the duration
of his tenure in the Navy. M ahan was convinced, however, that his main contribution lay
in helping to form ulate new ideas and strategies for the US Navy, and in this he was
trem endously successful, writing one of the m ost influential books of the nineteenth
century. In M ahan’s case, it was certainly true that the pen was mightier than the sword.
Though he served as a Naval officer, a popular lecturer and pre-em inent advocate
of Am erican Naval power, and President of the Naval W ar College from 1886 to 1889
and 1892 to 1893, M ahan was probably m ost influential as the author o f The Influence of
Sea Power upon H istory, which was published in 1890.5 This book argued in favor of
im perialist expansion using the rhetoric o f “civilization” rather than that of masculinity.
M ahan’s basic argument, illustrated by the actions o f the United Kingdom, Germany,
Japan and the United States in the years of em pire building that led up to the First World
War, was that colonial expansion and a large navy were essential to national prosperity in
modern industrial society. Drawing on exam ples from history, M ahan argued that the
continued econom ic health o f the nation required econom ic expansion and the secure
control of commerce. The need to secure com m ercial lifelines necessitated the acquisition
o f colonies, from which follow ed the need for a large national merchant fleet, a large

4 Seager, M ahan, p. 257.
5 Alfred Thayer M ahan, The Influence o f Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1890.
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navy to protect it, and the naval bases and coaling stations which were required to
maintain them both.6
In many ways, M ahan’s arguments were a kind of sea-going “manifest destiny” and his ideas had their greatest im pact in the United States at the very mom ent when
A m ericans were beginning to become anxious about the “closing o f the frontier.”
Indeed, Frederick Jackson Turner, at the end of his fam ous 1893 article, “The
Significance of the Frontier in A m erican History,” wrote that
He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of
Am erican life has now entirely ceased. M ovement has been its dom inant fact,
and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will
continually dem and a wider field for its exercise.7
Turner's conclusion m eshed perfectly with Mahan's expansionist vision.
M ahan’s book created a stir im mediately, though it was in Europe, particularly in
England and G erm any, that it was received most readily. By 1893, M ahan had become
celebrated in England, and while posted in Europe as the Captain of the USS Chicago, he
was able to make many connections with leading men in the Royal Navy and the British
Government. In A merica, however, M ahan's arguments in favor of American expansion
were still controversial, and his argum ent in favor of the proposed annexation of Hawaii
did not win him many supporters within President C leveland’s administration.8

6 See W alter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation o f Expansion. 1860-1898.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1963, pp. 85-95, for a good discussion of M ahan's influence on
shaping w hat LaFeber calls "the ideological consensus" o f the era.
7 Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History,"
originally read at the Am erican Historical Association meeting at the Chicago W orld's
Fair, July 12th, 1893. Reprinted many times, most recently in Turner, The Frontier in
A m erican H istory. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986. Page 37.
8 For reception o f M ahan's book, in the US, England and Germany, see Seager, M ahan,
p. 209-215. For M ahan's connections with European military planners, see pp. 278-281.
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Surveying the international situation in 1893, M ahan perceived that the United
States stood on the brink o f a major national transformation. The overthrow o f the
H awaiian monarchy, and the subsequent request for annexation by the planter
aristocracy, put the United States in a position, M ahan argued, “not unlike, and not less
m om entous than that required of the Roman Senate” when it decided to abandon “the
policy which had confined the expansion of Rome to the Italian peninsula.”9
The decision to annex non-contiguous territory would determ ine the future course
of the United States, M ahan believed. “Let it not be overlooked,” he wrote, “that whether
we wish or no, we must answer the question, we must make the decision. The issue
cannot be dodged. Absolute inaction in such a case is a decision as truly as the most
vehem ent action.” M ahan went on to argue that the decision about the fate of Hawaii will
affect the standing of the United States in world affairs: “we can now advance, but, the
conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance, we recede, for there is
involved not so much a particular action as a question o f principle, pregnant of great
consequence in one direction as another.” 10
M ahan’s statement “ if we do not advance, we recede” encapsulates not only
M ahan’s argum ent, but also the expansionist rhetoric behind Am erican im perialist
foreign policy. Along with such luminaries as Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge and
Theodore Roosevelt, M ahan was part o f a group of men who argued that overseas
expansion was crucial for the future of the United States. Not only were American

For tensions w ith the Cleveland Administration caused by his article on the annexation of
Hawaii, see pp. 248- 253, 268.
9 A. T. M ahan, “Hawaii and our Future Sea Power,” in The Interest o f A m erica in Sea
Power. Present and Future. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1898. Page 33.
10 M ahan, “ H aw aii,” pp. 33-34.
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econom ic interests at stake, but, M ahan believed, the future of civilization hung in the
balance as well. “Comparative religion,” M ahan wrote, “teaches us that creeds which
reject missionary enterprise are foredoom ed to decay. May it not be so with nations?” 11
This anxiety about national decay was central to Mahan's thought. An
exam ination o f M ahan’s “missionary enterprise,” reveals that his argum ents are based as
much on his anxieties about the future of A nglo-Saxon civilization and American
masculinity, as they are about economic expansion and coaling stations. Because
M ahan's arguments were so influential, a consideration o f the masculine, Christian,
Anglo-Saxon roots of M ahan’s expansionist argum ent gives a clearer understanding of
the American im perialist moment of the late nineteenth century.
For Mahan, as for Roosevelt, American civilization, masculinity, AngloSaxonism and imperialism were entwined; each reinforced the other. In the last years of
the nineteenth century, M ahan’s writings began to make this connection more and more
explicit. M ahan and his colleagues believed that the strength of the United States rested
upon the strength, or manliness, of its men. As a result, a threat to m asculinity (and its
related A nglo-Saxonism and Christianity) was by extension a threat to the future security
of the nation. M ahan believed that an em phasis on the personal virtues promoted by the
military would serve to preserve the Anglo-Saxon, Christian, m asculine values that he
saw as fundam ental to the survival o f the United States. Kristin Hoganson argues that

M ahan, “Haw aii,” p. 50.
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M ahan and his colleagues "looked to martial policies to shore up the virile character" of
A merican dem ocracy . 12
W hen M ahan looked out at the world in the late nineteenth century, he saw many
threats to the future well-being of the United States. Among these threats were the
softening of the manly fiber of the nation (what M ahan called the “moral m uscle”) by the
luxuries that industrial civilization produced, as well as the increasingly im portant
political role that A m erican women were playing in American society. Because o f these
threats, M ahan argued in 1893, the United States needed to “retain the masculine
com bative virtues ... erected by so many centuries of courageous battling.” As
Hoganson points out, M ahan believed that naval power was "not only a means to extend
the nation's commercial reach, but also a remedy for male degeneracy."13
For M ahan the solution to America's ills was imperialism. Imperial expansion,
necessary to maintain the economic status quo, would also serve to strengthen the
military, and shore up American masculinity. Correspondingly, any attem pt to weaken
the military resolve of the United States could be catastrophic. As M ahan explained in
1896, "I consider no greater misfortune could well happen than that civilized nations
should abandon their preparations for war and take to arbitration. The outside barbarians
are m any."14

12 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How G ender Politics Provoked the
Spanish American and Philippine-American W ars. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998, p. 37.
13 M ahan quotes are from Alfred Thayer M ahan, “Possibilities o f an A nglo-A m erican
Reunion,” N orth Am erican Review (November 1894), pp. 551-563, quoted in Seager,
M ahan, p. 270. Hoganson, Fighting for American M anhood, p. 36.
14 A. T. M ahan to Col. J. B. Sterling, Feb. 13, 1896, in Seager and M aguire, eds., Letters
and Papers o f Alfred Thaver Mahan. Vol. II. 1890-1901. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1975. Page 446.
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Like many o f his contemporaries, M ahan saw the expansion o f European power
in the period after the Civil W ar as a direct threat to American survival. W ith the Civil
W ar over, American energies could now be directed to meeting and countering the
European threat to Am erican economic expansion. As M ichael H unt points out, in the
period after the Civil War, “the extension of European rivalries into the Pacific, East Asia
and the Americas began to evoke in the United States both alarm and calls for
im itation.” 15 M ahan was one o f those individuals who was both alarm ed and who desired
that the United States expand. More importantly, however, M ahan was able to provide
the rationale for many of his fellow imperialists. This rationale was clear and distinct.
The similarity between this statement and Roosevelt's expression o f "National Duties" a
few years later is remarkably striking.
M ahan’s arguments concerning the link between masculinity, im perial greatness
and naval strength were deem ed prescient in the wake o f the victory over the Spanish
fleet in M anila during the Spanish-American war of 1898. As a result, M ahan was
viewed by people such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge as a prophet of
American expansion. M ahan considered this perception at the very end o f his
autobiography, entitled “From Sail to Steam.”
In direct result from the line of thought into which I was draw n by my conception
of sea p o w e r,... I am frankly an imperialist, in the sense that no nation, certainly
no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy of isolation w hich fitted
our early history; above all, should not on that outlived plea refuse to intervene in
events obviously thrust upon its conscience.16

15 M ichael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy. New Haven: Y ale UP, 1987. Page 36.
16 A. T. M ahan, From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life. New York: H arper and
Brothers, 1907. Pp. 324-325.
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W hen M ahan’s Influence o f Sea Power Upon History was published in 1890, it
caught the attention of policy makers and the foreign policy. Though the book was an
historical study, politicians, government officials and editors of influential journals, were
interested in what M ahan would make o f particular contem porary events. W hen M ahan
wrote to The New York Times in early 1893 concerning the revolution in Hawaii, then, it
was no surprise that the editor o f The Forum asked him to expand on his ideas concerning
American interests in the Pacific. M ahan’s original letter, and his ensuing article, both
provide interesting perspectives on the developm ent o f a rationale for not only for US
control of the Hawaiian Island group, but for Am erican im perialism in general.
M ahan's letter of January 31, 1893 pointed out the im portance of Hawaii's
position relative to China, and stated that “It is a question for the whole civilized world
and not for the United States only, whether the Sandwich Islands, with their geographical
and military importance, unrivalled by that of any other position in the North Pacific,
shall in future be an outpost of European civilization, or of the com parative barbarism of
China.” 17 The problem, Mahan pointed out, is that “China may burst her barriers,
eastward as well as westward, toward the Pacific as well as tow ard the European
continent. In such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous
issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Sandwich Islands by a great, civilized, maritime
pow er.” 18
Mahan repeatedly uses the word civilization; a word, Gail Bederm an has pointed
out, that had a multiplicity of meanings in the late nineteenth century.

“Civilization,”

she writes, “as turn of the century Americans understood it, sim ultaneously denoted

17 Mahan, “Hawaii", p. 31.
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attributes o f race and gender...M iddle and upper class men effectively mobilized
'civilization' in order to maintain their class, gender, and racial authority.” 19
In the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Anglo-Saxon male
preem inence in American society was being challenged by im migration, by
industrialization and wage labor, and by the increasing dominance o f the urban area
relative to the surrounding countryside. These threats to the traditional Jeffersonian ideal
o f the American man caused upper and middle class American men to reassert their
authority through a renewed and energized conception of masculinity.20 Simultaneously,
in the international arena, the imperial contest was accelerating, as G erm any, France,
Japan, and Russia were com peting with G reat Britain and the US for markets and
territory.
For members o f the US foreign policy elite, who were, in fact, middle and upper
class white men, the word “civilization” was used to justify imperialism and international
expansion. For Mahan, in fact, the United States itself was the end result of the progress
of civilization, and the expansion of the US was its clearest example. M ahan’s
com parison of the United States with Rome, quoted earlier, was no coincidence; he saw
many similarities between the American and Roman republics. As he put it,
We have not only occupied our original inheritance, but also, step by step, as
Rome incorporated the other nations of the peninsula, we have added to it,
spreading and perpetuating the same foundation principles of free and good
governm ent.. .And now, arrested on the south by a race wholly alien to us, and on
the north by a body o f states o f like traditions to our o w n ,... we have come to the
sea. In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried our
boundary to the G ulf o f M exico; today maturity sees us upon the Pacific. Have

18 Mahan, “Haw aii,” p. 32.
19 Gail Bederman. M anliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of G ender and Race in
the United States. 1880-1917. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1995. Page 23.
20 See Bederman, M anliness and C ivilization, pp. 1-44, particularly pp. 10-20.
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we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? Are there for us
beyond the sea horizon none o f those essential interests, o f those evident dangers,
which impose a policy and confer rights?21

In this passage, written in 1893, M ahan is not explicit about the masculinity o f the
nation. He does conceive of the United States as man; his tracing out o f the infancy,
youth and maturity o f the nation implies that the U. S. is analogous to a developing man.
But masculinity is not a governing metaphor here. Instead, M ahan’s “missionary
enterprise” rests upon a rhetoric that is more race-based than gender-based. The US,
M ahan argued, could and should expand overseas; it would be good for the United States,
and it would be good for those other areas and peoples upon whom the US could bestow
“free and good governm ent.” Using G reat Britain as an example, M ahan wrote o f “the
world wide pre-em inence held by English speech, and by institutions sprung from
English germs. How much poorer would the world have been had Englishmen heeded
the cautious hesitancy that bids us reject every advance beyond our shore-lines!”22
Am erican im perialism for M ahan meant the spread of A m erican civilization, the
American political system, and, of course, American economic interests. The benefits to
be reaped by this adventure, however, are more than material goods. As M ahan wrote
later, “civilization, in final analysis, means not material developm ent in the external
environm ent, but the personal, and through the personal, of national character.”23
W hat M ahan was getting at becomes clearer as he continues discussing the
opportunities that Hawaii provides to the United States. “It is not, therefore, in

21 M ahan, “H aw aii,” pp. 35-36.
22 Mahan, “H aw aii,” p. 50.
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negligence o f the future [of the peoples o f the Pacific] but in consequence to its immense
im portance to them ,” that the United States should em bark on an expansionist course.
Hawaii represented not only an opportunity for the United States to spread its civilization
and its governm ent to a new territory, but there is an important reason that the US should
engage in this process.
By 1900, when M ahan first drafted “The Problem of A sia,” his reliance on tropes
o f m asculinity and virility had replaced his reliance on the language of civilization. His
concept o f the national masculinity had become explicit:
Nothing more fatal can be devised for the states o f our civilization, and that
civilization itself, than the h a b it... of looking for the solution o f doubts and
adjustm ents o f interest to a central external authority... T he health o f the
com m unity of states, as of the com munity o f citizens, depends upon the vigor of
the individual member ... This virility of national character, born and sustained in
conflict, will ... serve to perpetuate the strong contrasts o f race tem peram ent and
political methods which now exist among us.24

In this passage, M ahan is completely explicit in his valorization o f the “virility of
national character." The discourse of national masculinity has becom e indispensable.
Ultimately, M ahan reasons, the spread of western civilization, of which American
civilization is the most perfect embodiment, has a beneficial effect dom estically because
it requires nations to act in a more manly fashion, because it strengthens the political ties
at home, and because it maintains the contemporary racial hierarchy. M ahan argues for
Am erican im perialism on the grounds that the national "virility" engendered by the
conflict will serve to solidify and unify some of the fragm entation that is occurring in the

23 M ahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies. Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., p. 88. This book grew out of an article that appeared in Harpers, March
1900.
24 M ahan, The Problem of A sia, p. 95.
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American social and political scene in the late nineteenth century. The U nited States has
a manly character, and, when strengthened, that manly character will ensure the nation's
continued survival
As I have discussed in previous chapters, the last years o f the tw entieth century
saw remarkable changes in cultural conceptions o f masculinity. W hen M ahan began to
use explict language of national m asculinity in 1900, he was allying him self with
Roosevelt and many others, all o f whom looked up to him as the “ prophet” of
expansionism. Together, these men turned their belief in the benefits o f manly
performance into a political philosophy that would save the nation. Carl Schurz, a
German-born politician and Civil W ar hero, wrote in H arper’s in 1898 that
a nation needs a war from time to time to prevent it from becom ing effem inate, to
shake it up from demoralizing materialism, and to elevate the popular heart by
awakening heroic emotions and the spirit of self-sacrifice.25

This belief that the performance o f manly acts would revitalize national
masculinity was incorporated into arguments for American expansion abroad as well. As
Josiah Strong wrote in Our Country.
God, with infinite wisdom and skill, is training the Anglo-Saxon race for an hour
sure to come in the w orld’s future ... Then will the world enter upon a new stage
o f its history - the final com petition of races, for which the Anglo-Saxon is being
schooled .. .Then, this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty o f numbers
and the m ight of wealth behind it - the representative ... of the largest liberty, the
purest Christianity, the highest civilization - having developed peculiarly
aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread
itself over the earth.26

25 Carl Schurz, “A bout W ar,” in H arper’s M onthly, M arch 5, 1898, No. 42. Page 219.
26 Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and its Present Crisis. New York: The
A merican Home M issionary Society, 1885. Pages 179-180.
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M ahan was perhaps not as strident as Strong and Schurz. Like them, however, he
was an im perialist, and like them he saw the United States as the culm ination of centuries
of progress. Consequently, the United States had the responsibility to help the rest of the
world advance along the path of civilization. As M ahan wrote in 1898, "I believe the
United States has duties to the world outside, as well as to herself - that in a general way
the extension o f 'Anglo-Saxon' control is a distinct benefit to the w o rld ." 27
In addition, and this is perhaps where M ahan is the m ost like Strong and Schurz,
he saw American men as the ultimate Anglo-Saxons, the preservers and extenders of
western civilization. The race o f Anglo-Saxons, M ahan wrote,
has proved its vitality and its worth by continuous existence and consistent
d ev elo p m en t... This type, by its virile power o f adaptation, has not only
predominated over, but absorbed and assimilated all other social and racial types
with which it has been brought into political association ... To the full expression
o f this political force, great alike in its nobility and its vitality, the United States
owes to mankind her due contribution; for in it is one o f the greatest hopes
the greatest hope o f humanity.28

For Alfred Thayer Mahan, then, an expansionistic foreign policy afforded the virile men
of the United States the opportunity to mold and direct the future o f the world.
M ahan’s view of the world in 1893 led him to advocate an im perialist foreign
policy, and his argum ent for imperialism was based on a belief rooted not only in
economic interests, but also in the im portance o f expanding western civilization.
Civilization, M ahan was convinced, would not long continue to exist w ithout virile,
manly proponents.

27 A. T. M ahan to Unidentified Addressee, M ay 29, 1898, in Seager and M aguire, eds.,
Letters and Papers o f Alfred Thayer M ahan. Vol. II. pp. 557-558.
28 M ahan, The Problem o f A sia, p. 194.
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T he transform ation o f American foreign policy in the years between
Reconstruction and W orld W ar One rested upon new conceptions o f national mission and
the performance of masculinity on the international stage. Alfred Thayer M ahan and his
expansionist colleagues were successful in shaping the foreign policy that brought the
United States into the twentieth century, and onto the world stage, and this did not
happen by accident, but by plan. As M ahan wrote in 1893, the annexation of Hawaii, and
the principle o f expansion that it represented, would be “fruitful o f many future acts,” and
“pregnant of great consequences in one direction or the other.” In this, M ahan was more
correct than he could possibly have realized.

Henry Cabot Lodge and the Lessons of History
If Alfred Thayer M ahan was the “ prophet” o f national m asculinity, in whose
policy statements we see the gradual developm ent of an expansionist creed based on
m asculine performance, Henry Cabot Lodge was its major proponent in U. S. foreign
policy. Lodge and his friend Theodore Roosevelt shared a sim ilar view o f the world and
of the im portance of the American role in it. The United States, both believed,
represented the future o f civilization, and, as W illiam W idenor points out, Lodge “ came
to attach a special significance to international relations and to see reflected therein
forebodings o f the very rise and fall o f civilizations.”29
Lodge was born in 1850, into a fam ous and prestigious fam ily o f Boston
Brahmins. Like Roosevelt, Lodge attended Harvard and excelled at the study o f history,
continuing to study with Henry Adams even after earning his BA in 1871. Lodge earned
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a law degree in 1875, and his Ph.D. in history in 1876 (after writing a thesis on AngloSaxon land law), one o f the three first Ph.D.s granted in history in the United States.
Though he gained adm ittance to the M assachusetts bar in 1876, Lodge continued his
association with Harvard and Adams after being aw arded his doctorate, serving as an
instructor o f American history. Lodge also served as an editor o f the North Am erican
Review, assisting Adams, during the years 1873-1876.30
Am erican history, for both Adams and Lodge, was the study o f the developm ent
o f the Am erican nation, in particular the spread o f Am erican principles from their
beachhead at Plimouth. Lodge developed this argum ent in his Studies in H istory,
published in 1884, where he wrote that “We m ust study the past, and learn from it, and
advance from what has been already tried and found good ... But we cannot enter upon
t h a t ... road until we are truly national and independent intellectually, and ready to think
for ourselves, and not look to foreigners in order to find out w hat they think.”31
American history, Lodge believed, was an academ ic discipline which served as the basis
for the continued development of the American national project and hence of American
patriotism.
Lodge took his cue in this regard from Francis Parkman, him self a Boston
Brahmin, and a patrician historian. Parkm an’s histories o f the British, French, and Native
Americans in North America, am ong them The Oregon Trail (1847. 1849) and The
Conspiracy o f Pontiac (1851) stressed the im portance o f manly performance to those who

29 W illiam C. W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign
Policy. Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1980. Page 12.
30 For Lodge's graduate studies at Harvard, see John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A
Biography. New York: Knopf, 1953, pp. 37-39.
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have shaped the course o f A m erican history. Indeed, Parkm an’s focus on native
Americans, and on the role they played in early American history, provided Lodge with a
similar outlook tow ard Filipinos and Am erican expansion in the Pacific.
Lodge believed that Parkman “represented all that was virile, natural, clearthinking, and strong” - attributes that could be derived from w hat Roosevelt was later to
call “the strenuous life.” Lodge made this connection explicit when he dedicated his
1892 book Historical and Political Essays to Parkman, "in token o f admiration for his
great w ork as an A m erican historian, and for his character as a man."32 History and
manliness were related for Lodge; Lodge (as well as Roosevelt, who wrote the
expansionistic W inning of the W e s t) believed that the study of history not only required
a manly resolve, but also served to inculcate manly ideals in others. A good example of
this kind of history is the volum e he co-wrote with Roosevelt, Hero Tales from American
H istory; the book even has a chapter on Parkman that stresses Parkm an’s manly
qualities.33
Manly qualities were crucial to the men of Lodge’s generation, because they were
afraid that such characteristics were in the process of disappearing. Lodge’s biographer
argues that Parkm an was im portant to Lodge because he was “living proof that an
aristocracy still had a role to play, and that there survived among some o f its members
those strong, manly, aggressive, and courageous qualities ... which Lodge’s generation

31 Henry Cabot Lodge, Studies in H istory. Boston: Houghton, M ifflin & Co., 1884.
Pages 364-365.
32 Henry Cabot Lodge, Historical and Political Essays. Boston: Houghton M ifflin and
Co., 1892.
33 See Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, Hero Tales from American H istory.
New York: Century, 1895.
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so yearned to resuscitate.”34 Parkman and his histories, Lodge argued, presented an
alternative to “that pallid and em asculate scholarship, of which New England has had too
many exam ples.” In a nation that was changing rapidly due to the forces o f immigration,
urbanization, econom ic expansion and even the W om en’s Suffrage M ovement,
Parkm an’s exclam ation that “for the student there i s , ... no better com panion than the
rifle or the oar” was decidedly backwards looking, and had great appeal to Lodge.35
Both Lodge and Roosevelt took Parkm an’s exhortation to heart, and lived out
what T R later called the “strenuous life.” Lodge, for example, kept in shape through
active horseback riding, because he believed that “for the developm ent of nerve, energy
and courage, so useful in the affairs o f life, and so pre-eminently valuable to a people
called to arms ... no sport can equal riding on horseback.”36 Lodge’s conviction that the
A merican people were “called to arm s” led to more than Lodge’s own performance of
m asculine deeds, however; it led him to em brace what he described as the “savage
virtues” that were so necessary for national survival.
It may seem ironic that Lodge, who was so concerned about the survival of
A m erican civilization in the face of challenges from those he considered less civilized,
should em brace savagery. But, as Lodge explained, “These primary or ‘savage virtues’
make states and nations possible, and in their very nature are the foundations out of

34 W idenor, H enry Cabot Lodge . p. 15; see also Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 4, for
family history, and view of Civil W ar patriotism.
35 Lodge and Roosevelt, Hero T ales, p. 140.
36 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 19, 1908, in Elting M orrison, ed^
T he Letters o f Theodore Roosevelt, vol. VI, pp. 1135-36.
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which other virtues have arisen. If they decay, the whole fabric they support will totter
and fall.”37
Lodge, like M ahan and Roosevelt, believed that the rise of the United States was
due to the virile nature o f Anglo-American men, but was concerned that the primary
virtues o f strength, determination, and courage were being weakened by the advancement
o f civilization and its inducements to softness and luxury. The trick then, was to find the
proper balance between savagery and civilization within the A nglo-A m erican man; the
future o f the nation depended on it. Anglo-American men needed to be civilized enough
to maintain the future progress o f the nation, but also savage enough to perform those
m asculine acts that would maintain national preeminence. The balance harkens back to
the conception of ‘boy culture,’ in which young men find themselves balancing the
genteel world of their mothers, with the violent and anarchic world o f boys. In Lodge’s
case, we can substitute the world of the home and o f mother with his fear o f the
effem inacy brought about by too much education. Similarly, the world of boy culture can
be substituted with the much more manly role of em pire building. As the long drawn out
conflict in the Philippines was to demonstrate, there was no shortage o f the savage in the
em pire builders o f 1898.
Lodge, like Roosevelt and Mahan, believed that he understood the lessons that
history had to teach him, and was convinced that the study of Am erican history revealed
the im portance of m anliness and masculinity to the advance of the United States. The
study o f international relations, on the other hand, was the study o f the rise and fall of

37 Henrv Cabot Lodge. A Fighting Frigate, and Other Essays and A ddresses. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Page 21.
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civilizations. The relationship between the two fields of study, o f course, was the notion
o f manly resolve - as the man is to the nation, so is the nation to the world.
In the book they wrote together, Lodge and Roosevelt lay out what the importance
o f manliness is for the country. Hero Tales from American History is a collection of
brief biographies that were written to serve as exam ples to young Am erican men. As the
introduction to the book explains, Lodge and Roosevelt admired those men “ who joined
to the stern and manly qualities which are essential to the well-being o f a masterful race
the virtues of gentleness, o f patriotism, and o f lofty adherence to an ideal.”38 Why are
these men heroes? They are heroes because they performed their masculinity.
Lodge is very clear about the importance o f the performance of manly acts.
Admirable American men had a certain “ character” that enabled and encouraged them to
do great things. An essential part of character was the drive to action; a man of
“character” was not happy to sit still, for character could not be tested by sitting in an
armchair. As Lodge explained in his chapter on Charles Russell Lowell (another
Bostonian), “ better and finer than a mere id e a lis t... was a man of action, eager to put his
ideals into practice and bring them to the test of daily life.”39 To reiterate, the “ man of
action,” who performed his role as a man, who put his ideals into practice, was better
than a man who merely developed the ideas. It was one thing to think, but true manliness
lay in the performance of the act.
Both Lodge and Roosevelt believed that the men of the United States had come to
a crossroads in the late 19th century. A t the same time that the United States was
becom ing more economically stable and secure, the frontier and the related westward

38 Lodge and Roosevelt, Hero T ales, p. ix.
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expansion were coming to an end. The result was a generation o f m en who were content
to relax on their father's laurels, they believed, and who focused more on living the good
life than the strenuous life. The previous generation had risked their lives on the
battlefields o f the Civil W ar to preserve the nation - what was required for the new
generation was a struggle o f sim ilar proportions that would distract young men from their
smug m aterialism and bring out the best of their American manhood. They needed to
perform manliness, and the proper arena for this test of m asculinity was all that was
needed.
As a biographer of Lodge has pointed out Lodge and Roosevelt “em braced a
vigorous foreign policy, and later imperialism, in the hope that it would do an
‘incalculable am ount’ for American character.”40 In addition, as Kristin Hoganson has
argued, the issues facing the United States at the turn of the century were not simply
economic, nor even military - they were primarily psychological and em otional 41
Similarly, W illiam W idenor argues that both both Roosevelt and Lodge believed that the
problems that the United States faced "were those of the soul, and both great power status
and imperialism were seen as instruments of salvation.”42 Theodore Roosevelt laid this
out clearly in a letter from December, 1899, that he wrote to his close friend Cecil Spring
Rice, who was also the British Ambassador: “ I believe in the expansion o f great nations.

39 Lodge and Roosevelt, Hero T ales, p. 227.
40 W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 83.
41 Hoganson, Fighting for American M anhood, pp. 8-13, and footnote 14, on pp. 210214.
42 W idenor, Henrv Cabot Lodge, pp. 83-84.
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India has done an incalculable am ount for the English character. If we do our work well
in the Philippines and the W est Indies, it will do a great deal for our character.”43
Strengthening American masculinity lay at the heart of the im perial project for
Roosevelt and Lodge, just as it was for Mahan. M ore important than the economic
incentives so evident in the establishm ent of colonies were the benefits that imperialism
would provide the United States, particularly with regards to its manhood. Lodge, M ahan
and Roosevelt “had great plans. They hoped to make of American im perialism a model
im perialism, an agent o f international reform and a means of elevating the tone of
A m erican life.” 44 As M ahan explained to Lodge in 1899 in a letter o f congratulation
after the ratification of the Treaty o f Paris ending the Spanish-A m erican War, American
im perialism will prove "beneficial to the world and honorable to ourselves,” by providing
Am erican men with a challenge that will force them to shake off their lassitude, and
em brace their latent masculinity. "I try to respect, but cannot," M ahan w ent on, men who
try to extend self-governm ent "to people in the childhood stage o f race developm ent."45
Training colonized peoples in the art of self-government, how ever paradoxical
that may sound, was a project that Lodge believed could save the United States from
becom ing a larger version o f Holland or Switzerland, a country that hid “a defenceless,
feeble body within a huge shell.”46 W hat would keep the body politic from becoming
flabby, accordingly, was the maintenance of the balance between the civilization that the

43 Elting M orrison, ed., The Letters o f Theodore Roosevelt. Vol. II. Cam bridge: Harvard
University Press, 1951. Page 1104.
44 W idenor. Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 113.
45 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Henry Cabot Lodge, February 7, 1899, in Seager and
M aguire, eds.. Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer M ahan. Naval Institute Press, 1975.
V olum e 2, p. 627
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United States (and Boston in partcular) represented, and the "savage virtues" which were
necessary for national health. Taking on the manly role o f colonizer, and tempering it
with the selfless goal o f preparing the colonized for self-governm ent, would allow
A m erican men to serve their country in the best possible fashion - by giving them a place
to perform their masculine duties, and thereby reinvigorate national energy.
For Lodge, Roosevelt, and M ahan this was a simple equation: American men plus
imperial mission equals national greatness. Am erican manliness, in decline due to the
softening effects of modern society, held the key to the future prosperity, indeed survival,
o f the United States. The key to reviving the strain o f m asculinity which was so
im portant to the founding of the United States, and perhaps even more so during the Civil
W ar, was Am erican imperialism; a virile foreign policy would bring the nation into
contact with peoples who would serve as newer versions of the native Americans who
had forced the colonists to organize and define themselves.
An imperialistic foreign policy, Lodge believed, was the key to saving the United
States from decline, and at the heart of this im perialism was the manliness of action. The
perform ance o f American masculinity was the key to the future survival o f the United
States.

A lbert J. Beveridge - “A Young A ttila”
A lbert Jerem iah Beveridge was a senator from Indiana who was celebrated (and
sometimes mocked) for his remarkably bombastic oratory in favor o f the ideals of
national masculinity. Beveridge saw the issue of the Philippines in much the same way

46 Henry Cabot Lodge, editorial in Boston Herald, N ovem ber 1, 1899. Quoted in
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as Lodge and Roosevelt did, and he took every opportunity to express his views. It is
im portant to exam ine his public speeches because of their notoriety and their persuasive
power. A t least rhetorically, Beveridge went further than Roosevelt or any of his peers in
advocating for a very aggressive version o f national masculine perform ance; his speeches
dem onstrate the prevalence and the popular success o f using national m asculinity as a
frame for an expansionist United States foreign policy.
Bom in Indiana in 1862, Beveridge was part o f the generation that adm ired the
men who served in the Civil W ar without actually having a chance to em ulate them.
Beveridge later recalled that his first memory was of soldiers returning home from the
Civil War, am ong them his own father; he wrote that those soldiers had “ learned on the
field o f battle the qualities of each other’s character and the purity o f each other’s
purposes.” Character, for Beveridge as well as Lodge, was evidence of manhood. As
Kristin Hoganson points out, “ Beveridge regarded soldiers as models of manhood in an
age when, he thought, manhood could not be taken for granted.”47
Beveridge had come to believe in the traditional masculine virtues through
personal experience. He had endured a childhood of poverty, and had put him self
through school by working as a hired hand on farms and in logging operations. After
graduating from High School, and narrowly losing a com mission to W est Point,
Beveridge was able to begin at Indiana Asbury University only through the intercession
of a lum berman for whom he had worked, and who loaned him fifty dollars. Beveridge

W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 114.
47 Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, p 146.
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went on to do well at Indiana Asbury, soon renamed DePauw University, and though he
continued to have money problems, he graduated with honors in 1885.48
Beveridge w ent on to take the Indiana bar exam in 1887 and built a successful law
practice in Indianapolis, attracting national attention and offers o f partnership in major
law firms. Replying that “I don’t want to be rich, I have other am bitions,” Beveridge
made it clear that he was focusing on a career in politics. The law, Beveridge believed,
was the precursor to a political career, and while building his practice, Beveridge took
every opportunity to cam paign for Republican candidates. The G rand O ld Party, the
party o f Lincoln, the party of Union which his father had fought for, represented the
ideals that Beveridge held.49
Beveridge saw the GOP as the defender o f sound money policies and the upholder
o f property rights and free enterprise. Beveridge also saw the Republican party as the
guarantors and supporters of those personal qualities that had made it possible for his
own rapid success. As John Braeman points out, "[t]he swiftness o f his own rise had
confirm ed for Beveridge that any man with the proper qualities could win fortune and
that poverty reflected personal faults - idleness, drunkenness and vice - rather than social
il ls ." As he said to the crowd at a campaign stop,
Down with the dem agogic cry against wealth - 1 am in favor o f everybody being
rich ... A nd if we cannot all be rich I am in favor of as many being rich as
possible.50

48 For good biographies o f Beveridge, see John Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge: American
N ationalist. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1971, and Claude G. Bowers,
Beveridge and the Progressive Era. New York: The Literary Guild, 1932. For
Beveridge's childhood see Bowers, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 1-30
49 Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 9, 20. For Beveridge's law career, see Bowers,
Beveridge, pp. 31-44.
50 Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 20.
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Beveridge was a talented public speaker whose powers o f oratory made him an
im portant cam paigner in Indiana, and he was able to acquire some valuable connections
and experience cam paigning for GOP candidates. A t the same time, Beveridge was
finding a platform o f his own. Spurred by the economic crisis o f 1893, and then even
more by the Spanish Am erican W ar o f 1898, Beveridge came to em brace the rhetoric of
im perialism and expansion.
Though he was an exponent of manly action, Beveridge did not serve in the
Spanish American War; his request for a battlefield com mission was turned down.
Beveridge wanted to fight. "I do not care to go in at all," he wrote to W ashington,
"unless I can go in for actual service in the field, for actual out-and-out warfare." Having
no desire to serve as a mere "carpetbag soldier," Beveridge pursued governm ent office
seeking instead to have a say in how the United States’ new em pire should be structured
and r u n .51
To that end, Beveridge sought support from the Indiana Republican Party for a
run at the Senate, and kicked off his campaign in September o f 1898. There was more
than m ere opportunism, in his timing, however; the political career o f A lbert Beveridge
was, in fact, inextricably linked to the turn-of-the-century conception o f Am erican
imperialism and expansion.52
A good place to see this link is in the speech that Beveridge gave to declare his
candidacy. The speech itself was well received, and helped make the 37 year old
Beveridge a well known figure in Indiana. In this speech Beveridge m akes the link

51 Bowers, Beveridge, p. 67.
52 Bowers, Beveridge, pp. See also Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, pp. 26-27.
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between im perialism and Anglo-Saxon masculinity explicit, and he em phasizes, time and
again, the role that manly action must play in US foreign policy.
A fter beginning his speech, “The M arch o f the Flag,” with a description o f the
glories of American progress, Beveridge asks a question, “an A m erican question. It is a
world question. Shall the American people continue their resistless march tow ard the
commercial supremacy of the w orld?”53 The answer Beveridge anticipated was, of
course, a vehem ent “yes.” But after taking his argum ent through the history o f American
expansion, and touching upon the recent arrival o f Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba and
Puerto Rico in the American orbit, Beveridge asked another question.
W hat does all this mean for every one of us? It means opportunity for all the
glorious young manhood of the Republic, - the most virile, am bitious, impatient,
militant manhood the world has ever seen. It means that the resources and the
com merce of these immensely rich dominions will be increased as much as
Am erican energy is greater than Spanish sloth; for A m ericans henceforth will
m onopolize those resources and that commerce.

This quote is remarkable in its com bination of A nglo-Saxonism , im perialism and
masculinity, and yet it is typical Beveridge; there are many such passages in “The March
of the Flag,” and indeed it is these sections that resonated with B everidge’s audience.
The speech was reprinted in the Indianapolis Journal on Septem ber 17, 1898, and the
state Republican party sent 300,000 copies around the mid-west. Beveridge him self
found that his particular take on imperialism made a good platform, and he dedicated all
his campaign speeches to the subject.54

53 A lbert J. Beveridge, “M arch of the Flag,” in Andrew and Zarefsky, eds., American
Voices: Significant Speeches in A m erican History. 1640-1945. W hite Plains: Longmans,
1989. Pages 374-378. Page 377.
54 Bowers, Beveridge, p. 73-78.
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Beveridge won election narrowly, defeating the candidate o f another faction
within the Republican party only after 12 ballots in the Indiana General Assembly.
Despite the conditions of his election, Beveridge was confident about the future. Taking
stock after his election, Beveridge decided to build on the success o f his stump speeches,
and continue to speak on the topic o f im perialism and expansion when he reached the
Senate. This tactic would enable him to continue to build on the success he had made
before the election, as well as advertising his ability to deal with foreign policy issues to
his colleagues in the Senate. There was a vacant seat on the Senate Foreign Relations
committee, and Beveridge hoped to get it. Beveridge was incredibly am bitious; having
ju st won election to the Senate, he was already thinking about the White House, and he
saw foreign policy form ulation as the first step towards winning the renown that would
take him th e re .55
Before going to W ashington, therefore, Beveridge made a trip to the Philippines
in May of 1899 in order to acquaint him self with the conditions there, as well as to turn
him self into an expert on the topic - expertise that would belie his youth and
inexperience in international affairs. Upon his return in August, Beveridge consulted
with President M cKinley in W ashington and made the rounds in the capitol, trying to
round up the support necessary to win the com m ittee assignments he hoped for. In the
process, B everidge’s arrogance and strenuous self-promotion became apparent, and he
dam aged his reputation. M cKinley agreed, believing that Beveridge had hurt “his

55 Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 42, and Bowers, Beveridge, pp. 66-73.
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standing here by his unwise methods o f securing recognition,” and adm itted that
Beveridge was “som etim es tiresom e.”56
B everidge’s tireless trumpeting o f his ow n abilities backfired; he did not get the
seat on the Foreign Relations Comm ittee, though he was assigned to the Comm ittee on
the Philippines as compensation. W hile this was a setback, Beveridge forged ahead with
his plan for national political recognition. The key, he believed, was a brilliant speech
that would define and clarify the argument over expansion, and bring glory to him self
and his ideas. As John Braeman explains,
Statesmen o f the past, so Beveridge had been taught, had shaped the nation’s
destiny by flights o f eloquence on the floor o f the Senate. And so he hoped to
fulfill his dream of guiding A m erica’s colonial policy by exploiting his trip in a
m ajor speech on the Philippines.57

B everidge’s Senate speech, like “The M arch of the Flag,” was a masterpiece of
im perialist rhetoric. Beveridge’s first ever speech in the Senate, it has been widely quoted
since and cited in numerous American history textbooks and docum ent readers, including
foreign policy textbooks.58 The speech, given in support of a resolution that Beveridge
him self had put forw ard, was delivered on January 9th, 1900, and served for many as an
introduction to the young Senator from Indiana.

56 Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 43. For more on the Philippines trip, see Bowers,
Beveridge, pp. 97-109.
57 Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p. 44.
58 See, fo r exam ple, Merrill and Paterson, eds., M ajor Problem s in A m erican Foreign
Relations. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), Fifth Edition, Vol. 1, p. 385. In addition,
as of January 2004, G oogle listed 408 references for the speech.
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T he speech attracted national attention. “ [Tjwas a gr-reat speech. T'w as a speech
ye cud waltz to,” said Finley Peter D unne’s “Mr. D ooley”,59 while The Springfield
Republican wrote that Beveridge “talked like a young Attila com e out o f the W est.”
Continuing, the paper wrote that “ if his A m ericanism is the true brand, then indeed is the
Republic no m ore.” Naturally, Theodore Roosevelt loved the speech, and the Republican
National Com m ittee ordered up a million copies to be distributed n atio n ally .60
Them atically, the oration covered the same ground as ‘T h e M arch o f the Flag,”
and followed the same argument, an argum ent which Beveridge laid out at the very
beginning: “The Philippines are ours forever, ‘territory belonging to the United States
forever,’ as the Constitution calls them. And ju st beyond them are C hina’s illimitable
markets. We will not retreat from either.”61
Beveridge viewed the recent acquisition of the Philippines as the solution to the
requirements of the Am erican econom y, as well as an opportunity for Americans intent
on exploiting the greater wealth of China. But even more important, the American
imperial, expansionistic project could solve the problem of what to do about American
men. These men, “the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhood the world has
ever seen,” to quote B everidge’s previous speech, were in the process o f becoming weak
and effeminate. The stern duties of empire, the “white m an’s burden” as Kipling warned
Am erican policy m akers, required men of a certain character.

59 Finley Peter Dunne, "Young Oratory," in Mr. Dooley's Philosophy. New York: R. H.
Russel, 1902. Pages 129-133; quote is on p. 131.
60 Bowers, Beveridge, p. 123-125; Braeman, A lbert J. Beveridge, p 45-47.
61 For the full text of the speech, see Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 704-712.
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The question o f the Philippines, Beveridge agreed, was not merely a question of
policy, o f expansion, or o f economics. Rather,
this question is deeper than any question of party politics; deeper than any
question o f the isolated policy o f our country even; deeper even than any question
o f constitutional power. It is elemental. It is racial.
For Beveridge, the issue of American expansion in general, and the Philippines in
particular, was a m atter of the westward spread o f Anglo-Saxon culture and power. This
was a beneficial thing, not merely for the Philippines and other areas that would come
under A m erican control, but it was also good for the United States itself, in that the US
would be acting out the will o f God.
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a
thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self
adm iration. No! He has made us the master organizers o f the world to establish
system w here chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit o f progress to overwhelm
the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adept in government
that we may adm inister government among savage and senile peoples.
These “savage and senile peoples,” were, of course, the Filipinos, who had
em barked on their own liberation before the United States intervened in 1898. Led by
Em iliano Aguinaldo, a com m itted Filipino force had struck the first blows for
independence long before Admiral Dewey allowed Mr. Gridley to com m ence firing on
the Spanish ships in M anila Bay. Following the collapse of the Spanish military in the
Philippines, the United States supplanted the form er colonial power and stepped in to
adm inister its new possession. This assumption of control, Beveridge argued, was
absolutely essential, not ju st for the Philippines, but also for the future of the American
race:
W ere it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and
night. And o f all our race, He has marked the American people as his chosen
people to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission
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o f A merica, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness
possible to man. We are trustees of the w orld’s progress, guardians of its
righteous peace. The judgm ent of the M aster is upon us: ‘Ye have been faithful
over a few things; I will make you rule over many things.’62

It was G od’s will, Beveridge believed, that the United States should take control
of the Islands in order to continue civilization’s progress. Because the US was chosen by
God, it had no choice but to stoop to conquering. American control would be a boon for
the Filipinos as well, for American political institutions would help to im prove and
prepare the effem inate Filipinos for self-government. As Beveridge was to write later,
‘T h e purpose o f our institutions is to manufacture manhood.”63 A m erican institutions,
exported to the Philippines, would do the same social work for the Filipinos that the
A m erican governm ent had done for Americans, that is, make men.
These quotes from Beveridge’s first speech in the Senate show the extent to
which Beveridge com bined US foreign policy with American masculinity, and how he
argued for the performance of manly duties in the service of empire. Like Theodore
Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Beveridge believed that the
US needed to act on the global stage the way a man should act in modern American
society.
The only problem with this equation was Beveridge’s fear (shared by Henry
Cabot Lodge) that American men were not up to the task. In fact, the irony was that
changes in the very American institutions that Beveridge praised may actually be causing
the "weakness" the he thought he saw. The "enervation" Beveridge saw was due not only

62 Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 704-712.
63 A lbert J. Beveridge, The Young Man and the W orld. New York: D. A ppleton and Co.,
1905.
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to the changing nature o f American society, which was becom ing more urban, more
industrial and more diverse (there were few er men hewing lumber, for exam ple), but
Beveridge was also anxious about the increasing influence of women, who were
them selves beginning to claim a larger role in American society. This anxiety over the
increasing effem inacy o f men concerned imperialists, for they saw in male decline the
beginnings o f the end o f American supremacy. Since the nation was dependent upon the
manly characters of American men, a weakness, or a faltering, in the manhood of
American men would have disastrous consequences for US foreign policy.
The connection between the responsibilities created by A m erican overseas
expansion and the fear o f male decline led Beveridge to author a thick volum e o f some
400 pages titled The Young Man and the W orld. In those pages, Beveridge hoped to
present the youth of A m erica with some guidelines to live their lives by so that their
“character” would be firm ed up. The book itself is divided into chapters with titles such
as “The Young Man and the Nation,” “The World and the Young M an,” “G reat Things
Y et to Be Done,” “The Young Lawyer and his Beginnings,” and “The Young Man and
the Pulpit.”
Like R oosevelt’s writings aimed at boys and young men, B everidge’s book seeks
to inculcate a particular set of virtues. In the preface to the volume, Beveridge points out
that the book is actually a collection of articles written for the Saturday Evening Post, the
first o f w hich was, in fact, “The Young Man and the W orld.” T hat article, he wrote, was
m eant “ as an addition to a series of articles upon the Philippines and statesm en of
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contemporaneous em inence.”64 For Beveridge, there was a clear connection between
ideals o f masculinity and an expansionistic foreign policy.
Ostensibly a guide to developing the character and thought o f young American
men for future success, the article “The Young Man and the W orld” lays out qualities that
Beveridge believes are indispensable to the young man of 1905. These are sincerity,
courage, reserve and intellect. W hile this list of “qualities” is not very remarkable,
Beveridge imbues them with a particular weight. Listing the men o f “genius” whom
American boys can com pare themselves to - “men in whom the energy, the thought, the
imagination, the power o f hundreds of men are concentrated” - Beveridge generated a list
which begins with “Alexander, Caesar, Richilieu, Napoleon, Bismarck, W ashington” and
ends with “Peter the Great.”65
Beveridge's ideal man of "genius" is revealed to be a military man, an
expansionist, and with the exception of W ashington (who seems a bit out of place) an
imperialist. Lest his readers become overwhelmed, Beveridge provides a handy
summation of his argument. “ Be a man; that’s the sum o f it all - be a man. Be all that
we Americans mean by those three w ords.”66 The cumulative im port o f those words, at
the end of an article titled “The Young M an and the W orld,” an article written out of fear
for American decline, is that American masculinity can be found in the military heroes
and em pire builders of the past, empire builders who were fam ous for action, famous for
the performance of military feats of conquest. To be expansionistic, to be an empire

64Beveridge, The Young M an and the W orld, preface (unnum bered page).
65Beveridge, The Young M an and the W orld, p. 47.
66 Beveridge, The Young M an and the W orld, p. 53.
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builder, in other words to take antique conceptions of masculinity and perform them on
the international stage, was to truly “ be a man” in the American meaning o f the word.
The key, once again, is performance; it was not enough to be born a male
biologically, and it was not enough to adhere to the socially prescribed role that men were
expected to play. No, Beveridge and his colleagues expected more. They expected that
men perform their masculinity, and that they act out their beliefs and their values on the
world stage.
A t the beginning o f the twentieth century, through the w ritings and actions of
Alfred Thayer M ahan, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Albert Beveridge, in addition to the
larger than life presence of Theodore Roosevelt, the connection between the performance
o f American conceptions o f masculinity and an expansionistic foreign policy was forged
and strengthened. M oreover, this connection became the central support for the effort to
save the United States from decline and to maintain international pow er and prestige. “If
we do not advance, we recede,” Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote, and as Henry Cabot Lodge
argued, the key to advancem ent was the performance of masculine acts based on
historical exam ples from the past. It is in this context, the context of manly performance
and imperial expansion, that his colleague Albert J. Beveridge spoke, unsurprisingly,
“like a young Attila com e out of the W est.”
W hile Roosevelt, M ahan, Lodge, and Beveridge, with their like-m inded
colleagues, had forged a powerful connection between their conceptions o f ideal
masculine performance and foreign policy, their definition o f m asculinity did not go
unchallenged. The chapters that follow will exam ine some of the challenges to the
Rooseveltian consensus that argued that the United States must "play the man."
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CHAPTER III

“TH ER E IS NO DIFFERENCE BETW EEN M EN A N D N A TIO N S:”
JO H N REED AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

John Reed was a journalist, poet, Harvard man, and an active member o f New York's
salon society, but he was also a socialist. As a socialist, Reed objected to hierarchies of
class. His socialist vision of foreign policy was explicitly non-hierarchical, which made it
very different from the competitive foreign policy o f strenuous masculinity discussed in the
previous chapters. Where Teddy Roosevelt described the United States as a lone patriarch,
leaving home to battle for world supremacy, Reed preferred to use the language of
international brotherhood, envisioning the United States as a "brother" to other nations,
rather than a father.
Although Reed's concept of brotherhood was rooted in socialist thought and
opposed to class distinction and privilege, it was still distinctly masculinist, and it is
important to note that the rough-living, hard-drinking socialist brotherhood that Reed
describes was decidedly strenuous. John Reed's masculinity of brotherhood differs from
TR's strenuous masculinity in that it strives for equality rather than supremacy, but in this
chapter I will explore the similarities as well as the differences between Reed and
Roosevelt's masculinist politics. The central similarity is that although Reed diverges from
the other important figures of the period in many important ways, he never diverges from a
fundamentally masculine ethos.
The best place to see Reed's conjunction of socialism, masculinity and international
relations is in his writings on the Mexican Revolution. In January o f 1914, John Reed was
deep in the state of Chihuahua, riding with a unit of Francisco “Pancho” V illa’s army, a
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unit named simply ‘La Tropa.’ During a day’s hard riding, Reed was called to ride by the
side of Captain Fernando at the head of the column. Passing him a half-full bottle of the
M exican drink sotol, Fernando ordered him to drink it. “Drink it all. Show you’re a m an.”
Reed obligingly downed the contents of the bottle.

A howl of laughter and applause went up. Fernando leaned over and gripped my
hand. ‘Good for you, companero!’ he bellowed, rolling with m irth ... Now you
are with the men (los hombres). When we win the revolution it will be a
government by the men - not by the rich. W e are riding over the lands o f the men.
They used to belong to the rich, but now they belong to me and to the
com paneros.1

This episode serves as a good introduction to John Reed’s view of the Mexican
Revolution, and his analysis of the motivations of the men who followed the
Constitutionalist Armies of Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza. In Reed’s eyes, the
revolutionary movement was equal parts agrarian land reform and masculine camaraderie.
Reed’s brotherhood with La Tropa might be considered important only for its story of
revolutionary adventure were it not for the fact that Reed’s journalism was influential in
shaping of American attitudes and policies towards Mexico, including the thinking of
President W oodrow Wilson.
This chapter will examine Reed’s view of the war, the link between Reed and
Woodrow Wilson, and the model that Reed’s masculine view of the Mexican Revolution
presented to U.S. foreign policy. I argue that Reed understood and experienced the
Mexican Revolution as a manly romantic adventure, one which served to unite ‘the people’
under a banner of brotherhood, and which helped to unite them in opposition to the
exploitation o f the landed and aristocratic elite. Reed’s model of revolutionary socialist
brotherhood served as the paradigm for his vision o f future U.S.-M exican relations; the
United States and Mexico, Reed believed, should act together as “brothers,” and in a spirit

1 John Reed, Insurgent Mexico. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914. Pages 5657.
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o f brotherhood act to solve their common problems, among them the problems of capitalist
exploitation and the dehumanizing forces of modem society.
More than most men, Reed believed in the analogy that joined manly action and
foreign policy, the analogy that was expressed so famously by Theodore Roosevelt. In fact,
Reed put his personal politics into action even more than Roosevelt himself. The crucial
difference, however, is that since Reed was a socialist, he believed more in collective action,
than in capitalism and individualism. Reed would have agreed with T R that the United
States needed to act like a man; he would have vehemently opposed T R ’s definition of how
a man should act. This chapter will explore Reed’s definition o f how men should behave,
and his proposals for U.S. policy towards Mexico.
While Reed’s ideas were ultimately unsuccessful, they did get a hearing at the
White House. W oodrow W ilson’s serious consideration and eventual rejection of R eed’s
model of international socialist brotherhood sheds light on U.S.-M exican relations as they
developed, and gives an interesting glimpse of what might have been, had Reed’s model
been pursued.
Just 26 years old, Reed had been sent to M exico as a reporter for Metropolitan, The
New York World, and The Masses, publications that hoped to find out exactly what was
happening in Mexico. Reed’s search for the story of the Revolution had led him to the
Constitutionalist army led by Villa. After spending time with Villa, Reed was given
permission to follow the Army of General Tom as Urbina, who was in charge of “ La
Tropa.” It was while he was with “La Tropa” that R eed’s views of M exico, the M exican
people, and the Revolution were formed.
Reed's views of the United States, of Americans, and of the capitalist system, had
been form ed earlier. John Reed was bom into a middle-class family in Portland, Oregon in
1887. His father was a Progressive reformer who instilled in Reed a sense of righteousness
that would later surface in Reed’s own political views. The younger Reed went to private
school and then to Harvard, graduating in 1910. Making his way to New York City to
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become a poet, Reed’s romantic tendencies led him to the bohemian artistic circles on
Greenwich Village. Getting caught up in the life around Washington Square, he spent time
with all manner of individuals with all manner of political views - anarchists, syndicalists,
nihilists, socialists, communists, feminists, capitalists, industrialists and artists.
The community that Reed arrived in was a vibrant center for free thinking and new
radical ideas. As Christine Stansell points out,

It was a coherent milieu with distinctly American protagonists - gentlemen at odds
with their class, women at odds with their roles, and immigrants seeking
conversations outside the ghetto. "It is the best stamping ground for men of talent,"
[Art Critic James] Huneker went on to boast. "Ideas circulate. Brain tilts with
brain. Eccentricity must show cause or be jostled.”2

As Huneker’s quote indicates, the bohemian milieu of lower M anhattan merely altered the
conceptions of masculinity that were relevant in fin-de-siecle America. The notions of
manly struggle, of competition, and of the idea that worth was proved through such contests
remained. The bohemians, for all their radical beliefs, left their conceptions of gender
untouched at the root.
That does not mean, however, that their beliefs and ideas were insincere. On the
contrary, the Villagers of Reed’s circle were dedicated to finding a new way, a different
approach, to modem American life. Stansell argues that “ [t]he turn to Bohemia was one
manifestation of gathering revulsion against a society that seemed locked in a stranglehold
of bourgeois resolve.”3 In the face of major, seemingly systemic, problems in American
life, and the increasing evidence that the two major political parties lacked the will or the
resolve to do anything about them, young intellectuals and activists in the Village began to
look elsewhere for other solutions.
The decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time when the
reforming spirit of populism moved toward progressivism, an urban reform movement - in

2 Christine Stansell, American Modems: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New
Century. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000. Page 14.
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fact, many of the bohemians of Reed’s circle can be seen as the furthest outlying members
of the Progressive movement, a movement which believed in the use of government
instruments and other organizations to bring about change for the com m on g o o d .4
Writers aligned with the Progressive movement mobilized their pens on behalf of
reform, and journals and books dedicated to reforming and cleaning up business,
government and the cities proliferated. Many of these ‘muckrakers,’ to use Theodore
Roosevelt’s phrase (itself appropriated from Bunyan’s Pilgrim ’s Progress), became
famous, and their works extremely influential. Writers like Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell
and Upton Sinclair took on big business and occasionally won - Sinclair’s The Jungle
(1906), for example, led directly to the passage of the Meat Inspection A ct of 1906, and
provided impetus for the Pure Food and Drug A ct which was passed the same day.5
Related to the Progressive movement, then, was a rapid growth in magazine
publications and their influence, as journals such as M cC lure’s, M etropolitan,
Cosmopolitan, The New Yorker, The New Republic and The M asses all saw the light of
day. O f these journals, it was The Masses that fit Reed’s personality and perspectives the
best. Having come across a copy of The M asses by chance, Reed found a forum for his
literary output and his quasi-radical views, views that espoused the I.W. W., socialism,
feminism and free love.
The Masses espoused socialism as the solution to American problems. Socialism in
America has an interesting history, one that conflicts with long-held conceptions of
masculinity. Perhaps not surprisingly, many American ideas of masculinity are connected

3 Stansell, American M odems, p. 14
4 Progressivism was famously described by W illiam Allen W hite as populism which
“shaved its whiskers, washed its shirt, put on a derby, and moved up into the middle class,’’
and there are indeed similar strains behind each m ovem ent For more on the connections,
see Robert W iebe’s The Search for Order: 1877 - 1920. New York: Hill and W ang, 1967;
and Richard Hofstadter’s Age o f Reform: From Brvan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage
Books, 1955.)
5 See Ellen F. Fitzpatrick, ed., Muckraking: Three Landmark A rticles. Boston: Bedford
Books, 1994; see also George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt. 1900-1912. NY:
Harper & Row, 1958, pp. 207-208, for a discussion o f the connections between
"muckraking," the writer, and the laws.
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to the idea o f work and the legend of ‘American opportunity.’ In order to understand
Reed’s arguments, we need to consider the nature of work in the United States at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
The United States has long been considered, rightly or wrongly, as a fabled land of
opportunity; from the very first settlers to today, the freedom to work and the dream of
social and economic advancement have gone hand in hand with the American political
project, even as economic independence is linked to political independence. Eric Foner’s
Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men argues that “the concept of ‘free labor’ lay at the heart of
the Republican ideology, and expressed a coherent social outlook, a model of the good
society.”6
The decade before the Civil W ar there was a growing concern in the North that
slavery threatened to do away with the right of men to work where and how they wanted. In
many cases, Northern opposition to slavery in the new territories of the west was rooted in
the fear that slavery would limit opportunity for Northern men. Foner points out how the
North was rooted in a Calvinist work ethic that praised the generation of capital, and saw
Southern society, which was dominated by slavery, as a threat to their way of life. Report
after report was published in the North. “Republican newspapers carried countless reports
from travelers to the slave states and the testimony of southern spokesmen themselves. The
burden of this evidence was always the same - the southern economy was backward and
stagnant, and slavery was to blame.” 7
Many northerners believed that work and manliness were related, and that the lack of
work led to lassitude, loss of initiative, and a general sense of enervation.8 In addition, the
newspaper accounts of the South that appeared in the papers spoke often of houses being
unpainted and fields left untidy, in addition to making frequent comments on the lack of a
6 Eric Foner, Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men: The Ideology o f the Republican Party
Before the Civil W ar. New York: Vintage Press, 1970. Page 11.
7 Foner, Free M en, p. 41.
8 For a discussion of the belief in the importance of work, see Daniel T. Rodgers, The
Work Ethic in Industrial America. 1850-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
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middle class in the Southern economy. Either the whites were rich slave owners who lived
off the labor of others, or they were poor, shiftless, workers who would never amount to
anything, in part because of the structure of the economy. These workers were also paying
the price of an economy that relied too much on unpaid labor.9
Playing off these constructions o f Southern identity the Republican Party sought to
guarantee the rights of laborers (men, that is) to work, and therefore the Party stressed the
need to com bat slavery. While Lincoln may not have believed in the essential equality of
Blacks and whites, he did see Blacks as human, and therefore as individuals who had the
right to enjoy the fruits o f their own labor.10
Black laborers, however, posed a problem for many whites, and not just
Southerners. In the rapidly industrializing North, Black laborers’ search for work provoked
fear in white workers, and engendered a response with wide reaching consequences. This
response was the development of the belief in the importance of ‘whiteness,’ and the
consequent assignment of the social and political benefits that went along with it.
Whiteness, then, was as inextricably linked to ideas of labor and work as was
masculinity. This has been investigated by a number of recent studies. David Roediger's
The Wages of W hiteness explores the construction of divisions between laborers along the
lines of racial differences, and like Noel Ignatiev in How the Irish Became W hite. Roediger
pays particular attention to the attitudes of Irish immigrants in urban areas of the United
States in the mid nineteenth century, and their attempts to carve out a rung on the American
social ladder. Roediger and Ignatiev point out that their tenuous hold on their position in
American society was claimed only at the expense of African American workers, who
themselves were in the process of making the transition from slavery to wage labor.
Roediger and Ignatiev point out the ways in which a hierarchical racial identity (that
is, the codification of differences between ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ ) was one of the

9 See Foner, Free M en.pp. 40-49 for several accounts.
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rewards that ‘w hite’ workers were ‘paid’ by American society. Recent Irish immigrants
may not have had better jobs, better reputations among the American elites, or even a
different socio-economic status than African Americans, but their claim o f racial superiority,
namely that they were ‘w hite’ and not ‘black,’ gave them enough to go on. As Roediger
writes, “status and privileges conferred by race could be used to make up for alienating and
exploitive class relationships ... White workers could, and did, define and accept their class
position as ‘not slaves,’ and ‘not B lacks.’” 11
The problem, o f course, was that Blacks and Whites on the bottom of the economic
scale had more in common than they had differences. Discounting actual physical
appearance, the situation between recent immigrants (Irish immigrants in particular) and
Blacks was similar. Their economic opportunities were circumscribed, the professions that
they were allowed to engage in were limited, certain neighborhoods were blocked off from
their settlement, their churches were central organizers of social life, while they also came to
provide solace and an increasingly strong locus of moral and political power. In fact, as
Roediger and Ignatiev point out, the creation of ‘whiteness’ hurt white workers as much,
and perhaps more, than it did the Black workers. As Roediger puts it,

Race feeling and the benefits conferred by whiteness made white Southern workers
forget their ‘practically identical interests’ with the Black poor and accept stunted
lives for themselves and for those more oppressed than themselves ... [Wjhite
supremacy undermined not just working class unity but the very vision of many
white workers.12
W hat these workers could not see was the vision of a nation with much greater
equality, a nation with fewer (and/or smaller) class divisions, a nation with a successful labor
movement, a nation where racism was not the divisive issue it became. Instead, the result of

10 A great deal has been written on Abraham Lincoln, but a good single volume biography
is David Herbert Donald's Lincoln. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. For Lincoln's
racial views, expressed in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, see pp. 215-224.
11 David Roediger. W ages of Whiteness: Race and the Making o f the American W orking
Class. New York: Verso, 1993; p. 13.
12 Roediger. Wages of W hiteness, p. 13
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the belief in ‘whiteness’ was that racial difference became codified, and that American
workers remained divided along racial lines rather than uniting to com bat the exploitation
and the oppression of the nascent American industrial system.
Socialism offered one alternative to unite workers by class across racial lines, but it
was not able to succeed in the U.S. Many historians have attempted to answer the question
of why the United States, of all the w orld’s industrial nations, never had a viable socialist
movement. Tracing a number of important reasons why socialism never took hold,
historians have looked at political, social, economic and historical issues that made the U.S.
exceptional in its rejection of the socialist path. Only recently, however, have historians
begun to examine socialism as a movement with a strong racial component, a movement that
played a large role in the construction of whiteness; this will doubtless prove a valuable tool.
As Jacqueline Jones has explained, “ [i]n the history o f the idea of whiteness ... lies a good
deal o f the reason why socialism failed in America.” 13
It makes perfect sense that whiteness and American constructions of masculinity lie
at the heart o f not just the labor movement in the United States, but the socialist movement
as well. The conjunction of these ideas needs to be considered when discussing the careers
of prominent socialists in the early part of the Twentieth Century, and especially when
considering the career of John Reed. Bridging the divide between Blacks and Whites, as
well as that between labor unions, was one of the goals of American socialists and labor
groups, the IW W in particular. The Wobblies, with their goal of creating “One Big
Union,” were active in trying to unite workers, regardless o f skill level, racial designation or
immigration status. It makes a great deal of sense that in the early twentieth century, and the
1910s in particular, the Wobblies were able to attract the sympathy of New York socialite
socialists such as John Reed, even as they were singled out for particular harassment from
the established economic and political powers.
13 Jacqueline Jones, review of Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks. It D idn’t Happen
Here: W hy Socialism Failed in the United States, in American Historical Review, October,
2001 (vol. 106, no. 4.), pp. 1383-1384.
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Complicating this attempt at unity, however, was the issue of gender, and the
ideology o f ‘m anliness’ in particular, specifically the way ‘w hiteness’ and ‘manliness’
were intertwined. Historians have traced the origins of the combination o f manliness and
the working class to the ideology of the Revolutionary era; “As the working class matured
... within a slaveholding republic ” Roediger writes, “the heritage of the Revolution made
independence a powerful masculine personal ideal.” 14 This began to change, however, as
the expansion of the United States westward threatened to expand the reach of slavery.
Slavery was intolerable to many laborers not because of opposition to racist policies,
but because slaves worked under compulsion, and they did not work for wages. Labor
unions may have provided a necessary corrective to the power exercised by industrialists,
but they could not do much about slavery. American men had no desire to be either a real
slave, or a “wage slave,” and acted to make sure that they were guaranteed the ability to
shop their work around.15
Work, and the fear of limits on it, was intimately connected to notions of manliness
and masculinity, as well as being connected to male provider anxiety. Roosevelt, a
Republican, spoke often of the relationship between working and being a man. By the time
Reed begins writing, however, the socialist movement had had some success in challenging
the connection between manliness and labor. The “Bread and Roses” strike in Lawrence,
Massachusetts, in 1912 successfully challenged industrial power, but this famous strike
may be the exception that proves the rule; many of the strikers were “radicals o f the worst
sort,” namely women strikers who transgressed traditional gender, labor, and political
hierarchies. O ther strikes, including the Silk Strike in Paterson, New Jersey, where Reed

14 Roediger. W ages o f W hiteness, p. 13.
15 For a discussion of the rhetoric of "wage slavery," see Lawrence Glickman, A Living
Wage: American W orkers and the Making of Consumer Society. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997, pp. 17-34. For a discussion of the post Civil W ar emphasis on the male wageearner, see Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor. Marriage, and the
M arket in the Age of Slave Emancipation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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was arrested, were failures, in part because the industrialists had learned from Lawrence, and
maintained tighter control, not allowing such gender transgression to occur.16
Reed’s socialism, then, was rooted in a conception of manly action that was often
contradictory; his socialist impulses in the direction of brotherhood and solidarity were
often tempered by his belief in a rather Rooseveltian strenuous life. R eed’s notion of
masculinity, rooted in the romantic ideal of manliness promoted by prep schools and Ivy
League colleges like Harvard, was much closer to that of Roosevelt than it was to that of the
factory workers that he cham pioned.17 It is not surprising that his biographer, Robert
Rosenstone, describes him as a “Romantic Revolutionary;” Reed, despite his intentions,
comes across as a revolutionary dilettante, a man whose class background, education, and
essential manly identity separate him from the “people” he wants to be a part of. It is
perhaps not surprising that his greatest successes come in describing “others” to
Americans, and in such a way that his American identity is given a greater emphasis than his
socialism. In Insurgent Mexico. The War in Eastern Europe, and Ten Days that Shook the
World. Reed is an expatriate American writing (very well) on important news stories; he is
more the reporter than the socialist in this context.
While covering the Paterson Silk Strike for The Masses, Reed became radicalized,
having seen first hand the link between political institutions and factory management. Reed
helped to write and stage a famous pageant at Madison Square Garden in 1913 to raise
money for the striking workers, a pageant that featured the workers themselves in a new
kind of social-realist mass labor-theater. It was on the basis of the pageant, and on the

16 See Ardis C am eron’s Radicals of the W orst Sort: Laboring W omen in Lawrence.
Massachusetts. 1860-1912 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), for an excellent
overview of this theme.
17 Harvard was at this point a bastion of the manly ethos - see Kim Tow nshend’s
Manhood at Harvard: W illiam James and Others. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1996, for an extended discussion.
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strength o f pieces written for The Masses, that Reed was asked to go to M exico as a
correspondent.18
The power of Reed’s writing, which can be seen in all of his successful journalistic
pieces, grows out of his identification with his subject, and in his performance of his
socialism. As a writer, and the son of a well-to-do family, Reed was not actually a factory
worker, nor a M exican revolutionary; he perform ed those roles (getting arrested in Paterson,
and coming under fire in Mexico, while doing so), and played the part well. That is beside
the point, however - Reed’s socialism, like his masculinity, was rooted in the act; that is not
to say that his sentiments were not genuine, but Reed believed implicitly in the necessity of
involvement, in the need to be involved, to be on the scene, to be arrested and to be shot at both his socialism and his masculinity require manly performance. It is this belief that
shapes his view of foreign policy as well.
In the course of his coverage of the Paterson strike, and the resultant pageant, Reed
had come to know the strikers and the goals they fought for, through time spent with them
in jail. Though still not one of the workers, the time Reed spent in jail for refusing to leave
the picket line allowed him to identify himself with the workers, and write passionately and
effectively about their struggle. The key to John Reed, and his writing, is not to be found in
his objective reporting; rather, it is the lack of objectivity that makes it interesting.
R eed’s reporting tells us as much about Reed himself as it does about the event
under scrutiny. According to Robert Rosenstone, “a fusion of self with historical event
occurred because [Reed’s] writing reflected a search for meaning and self-definition. The
question raised in [his writing about La Tropa] is central to his whole experience in Mexico;
indeed it had hovered unspoken in his mind for years: how does one becom e a man?” 19
R eed’s childhood experience as a sickly youth surrounded by Portland’s muscular
18 Here, and elsewhere, I have relied on Robert Rosenstone’s Romantic Revolutionary: A
Biography o f John Reed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, and Granville Hicks,
John Reed: The M aking of a Revolutionary. New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968.
Rosenstone's biography is the newest, and at this point the best. For his early life, see
particularly pp. 3-159.
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lumberjacks, sailors and cowboys, his admiration for his father and his political reforms, in
addition to his own desire to prove himself, led Reed to become convinced that manliness
was something that was performed through particular activities. “For Reed,” Rosenstone
explains, “being a man had something to do with drinking, swearing, fighting, enduring
hardship and making the kind of principled stand that might lead to destruction.” 20 This
statement functions as a pretty succinct description o f the masculinity Reed found with La
Tropa, and which he laid as the foundation for his foreign policy paradigm.
Reed’s dispatches increasingly sympathized with the forces o f Villa, and argued that
the main goal of the Mexican revolution was land reform. After interviewing Carranza, the
leader of the Constitutionalists, Reed described him as less a man than Villa, a man who
denounced his enemies in a high pitched, loud and quavering (read: effeminate) voice. Reed
tried to picture him as the leader of the revolution, but failed: “I tried to think that here was
the voice of aroused Mexico thundering at her enemies; but it seemed like nothing so much
as a slightly senile old man, tired and irritated.”21
Reed's view of Carranza follows Roosevelt's classic analogy; as the man is to the
nation, so is the nation to the world. Carranza, "a slightly senile old man," did not have the
requisite manliness to provide the model for Mexico. Reed "tried to think that here was the
voice of aroused Mexico," but he could not equate the "tired and irritated" man with
something so manly as a revolution. Reed's political views of the situation were clearly
shaped by his view of Carranza's masculinity, a view that was in line with the Rooseveltian
view that equated personal masculinity with national performance.
Reed’s writing about Mexico, then, was shaped by two factors. First, Reed
identified with the revolutionaries of La Tropa, his affections growing out of a personal
connection that he was able to make with the soldiers’ masculinity. Second, this connection,
and in fact his entire analysis of the differences between Carranza and Villa, rested on

19 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150. See also Hicks, John Reed, pp. 114-117.
20 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150; Hicks, John Reed, pp. 114-115, and 116117, covers Reed's view of Villa as a man.
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Reed’s evaluation o f each individual’s manliness. Further, Reed’s description o f Villa and
Carranza, rooted in the prevalent conceptions of masculinity, became important because of
the influence that Reed’s reporting had on the United States.
Reed was exceptionally lucky in his reporting - by traveling with Villa, and
developing a kind of friendship with him, Reed was able to travel places where other
reporters were not able to go, in addition to being allowed to travel with the army. He was
also able to “scoop” other reporters, as he did in his reporting on the battle of Torreon,
because of his proximity to Villa and his army. Reed’s reports, therefore, have an
immediacy and a power that other reporters were not able to match. Add to this Reed’s
focus on manliness and masculinity, and the result is powerful war reporting, that looks at
the human cost of war as well as the political goals of the men who are fighting.
Some have argued that the immediacy, the passion and the involvement of the book
comes at the cost of accuracy and balance. While Reed may have elaborated upon the facts,
in many ways that is beside the point; despite the poetic license, “there is no doubt
[Insurgent Mexico 1 contains the core o f his reaction to Mexico. There, among the ragged
troops of revolutionary armies, Jack [Reed] underwent many experiences that could be
summed up in the glorious feeling that he was truly one o f los hom bres.” 22
Reed left for Mexico in 1913, but the conflict had already been going on for several
years. The Mexican revolution had begun in 1910 with Francisco M adero’s campaign to
prevent the reelection of Porfirio Diaz, a dictator who had ruled Mexico since 1876. By
focusing his attack on Diaz’s abusive dictatorial powers, and by stressing the opportunities
that “good governm ent” held for M exico (much as progressives did in the U.S.), Madero
was able to weld disparate political forces into a coalition united by their opposition to Diaz.

21 Reed, Insurgent M exico, p. 251.
22 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150.
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Though Diaz tried to eliminate this political coalition by force, the opposition was finally
able to drive him from power, and he resigned on May 25, 1911. 23
After D iaz’s resignation, a provisional government headed by D iaz’s form er
minister of former affairs ruled from May to November; but it became rapidly apparent that
though Diaz had been driven out of power, the old political system remained. The coalition
originally united in opposition to Diaz remained intact. The provisional government tried to
split the opposition into factions by attacking one of the most prominent o f the reformers, a
man named Emiliano Zapata. In addition to his opposition to Diaz, Zapata was in favor of
land reform, specifically, the appropriation and redistribution of land that belonged to huge
hacendados, or ranches. Many of the hacendados were owned by American companies or
absentee owners, and there was strong support for agrarian reform among the peasants who
made up a large part of the Zapatista army.24
M any of M adero’s supporters, however, were not in favor o f land reform; they were
political, and not social, reformers, who sought merely to remove the dictator from the
government, not any kind of wholesale political change. When the provisional government
attacked Zapata, they were trying to split the agrarian and the political reformers, two groups
that had been united only in their opposition to Diaz, and thereby preserve the old,
dictatorial, political system. 25
When Madero finally took office in November of 1911, the coalition that had driven
out Diaz, and put Madero in power, was fraying, but not yet broken. Zapata and his
supporters had maintained their faith in M adero’s revolutionary spirit, and were waiting for
the beginning of land reform. Madero, who was more interested in political reform,
however, did not see land reform as an urgent problem and put it on the back burner.

23 Robert Freeman Smith. The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico.
1916-1932. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1972. Pages 14-22.
24 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 15.
25 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 15-16.
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Meanwhile the Federal army (that was loyal to the old order, and therefore beyond
M adero’s control) tried to eliminate Zapata and his peasant army from Morelos. 26
A t this point the coalition broke, and Zapata proclaimed the famous Plan of Ayala on
November 28,1911, a plan that stressed the elimination of the hacendados and the
redistribution of land, to the villages and peasants. Madero spent the rest o f his time in
office trying to deal with the agrarian reform movement led by Zapata, in addition to
managing the political and constitutional reforms that he was intent upon. He was
ultimately unable to do either, and he was forced out o f office in February of 1913, and later
shot, by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta. Huerta had been able to gain power by
playing on the fears that M exico’s reform movement might go too far; one of the men who
was afraid of the reformist turn Mexico was taking was the American Ambassador, Henry
Lane Wilson, who had conspired with Huerta in the overthrow of Madero. Wilson had
encouraged Huerta because of fears that Madero was going to nationalize American
investments; Huerta, of course, promised not to do it. 27
The death of Madero, however, restored the coalition that had splintered with the
attempts to crush Zapata and his mainly Indian army from Morelos. Zapata was able to find
allies in Villa, who came to control Chihuahua and much of Northern Mexico, and
Venustiano Carranza, who had been Governor of Coahuila, to the east. Carranza was not an
agrarian reformer, but was rather a political and constitutional reformer. As Robert Freeman
Smith points out, Carranza’s focus was national from the very beginning, and his goal was
to strengthen the Mexican political system. According to Smith, Carranza was “an intense

26 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 16.
27 In addition to Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 17, see Mark T. Gilderhus,
Diplomacy and Revolution: U.S. Mexican Relations under W ilson and Carranza. Tucson:
University o f Arizona Press, 1977; for a Mexican view, see Josefina Zoraida Vazquez and
Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1985; see also W alter LaFeber, The American Search For Opportunity. 1865-1913. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 220 -227; For general diplomatic histories, see
W alter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad
Since 1750. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1989, page 262, and Paterson, Clifford and
Hagan, eds. American Foreign Policy: A History. 3rd ed., Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1991, p. 233.
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nationalist, [who] desired in his own way to build a Mexico which could deal with the
powers of the world on an equal basis.”28 With his global view and state building agenda,
Carranza differed gready from both Zapata and Villa, who had primarily local power and
allegiances, and whose political goals were focused on agrarian issues. For Zapata and
Villa, “the bureaucratic mechanics of administrative reform and the complicated arguments
about legislative and judicial processes seemed to be excuses for delay or even denial of
reform .”29
The differences between Villa and Zapata on the one hand and Carranza on the other
grew wider with time, but when Reed crossed the border in December of 1913, the
Constitutionalist coalition still held. Reed, though ignorant of many of the facts of the
revolution, was drawn to the cause of agrarian reform as embodied by Pancho Villa. As
Rosenstone writes,
Reed sensed rather than knew ... th a t... the country was undergoing two
revolutions simultaneously, one political, the other agrarian ...Without all the facts
arranged and neatly categorized, Reed understood enough o f the situation to know
where his own sympathies lay ... With little knowledge o f the land starvation felt
by the peon, or the virtual serfdom in which millions lived, he instinctively felt that
no Mexican revolution was worth the name if it was being fought merely for a
constitution. Realizing that Carranza was more of a politician than an activist, and
one who had taken no positive stand on social reform, Reed’s heart naturally
embraced the Villistas. 30
After riding with La Tropa for a while, Reed was befriended by Longinos Guereca,
who takes him under his care.
“ We shall be compadres, eh?" said Longinos Guereca. "We shall sleep in the same
blankets, and always be together. And when we get to Cadena I shall take you to my
home, and my father will make you my brother .. .1 will show you the lost mines of
the Spaniards, the richest mines in the world ... W e’ll work them together, w e’ll be
rich, eh?”31
This little vignette illustrates succinctly what Reed believes American foreign policy
should be. Taking Roosevelt’s analogy as his model, Reed sets up G uereca’s generous

28
29
30
31

Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 19.
Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 19.
Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, pp 154-155.
John Reed, Insurgent M exico, p. 70.
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offer o f brotherhood as the model for foreign policy. The United States and M exico should
work as brothers, and through cooperation, both nations can become wealthy. The key, of
course, is the trope of brotherhood, rooted in a common masculinity, a manliness that shows
itself in fighting together, sleeping together, and working together. Equally essential to this
idea of brotherhood was that the offer of cooperation comes from M exico/Guereca first, and
was not proposed by the U.S. / Reed; had the offer for cooperation com e from the U.S., the
power imbalance would have altered the meaning o f the offer.
Reed’s Insurgent Mexico is replete with examples that stress the masculinity o f the
common man. R eed’s description o f Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa fits squarely into the model
of masculinity that Reed espouses, that of the noble peasant who, in spite of adversity, is
able to rise to prominence. Villa, as described by Reed, is a kind of M exican Horatio Alger
hero, with the added romance (and manliness) of the bandit. Reed describes Villa as a
“bandit,” and “outlaw ,” a “man with the naive simplicity o f a savage,” “with reckless and
romantic bravery.” Reed describes how “in time of famine, he fed whole districts, and took
care of entire villages ... Everywhere he was known as The Friend of The Poor. He was the
M exican Robin H ood.”32
This is the legendary Pancho Villa, the Villa of ballads and stories, and in fact Villa
serves a particular literary purpose for Reed, a purpose that is often at odds with factual
evidence. This did not prevent the legendary stories from taking hold; in fact Woodrow
Wilson, one of R eed’s many readers, took Reed’s descriptions as fact. In conversation
with Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, W ilson stated that Villa “ was a sort of
Robin Hood and had spent a not uneventful life robbing the rich in order to give to the poor.
He had even at one point kept a butcher’s shop for the purpose o f distributing to the poor
the proceeds o f his innumerable cattle raids.”33

32 Reed. Insurgent M exico, pp. 122-123.
33 Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, in Link, et al., eds.. T he Papers of
Woodrow Wilson. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966 - .V o l. 29, p. 229.
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As Friederich Katz, author of the definitive biography of Pancho Villa, points out,
Villa was a figure in whom the American left found much to admire.

It was an admiration based on Villa’s popular origins, the popular character of his
army, his confiscations of the properties of the oligarchy, and his redistribution, as
well as the erroneous notion that he had already distributed land from the state’s
haciendas to the peasantry of Chihuahua.34
Katz aptly describes why Reed was drawn to Villa. Reed, in fact, did believe in V illa’s land
redistribution as an accomplished fact, rather than as something to be achieved when the
fighting is done. The Villa of legend and the Villa that lived in the mind o f the socialist
journalist John Reed are indistinguishable.
When the reader of Insurgent Mexico encounters Reed’s section on Villa, after
more than one hundred pages, Reed’s connection o f masculinity, the land and the Mexican
Revolution has been stressed repeatedly. Villa embodies the M exican revolution - he
represents the connection between the traditional Mexican peasant, and the masculine ideal.
For example, Reed describes a ceremony in which Villa is given a medal for bravery.
Reed mentions the uniformed men, the band playing, the grand staircase of the palace, the
balcony over the square where the award was to take place. Then comes the time for Villa to
make his acceptance speech.

But as he looked around the room at those brilliant, educated men, who said they
would die for Villa, the peon, and meant it, and as he caught sight through the door
of the ragged soldiers, who had forgotten their rigidity and were crowding eagerly
into the corridor with eyes fixed eagerly on the companero that they loved, he
realized something of what the Revolution signified ... he leaned across the table in
front of him and poured out, in a voice so low that people could hardly hear: “There
is no word to speak. All I can say is my heart is all to you.35
Reed’s description of this moment highlights the manly camaraderie that he saw as the
central aspect of the Revolution. V illa’s love for his men and his m en’s love for him elide

34 Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998. Pages 319-320.
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the class boundaries that are the central political issues o f the Revolution itself - manly
action, that is, the performance of manly feats of valor on the field of battle, has enabled
Villa to create strong bonds of manly love that bridge the gaps o f class. Manliness, for
Reed, works as a socially leveling factor.
While Friederich Katz argues that in the figure of Villa Reed found what he was
looking for, it is also true that the situation in M exico itself seemed to be creating a new
ideal society.
Reed felt that in Chihuahua the foundations of a socialist society as he envisioned it
were being laid. The oligarchy had been expelled from the state, every inhabitant
who wanted it had the right to a piece of land, and the state assumed responsibility
for the welfare of the poor and the unemployed.36

W hat was happening in Chihuahua was the creation of a socialism built on the precepts that
Reed valued, that of manly brotherhood, which he saw, and created, in the figure of Villa. It
was this society, the future of Mexico, which could serve as a model for the rest o f the
world, that Reed believed the U.S. should protect, rather than the U.S. dominated
oligarchical hacienda system that oppressed the peasants.
Reed returned to New York in early April, but while he was traveling the tense
relationship between the United States and Mexico flared into violence. Seven American
sailors at Tampico, Mexico had apparently wandered into a restricted area, and were
arrested. In short order a conflict marked by conceptions of manly honor ensued. The
Mexican commander, a Huertista, had the soldiers released, but the American commander
insisted that the Mexicans show their respect by means of a military salute to the American
flag. The Mexican commander refused to give the salute, but the American naval officer
insisted. W oodrow W ilson backed up the Naval officer, as did Congress. The Mexicans
continued to refuse, and tensions rose.
The situation grew more complicated when W ilson learned of a shipment of arms
and munitions that was due to arrive at Vera Cruz. Fearing the munitions would upset the

35 Reed. Insurgent M exico, p. 121
134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

balance o f power at a time when he was planning an intervention, Wilson, on April 21, 1914,
ordered a naval force to take the town (Vera Cruz). Sailors and M arines went ashore and
took the town at the cost of 19 dead, while the Mexican soldiers and townspeople lost more
than 200.37
Reed followed these events by reading about them in the paper; he was off reporting
on another story. Shortly after his arrival in New York, Reed and M ax Eastman, the editor
of the socialist journal The Masses, left for Ludlow, Colorado, to report on the massacre of
miners and their families that happened on April 20, 1914. This event, in which members of
the Colorado National guard (actually mine guards with salaries paid by John D.
Rockefeller) leveled a strikers’ tent colony with machine guns, reminded Reed o f the
situation he had just left behind in Mexico. In Mexico, Reed had been struck by the classwar aspects of the Mexican revolution; similarly, Ludlow, which was a “virtual feudal
domain” of Rockefeller, revealed a similar political and social crisis - namely that of the
workers to find a way to keep body and soul together in the face of capitalist oppression.
Upon his return to New York, Reed wrote an article for the New York Times, dated April
26th 1914, in which he considers the nature of the Mexican revolution from the classstruggle perspective.38
Reed’s articles and editorials found publication easily - in fact, his articles met with
great acclaim. While Reed was still in Mexico, his articles were running in The Masses,
The World, and Metropolitan. The Metropolitan ran his article on the fall of Torreon under
a banner that said “W ord pictures of war by an American Kipling ... W hat Stephen Crane
and Richard Harding Davis did for the Spanish American War in 1898, John Reed, 26
years old has done for M exico.” 39 Reed’s friend, fellow Greenwich Villager and Harvard
36 Katz, Pancho Villa, p. 320.
37 On Reed, see Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 172-174; On Tam pico and Vera
Cruz, see Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, pp. 10-12, and LaFeber, American A ge, p.
280.
38 For a good overview of the situation at Ludlow, see Hicks. John Reed, pp. 139-144;
Rosenstone. Romantic Revolutionary, pp. 172-174.
39 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 166.
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classmate W alter Lippmann, also loved Reed’s pieces. Lippmann wrote Reed, stating that
his “articles are undoubtedly the finest reporting that has ever been done.” Lippmann went
on to say
I can’t begin to tell you how good the articles are. You have perfect eyes, and your
power o f telling leaves nothing to be desired. I want to hug you, Jack. If all history
had been reported as you are doing this, Lord - 1 say that with Jack Reed reporting
begins.40

Lippmann was not the only one who admired R eed’s writing about Mexico. Reed's
popularity translated quickly into influence at the highest level, and had an impact on U. S.
foreign policy. President Woodrow W ilson had read some of R eed’s dispatches, and was
particularly impressed by the discussion of the situation that Reed wrote for The New York
Times. Titled “The Causes Behind M exico Revolution,” the article promised to focus on
the “Effect o f An American Occupation Upon Her Future.” Reed argues in the article that
despite the confusion there has only been one Mexican revolution, and that “[I]t was,
purely and simply, a fight for land.”41 Reed traced the development of the revolution, from
the development of revolutionary sentiment under Diaz to Carranza’s attempts to unite the
peons with his more middle-class centered movement.
This brought Reed to a discussion of the importance and popularity of Pancho Villa.
Reed’s experience with La Tropa fed directly into the article, and he wrote that Villa’s
popularity, his nation-wide support, his success as a Governor of the State of Chihuahua,
and his success as a general, were all due to the fact that it was only Villa who had grasped
that the Revolution was about land reform. As a result of the land redistribution that Villa
began, “sixty-two and a half acres to every adult male,” Zapata joined with Villa, and the
Revolution took on a new shape. Because of this new cohesion, both ideological and

40 Quoted in Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. New York:
Vintage, p. 81, and Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 166.
41 John Reid (sic), “The Causes Behind M exico Revolution,” N ew York Times, April 27,
1914, p. 4
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military, “ [t]he old barriers between communities are broken dow n,” Reed wrote, “thought
spreads, and every day more Mexicans join the revolution.”42
Reed saw this development as part of a larger progression. As a result of V illa’s
land distribution, and its popular support, the people of Mexico developed a nascent
democratic belief. In the article, Reed argued that
there has also grown up, not only among the soldiers but even among the women
and old men in outlying villages and haciendas far removed from the lines of
communication, the feeling and the desire for representative governm ent... the idea
is at last thoroughly implanted in the peons - for the first time 43

There was much of the traditional romantic American belief in Jeffersonian values behind
this assessm ent - the idea that the ownership of land would bring democratic feeling
through a natural developmental process.
Reed’s support for this idea was, perhaps, at odds with the socialist position, which
would, perhaps, have staked out a more communal approach to the ownership of land, but it
is entirely consistent with his focus on and interest in masculinity. It is clear from the quote
above, for example, that the manliness that representative government engenders had grown
so strong that it affected even those whose masculinity was weak, namely old men and
women. As Reed recalled in Insurgent M exico. Captain Fernando of ‘La T ropa’ described
the goal of the Revolution as the creation of a government “by the men,” a line spoken even
as they were riding over territory described as “the lands of the men.” The land, of course,
had been appropriated from the rich, but now it belonged to “the men.” Clearly, there was
a difference for Reed, as well as for Captain Fernando whose words Reed recorded, between
being rich and being a “m an.”
This difference was rooted in the different modes of land ownership. Reed stressed
the manly aspects of this when he described what an American intervention in the
Revolution would mean. Reed argued in the article that an intervention was inimical to the
Revolution by its very nature. Because the Revolution was rooted in the expropriation and

42 ibid.
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redistribution of land, the U.S. was against that policy as a matter o f principle, and the net
result o f the conflict would be the installation of a repressive government, and the wholesale
revocation o f the right to vote. Reed argued that this was inevitable “because the people’s
choice for President will take the lands away from the rich who stole them and return them
to the people to whom they rightfully belong.”44
As a result of this fundamental conflict of interest, Reed argued that it was not the
Mexican Army that would be the most determined American foe, it would be the peasants
themselves. Because the peasants had already shown that they would take to the streets
during the Vera Cruz incident, Reed argued that it would only get worse if the conflict was
made national in scope. A fter comparing the peasants of Mexico to the farmers of
Lexington and Concord, Reed concluded his article by making the connection between
American intervention and the emasculation of Mexico clear. An American reordering of
the Mexican government and society

will leave things worse than they were before - an exploiting class firmly entrenched
in the places of power, the foreign interests stronger, because we supported them, the
great estates securely reestablished, and the peons taught that wage slavery and not
individual freedom is the desirable thing in life. 45

Wage slavery, as we discussed earlier, was one of the greatest threats to masculinity;
slavery itself was greater, but wage slavery also implies the loss of autonomy, the complete
dependence on the wage provider, and therefore the loss of independence that is central to
being a Man. Wage slavery is not only associated with the agricultural context that Reed
uses here in the context o f the Mexican Revolution, but is linked even more with the threat
industrialization posed to the Jeffersonian ideal.46
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 For a discussion of the connections between the republican ideal as articulated by
Jefferson and other founders and that of labor leaders, see Leon Fink, W orkingmen's
Democracy: The Knights o f Labor and American Politics. Urbana: University o f Illinois
Press, 1983.
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Reed’s understanding o f the Mexican Revolution, then, was rooted in the turn o f the
century conception o f masculinity, and his solution was the manhood affirming solution of
the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer. W hen the Mexican peasant took control of his own plot
of land, Reed believed, he began a democratic process rooted in the manly ideal of politics,
an ideal that reached back through time, past Locke and Hobbes, all the way to
Cinncinnatus, the legendary Roman citizen/farmer who left his plow to fight for the
preservation and safety o f the republic.
In the same way as the Roman, the Mexican peasant proved his political worth, as
well as his essential manliness, by fighting for the land that granted him nobility. This is
Reed’s vision of masculine performance, and it is not that far removed from the ideals of
Theodore Roosevelt; the difference here, however, is Reed’s socialist leanings towards
brotherhood with the revolutionary, something that Roosevelt would never have considered.
In foreign policy terms, then, though Reed viewed an intervention in Mexico as
being in line with economic interests and with American views of international law, he still
viewed such a policy as a bad idea. The United States, he observed, is “opposed to the
distribution of lands” as undertaken by Villa, but that should not be the decisive factor
against American intervention. An intervention, Reed argued, would kill the Revolution “It will be done forever. And the United States will have quenched an awakening race that
might have loomed great in the w orld’s history.” The connection between an American
intervention and the “quenching” o f the race is the issue of manliness - because the
Revolution is about the creation of men through the working o f land, an intervention by the
United States prevents the development of the manliness that Reed finds so important.
Consequently, R eed’s opposition would help to promote a foreign policy that strengthens
the masculinity that he holds as ideal.
In the Times article, Reed argued that the revolution was agrarian in nature, and the
result of a peasant movement to reclaim land that they had lost during the Diaz years. Reed
argued that the political aims of the revolution came about as a secondary result of the
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attempt to reclaim their land; the peasants needed to consider the political tools that would
help bring about land reform. Reed went on to praise Villa and Zapata, and to question
Carranza’s commitment to agrarian reform.
W ilson thought enough of the article to clip it and send to his Ambassador in
London, W alter Hines Page. With the clipping he wrote that Reed’s article
sums up as well as they could be summed up my own conclusions with regard to
the issues and the personnel of the pending contest in Mexico. I can verify it from a
hundred different sources, most of them sources not in the least touched by
predilections for such men as our friends in London have supposed Carranza and
Villa to be. 47
Thus, Reed and Wilson share similar thoughts about the Mexican revolution to the extent
that W ilson adopted Reed’s words, as an expression of his own policy.
Reed returned from Mexico to find that he had become a celebrity. "Publicity in the
press had spread his fame far beyond the confines of the village. Besieged with more
lecture invitations than he could accept and interviewed by reporters, he was listened to
attentively, often quoted in print, and made the object of more than the usual number of
inviting glances from women.” 48 Reed found that his celebrity gave him more prestige,
and that he could use this prestige to argue for American support for the peasant-based
class struggle that he saw the Mexican Revolution to be. In fact, Reed soon had the
opportunity to argue his case in the Oval Office itself.
In late May of 1914, Reed read in an interview that President W ilson had granted to
the Saturday Evening Post that he favored a Mexican government that was interested in
pursuing agrarian reform. Reed was intrigued, and writing from Provincetown on June 4th,
Reed asked W ilson’s secretary W illiam Phillips for an interview. M entioning the
forthcoming publication of Insurgent Mexico. Reed hoped to get an interview with Wilson
where W ilson would tell him the “ inside story of the non-recognition of Huerta and the
occupation of Vera Cruz, and to indicate, if possible, in what way our Mexican policy has
been consistent from first to last.” In addition, Reed wanted W ilson to tell him “the

47 W oodrow W ilson to W alter Hines Page, Woodrow W ilson Papers. Vol. 30, p. 42.
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history of the secret pressure brought to bear upon him by foreign nations whose citizens
were heavily interested in the Republic.”49
Reed was clearly taking the tack that he would later take during the First World War
and the Russian Revolution, that capitalist interests sought to force governments to enact
policies on their behalf, and to the detriment of the common people, in this case the
“peons” o f Mexico. These policies forced the peasants of less developed nations into a
situation of dependence, or worse, slavery, and made a brotherhood o f equals, Reed's
socialist goal, impossible. By standing up for peasants and for workers, Reed believed that
he was defending the possibility for a future brotherhood o f men.
Reed was unsure, of course, if there was any policy at all at work behind W ilson’s
dealings with Huerta and the Constitutionalists (as were most Americans), but Reed used
that uncertainty as another reason for Wilson to grant the interview. M aking his case to
Phillips, Reed wrote that “newspapers favorable to the President’s policy have, in their
bewilderment, failed to convey anything but the impression that the whole business is a
series of lucky blunders based on an unworldly idealism. I have an idea that it is a pretty
careful, well-thought-out plan. It seems to me it would be of value to present the whole
thing to the world.” The flattery, plus the chance for Wilson to lay out his geo strategic
plan, got Reed the interview with Wilson, in addition to one with Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan.50
R eed’s first impression of Wilson was positive; as with his meetings with Carranza
and Villa, Reed sees a connection between the man and the government, the man and the
nation. In his unpublished manuscript “Presidential Interview,” Reed describes Wilson, in
his white flannel suit, as “very American, ” the manly embodiment o f the ideal. Wilson,
Reed writes, "almost perfectly describes the American theory of government at the point at
which it has arrived in the feelings of the great mass of our people." This was because,
48 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 172.
49 Reed to W illiam Phillips, Woodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 157.
50 Reed to Phillips, Woodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 157.
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according to Reed, W ilson “ believes still in the fundamental principles upon which this
government was founded; and in the power of the people peaceably to remedy evils by their
common will.” This impressed Reed - “I never met a man who gave such an impression
of quietness inside. Deep within him is a principle, or a religion, or something, upon which
his whole life rests.”51 Reed argued that this guiding principle o f W ilson’s was an
unswerving loyalty to ‘the will of the people,’ a will that was expressed in events such as the
American Revolutionary War.
These impressions o f Wilson's masculinity and his American principles must have
left Reed a bit stunned - as he wrote at the very beginning of “Presidential Interview,”

I remember there were so many things I wanted to ask him, and I thought I had
asked and been answered them all. But after I left the Executive Office, I suddenly
realized that he had only answered what he had wanted to answer, and that some of
the questions I thought had been answered had not been. I don’t yet know how it
happened.52

Because he had been managed so handily, Reed had forgotten to discuss the goal of
his article, and writing from Union Station at midnight, Reed asked Wilson for his approval:
I forgot, when I was with you, to ask if you would allow me to write my own
Interpretation of your Mexican policy in an article. It would, of course, be entirely
mine; but I should write it in the light of what you told me, and would not say or
imply that you had told me anything.
Asserting once again that “ people don’t know what you’re doing or why,” Reed promised
to allow the President to approve his article before submission.53
Wilson replied, with gratitude, that he was “ perfectly willing” that Reed “should
use our interview of the other day in the way you suggest for an article o f your own written
in the light of what I told you but not bringing me in at all.”54 This Reed set out to do, and

51 John Reed, “ Presidential Interview,” contained in Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30,
pp. 231-238. This quote is on page 232
“Presidential Interview," Woodrow W ilson Papers. Vol. 30, p. 231-232.
53 John Reed to W oodrow Wilson, Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 186-187.
54 Woodrow W ilson to John Reed, Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 189.
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in a letter to W ilson he wrote from Provincetown, Reed tried to explain once more his goals
for the article.
Quoting from an article he had read in the English Review by Sydney Brooks titled
“President W ilson,” Reed stressed the problems that the President was having making his
case. Brooks wrote that
The country has never quite understood, and has therefore never quite subscribed to,
the principles which have guided Mr. Wilson throughout the M exican entanglement
or the end he has been pursuing ... His whole Mexican policy, indeed - the problem
of how such a man could act in such a way - only becomes comprehensible when
the guess is hazarded that his conscience rather than his intellect dictated i t .55

Adding his own critique, Reed goes on to say that

Everybody I have talked to seems hopelessly at sea, both as to what was meant by
the occupation of Vera Cruz and the consistent policy which I see clearly now you
have always maintained in the Mexican question. Nobody knows anything about it,
Mr. P resident.56

Reed wanted Wilson to stand up and make it clear that he was on the side of the
peasants who were rebelling, the common people who, like the Americans of 1775, were
fighting for their liberty. Reed urged Wilson once again, that “ [I]f you allow this to be
made public, I think that a child might understand the developments which may come
hereafter. And it seems to me that by taking the country into your confidence on a question
like this a blow could be dealt the “secret diplomacy” of the w orld’s governments, and an
easy way opened for the coming of international peace.”57
Reed clearly believed that he and Wilson saw the situation in M exico the same way,
that is, as a revolution of the people against the wealthy and landed classes. The meeting in
the White House had no doubt convinced him of that fact, and while w e cannot be sure, it is
likely that W ilson expressed his admiration for Reed’s summation o f the M exican situation

55 John Reed to W oodrow Wilson, Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, pp. 192-193.
56 Reed to Wilson, W oodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30, pp. 192-193.
57 Reed to Wilson, W oodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30, pp. 192-193.
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which he sent to Page. Unfortunately Reed was mistaken in his assumption o f unanimity
with Wilson.
As promised, Reed had forwarded his draft of the article that was going to The
M etropolitan to W ilson to have it O K ’d before submitting for publication. W ilson’s
secretary Joseph Patrick Tumulty urged W ilson to reject it because “it contains various
statements which might prove very embarrassing and which should be eliminated.”58 Reed
worked on it some more, and on June 27th, submitted another draft, with a note that stated:

I don’t w ant to publish it unless I know that it is in line with your real thoughts
about Mexico. You know, of course, that I am in no way violating your confidence,
and that no mention will be made of my talk with you, or any inference that these are
your sentiments - if they are - expressed in a talk to me. 59

Once again, however, Wilson felt he needed to distance himself from Reed’s views.
W riting to Tumulty two days later, Wilson wrote that “I admire the man and the work he
has done, but clearly it would not be possible to authorize the publication of the article he
has sent us. I opened my mind to him completely and with the understanding he was not to
quote me.” Going on, W ilson suggested that “ [I]f he were to recast the article so as to
leave out all quotes or all intimation ... I think it would be possible to authorize its
publication.” W ilson then suggests a couple o f lines for Reed to adopt: “Talking with so
frank a man, it was possible to get very clear impressions of what his attitude was in regard
to the important matters we discussed. I got the impression, for example, that with regard to
* * * he would be pretty certain to decide that, etc.”60
W ilson was being less than frank, of course, for he was in the process of moving
away from the position that Reed thought they shared. Wilson must have been convinced
by Tum ulty’s analysis o f R eed’s “em barrassing” statements; it is likely Tum ulty
reminded Wilson that he could not support a socialist revolution that threatened American
58 Joseph Patrick Tum ulty to Woodrow Wilson, W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 202.
59 John Reed to W oodrow Wilson, W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 220.
60 Woodrow W ilson to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 223.
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investments and economic interests. In any case, Tumulty sent Reed a letter denying
authorization o f the draft Reed had sent. Reed replied the same day with a final, amended
draft which he hoped would finally gain approval. Arthur Link, the editor of the Woodrow
Wilson Papers believes that Tumulty must have rejected this draft as well, because it was
never published;61 Robert Rosenstone, R eed’s biographer, argues that “ [b]y the time the
piece was safe from the White House point of view, it was worthless as an article.”62
In terms of understanding Reed’s view of the Mexican Revolution and his argument
for American foreign policy, it does not matter if it was published or n o t In fact, comparing
the final paper with the piece published in the New York Times, we can get a pretty good
sense o f what Reed believed the U.S. should be doing, even if the rewrites and the
circumlocutionary tips from W ilson gave Reed the idea that he and the President did not
actually see the situation the same way.
Having begun the article by describing Wilson, Reed began to discuss the actual
situation in Mexico. “The startling thing about President W ilson’s M exican policy," Reed
wrote, “is that it is so obvious.” Arguing that Wilson had expressed his ideas many times
before, Reed lays out the essentials o f W ilson’s approach to the M exican situation,
beginning with an evaluation of its historical roots.

It is quite in character that Mr. Wilson ... returns to the attitude that this nation once
took toward the world. We boast still that the Revolution of 1775 gave impetus and
encouragement to revolutionary democracy all over Europe. We are proud that this
nation was dedicated as a refuge for the oppressed of the world: that American
sympathy has always been on the side of a people in revolt. 63

Reed clearly believed that Wilson was in full support of the peasants’ revolution in
Mexico, and that he was following a tradition of American support for revolution: "The
dominant note of the President’s words, - the point to which he returned again and again,

61 John Reed to Joseph Patrick Tum ulty, W ith Enclosure, note 2, W oodrow W ilson
Papers, vol. 30, p. 231.
62 Robert Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 176.
63 Reed to Tum ulty, “Enclosure,” W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 233.
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was that as long as he was there the United States would not give its support to tyrannies."
The Huerta regime, W ilson told Reed, was not worthy of recognition because it was based
upon assassination; “That it was a government based upon assassination was secondary;
the important thing was that it was not a government of the people.”64
A government of the people, in Reed’s mind, was not merely an echo o f Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, nor was it an abstract American political principle. Government o f the
people, Reed believed, meant a Mexican government made up of the peasants, the common
people who rode with Villa, and the revolutionaries whom Reed encountered while reporting
for the New York papers.
Given this perspective, it was relatively optimistic of Reed to believe that the United
States was going to back a Revolution that focused on the creation o f such a government particularly in light of American support for the previous repressive M exican governments.
In retrospect it was also optimistic of Reed to believe that Wilson would be the guarantor of
such a shift in Mexico. But Reed did believe in it, as we can see. Reed wrote:

It is important to bear in mind the closeness of the relationship of the United States
and the Latin-American countries. No revolution down there has ever got anywhere
without the sympathy of the United States ... W hat [Wilson] meant is perfectly
plain. The United States did not intend to lend its support, directly or indirectly, to
the looting of the people of Central and South America.65

Having explained the purpose of W ilson’s policy of non-recognition, Reed
expanded the argument. Utilizing the circumlocutionary phrasing that W ilson himself had
recommended, Reed wrote that “ [t]alking to so frank a man, it was possible to get a very
clear idea o f what his attitude had been toward Huerta at this time.” Wilson, Reed believed,
had taken the right approach when he decided to use “non-recognition” as the core o f

American policy towards the new government in Mexico. Non-recognition, Reed wrote,
is a powerful weapon and a new one in the hands of the w orld’s great States for
International Peace. President Wilson is one of the new generation of Peace
64 Reed to Tum ulty, “ Enclosure,” W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 234
65 Reed to Tum ulty, “Enclosure,” W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 234-235.
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Advocates - the kind that believes that war is objectionable not primarily because it is
bloody or cruel, but because it no longer accomplishes its purpose.66

The advantage o f non-recognition is that it is an option to armed conflict, and Reed
wrote that W ilson believed “that the whole fabric of civilization rests, not upon force, but
upon the convention between human beings that they shall appeal to reason and not to
coercion for the settlement of their differences.” Reed went on to make his argument by
pointing out that “ reason,” and not “coercion” plays itself out in Am erican society
everyday, through the American legal system; “That is why we have courts and
policem en.”
We have agreed, in theory at least, that in a difference between two men the stronger
shall not be allowed to get a club and beat the other to death; and we have created
impartial tribunals to settle the case according to its merits. There is no difference
between men and nations. The honor, interest and beliefs of two men are ju st as
sacred as those of two nations. The President did not use the army and navy to
coerce Huerta. He used them as policemen . . . 67

“There is no difference between men and nations,” Reed argued, and there is no
inherent difference between men, either, according to Reed’s socialist vision. Rather, there
was a difference in class or in social status that was the result of fundamental structural
inequities in the economic system. Reed’s argument for socialist brotherhood, the kind that
he shared with Longinos Guereca, and his vision of international relations, the kind he
hoped to develop with Mexico, were rooted in the same logic. Namely, that “the stronger
should not beat the weaker to death,” and that the United States and M exico should resolve
their issues in a court of law, and then get on with their interdependent lives. Returning to
G uereca’s language, the U.S. and M exico “ share the same blanket,” and together, they
should become wealthy and prosper.
Reed believed that this would only be possible if Wilson recognized the true nature
of the Revolution, respected the will of the peasants, and disregarded the pressure o f the
American business elite who were pushing for intervention in order to preserve their own ill-

66 Reed to Tum ulty, “Enclosure,” W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 235-236.
147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

gotten gains. A t the time of writing, Reed was optimistic: "It is clearly the President’s
purpose that no one shall take advantage of Mexico - in any way; neither military dictators,
citizens of this country, citizens of foreign countries, nor foreign governments." 68
From this description, it is evident that Reed viewed W ilson as a professor, or a priest,
someone who was above the fray, someone who was aloof.
Despite this sense of Wilson's remove, Reed concluded his draft o f the interview
article with a certain cautious optimism:

According to the evidence of his words and acts, the president is fighting everywhere
the small predatory minorities which balk the People’s struggle for intelligence and
life. But often the very conditions which gave rise to these minorities were
established peaceably, with the consent of the people they oppress; and in that case
if possible the conditions must be changed by the people peaceably, for upon the
principle of government without coercion rests our civilization. 69

That is an impressive line - “upon the principle of government without coercion
rests our civilization.” While it may be true in an ideal world, it was not true in the world
that John Reed inhabited, the world of Paterson, of Ludlow, and of Tam pico and Vera Cruz.
It is, however, the ideal world of Rousseau’s Social Contract, of Locke’s Tw o Treatises on
Government, and other idealized political theorizes that hypothesize a government of men
brought together in a shared desire to create a safer and more equable world; one in which
limits on liberty were accepted in order to bring about an increase in security. It is in this
canon that Reed’s romantic view of an American brotherhood with M exico belongs.
Unfortunately, U.S./Mexican relations did not play out the way Reed believed they
would. Instead o f the brotherhood that Reed hoped for, the United States, beginning with
W ilson (and continuing to the present day) pursued a foreign policy based upon the use of
military and economic power; it was not the brotherhood of equality that the United States

67 Reed to Tum ulty, “Enclosure,” Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 236.
68 Reed to Tum ulty, “ Enclosure,” Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 237.
69 Reed to Tum ulty, “Enclosure,” Woodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 238.
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was interested in, but rather the position of the ‘big brother’ who could have his way by
force.
Speaking in 1918, after years of frustration with Mexican policies, and after the
failure o f the “Punitive Expedition” which had been sent after Pancho Villa, following his
March, 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico, W ilson described the relationship between
the U.S. and Mexico in sorrowful terms. Speaking to a group of M exican newspaper
editors, W ilson stated that it was unfortunate that the Monroe Doctrine “was adopted
without your consent.” Continuing, W ilson added that “We did not ask if it was agreeable
to you that we should be your big brother.”70
W ilson’s com ment is worth thinking about for it illustrates the similarities to, and
the distance from, Reed’s vision of socialist brotherhood, and is illustrative o f the
intellectual connection between the two men. Reed, in his articles and in his book Insurgent
M exico, constructed a version of masculine international relations that was defined in terms
of brotherhood. Reed was able to discuss this vision in person with W ilson who, though
agreeing initially (as indicated by his enthusiasm for Reed’s article), eventually
disassociated himself from Reed’s ideas. The vision of fellowship, of “sleeping under the
same blanket,” was replaced with the brotherhood of the Monroe Doctrine and the use of
force.
This difference in conceptions of a foreign policy of manly performance can also be
discerned at the end of Reed's interview . W hat emerged at the end of the tortuous process
was a weak paper that was more Wilson than Reed; this can be plainly seen in R eed’s actual
adoption of W ilson’s suggested language. A t the same time, though, R eed’s very clear
enunciation of the connection between the conception of “nation” and the conception of
“man” was preserved. If Reed had been writing for himself, it is doubtful that he
developed the idea of the United States as a “policeman,” having seen first hand the
connection between law enforcement and big business in places like Paterson and Ludlow.
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Rather, it is his desire to connect with, and thereby influence, W ilson that leads Reed to
promote the President’s words uncritically.
“ [A]fter I had left the Executive Office,” Reed wrote at the beginning o f the piece,
“I suddenly realized that he had answered only what he had wanted to answ er ... I don’t
know yet how it happened.” W hat had happened was that Reed had been managed handily
by W ilson, and that his ideas of “brotherhood” in foreign policy had been transformed and
replaced by W ilson’s conception of international affairs as a constitutional, law-and-order
interaction.
It is unfortunate that R eed’s vision o f international “brotherhood” lost out to
W ilson’s vision of Courts and Policemen. Had Reed's ideas been followed, U.S. foreign
policy may have moved to a new level of internationalism, one that focused on the
similarities and commonalities between nations, rather than on the conflicts that bring
nations together in an entirely different way. John Reed’s vision of a U.S. foreign policy
based on the idea that nations, like men, are brothers, never had a chance to be put into play;
on the other hand, Woodrow W ilson’s vision has become famous as much for its grand
failure as for its optimistic idealism. This will become clear in the final chapter, where we
will explore the trajectory of Woodrow W ilson’s foreign policy.
Now we will turn to Jane Addams, and then to W. E. B. Du Bois, as we explore
their alternative masculinities and their alternative foreign policy visions.

70 W oodrow Wilson, “Remarks to M exican Editors,” W oodrow W ilson Papers, vol. 48,
p. 258.
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CHAPTER IV
M AN H OO D AS “A RRESTED D EV ELO PM EN T:”
JAN E ADDAMS, PEACE, AND FOREIGN POLICY

On the evening of April 30, 1899, the founder o f Hull House, the famous reformer
and one of A m erica’s most famous women, Jane Addams, stood up to address the Chicago
Liberty Meeting. Taking as her subject “Democracy or M ilitarism,” Addams addressed
the recent attempts by the United States to pacify the Philippines. Arguing that political
ideals needed to be adjusted to fit actual situations, she stated that “we may make a mistake
in politics as well as in morals by forgetting that new conditions are ever demanding of a
new morality.” International peace, Addams claimed, had taken on a new meaning; peace,
she argued, “has come to be a rising tide of moral feeling, which is slowly engulfing all
pride of conquest and making war impossible.” Warming to her subject, Addams urged
her audience to act in the name of peace: “Let us not glorify the brutality [of war]. The
same strenuous endeavor, the same heroic self-sacrifice, the same fine courage and
readiness to meet death, may be displayed without the accompaniment of killing our fellow
m en.” 1
Jane Addams, on that night in Chicago, was trying to claim the high ground in the battle for
American masculinity, but she was attempting to do so in terms defined by Theodore
Roosevelt and his colleagues, who had forged a connection between the performance of
masculinity and US foreign policy.
This chapter will examine the degree to which Addams and her colleagues, mainly
peace activists and women, were successful in their attempt to disconnect manliness from
militarism, and to reconnect it with peace activism. During the late nineteenth and early
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twentieth centuries, many activists, primarily women, fought against the masculinization of
American foreign policy and against militarism. These activists used several strategies to
develop new approaches to international relations. One approach was to separate
masculinity from international action, and to conceive of a world that was not constructed
according to a male model. Another tactic was to redefine what American masculinity
should be. Both failed. I argue that the reason for this failure was that it had become
impossible for US foreign policy to be conceived in terms that did not equate foreign policy
with manly action.
As I have discussed in the previous chapters, at the end of the nineteenth century the
concept of masculinity became central to public debate. Vociferous individuals such as
Theodore Roosevelt argued that American men needed to return to a more “Strenuous
Life,” and engage with the world in a much more physical manner. Drawing on a potent
blend of social Darwinism, popular psychology, and imagined history, advocates of the new
masculinity promoted all manner of activities and pursuits such as the new games of
football, baseball and basketball, the newly organized Scouting movement, and camping in
the outdoors as the means of eradicating “the woman within” and recovering some of the
traditional strengths of American manhood.2
During this period, fears for the fragile economy, and the slow growth of A m erica’s
overseas territories, were linked to anxieties regarding the flabby physical bodies of
American men. The push to strengthen the economy and expand Am erica’s overseas
possessions gave rise to societal pressures for men to strengthen their own bodies.
Eventually the two became conflated in an analogy that Theodore Roosevelt described in his
famous speech “National Duties,” which held that as men played their part in the life of the
nation, so m ust the United States play a manly role in the affairs of the world.

1 Jane Addams, "Democracy or Militarism" in The Chicago Liberty Meeting. Liberty Tract
No. 1 (Chicago: Central Anti-Imperialist League, 1899).
2 Rotundo, American M anhood, pp. 262-274; Kimmel, Manhood in America, pp. 118-155.
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As a result, foreign policy took its place at the center of a national debate that equated
national character with personal manly character, and the pursuit o f the “strenuous life”
with the pursuit of empire.
The popular support for the Spanish-American W ar is a striking example of this
combination of resurgent masculinity and American expansionism.3 This combination was
not limited merely to jingoistic outbursts during wartime, however, for the foreign policy
debate in the years following the Spanish-American War was also circumscribed by the
popular conception o f masculinity that Roosevelt espoused. Appalled by the bloodthirsty
support for the war, and driven by the Progressive belief in social progress through political
action, opponents of American militarism organized themselves into effective proponents for
international peace.
Many o f the prominent peace groups were initially led by men; this soon caused
difficulties for many of the organization’s female members, who felt that the problematic
equation o f masculinity and national identity was not being addressed. Noted suffragist
Carrie Chapm an Catt found that that most of these groups had a “very masculine point of
view.” In fact, she was forced to conclude after a series of conflicts with the male
leadership of various international peace organizations that the movement as a whole was
“over-m asculinized.”4 Catt, and other women who had had the same experience, including
Jane Addams of Hull House fame, called for the formation of women-led peace advocacy
groups. These groups, led by “a handful of determined women, attempted to create a
foreign policy constituency out of an existing network of more than a million women who
belonged to the popular w om en’s clubs and organizations of the tim e.” 5
This network existed in large part because women did not have the right to vote.
The W om en’s Peace Party, the American Union against Militarism, and other, related
3 Kristin H oganson’s book, Fighting for American Manhood, is an excellent exploration of
this linkage.
4 Barbara J. Steinson, American W om en’s Activism in World W ar I. New York: Garland
Publishing, 1982. Page 26.
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groups formed between the Spanish-American W ar and the end of World W ar I, followed
the model o f the W om en’s Christian Temperance Union and other influential w om en’s
groups, as they attempted to influence policy through means other than voting.6 Acting
within the political context of Gilded Age America meant that women were working within a
framework dominated by men; in order to be effective, they needed to develop a political
strategy that broadened, but did not challenge, the conventional gender order. W omen active
in the peace movement argued, therefore, that their concern for world affairs was an
extension and a continuation of their "social housekeeping," their work on issues such as
temperance, the abolition of slavery, and other related social problems where they had
exerted influence earlier. As Judith Papachristou explains, these women saw their
organizations as “an extension of their domestic responsibilities and described their
political activities in the Gilded Age as ‘home protection’ and as a way to extend the
superior morality o f the home into public life.”7
In this way, women peace activists saw themselves as inherently different from men;
men were concerned with the hurly-burly of modern industrial life, and saw the world in
terms of politics and business, where profit, competition, and success and failure were the
norm. Many women, however, viewed the world in a much more caring, giving and
unselfish manner because of a domestic routine that revolved around the home and the
family. Because of this difference in experience, activist women frequently rejected the male

5 Judith Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy, 1898-1905: Exploring
G ender in Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic History 14, Fall 1990, 493-509. Page 493.
6 The year which marks the end of my period of study, 1920, is also the year in which
women won the vote. This is not a coincidence; women were able to gain the support of
leaders such as Woodrow W ilson through their support for the war effort. W ilson went so
far as to tell Congress in the fall of 1918 that female suffrage was “vital to the winning of
the war.” See Thomas Knock. To End All Wars: Woodrow W ilson and the Q uest for a
New W orld Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) for an analysis o f the
relationship between w om en’s groups and W ilson’s policies. For a study o f the w om en’s
suffrage movement, see Aileen Kraditor. The Ideas of the W om an’s Suffrage Movement.
1890-1920. New York: Norton, 1965.
7 Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 495. For a discussion of the
roots o f "social housekeeping," see Paula Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women
and American Political Society, 1780-1920," in American Historical Review, No. 89, vol. 3
(June 1984), pp. 620-647.
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world-view of people such as Theodore Roosevelt, as well as the manly view of what the
role o f government should be.8
Similarly, they found foreign policy to be flawed in its very conception. Progressive
politicians tended to view the nation and its government along the classical “rational actor”
lines, where policy was the outcome of a rational, considered and deliberate decision making
process. Women did not see the extant foreign policy as a rational product at all; in fact it
was flawed the same way men were flawed. In fact, women peace activists “regarded
foreign policy as an expression and reflection of the men in power, men whose values they
saw as inimical to their own precisely because they were male values.” 9
As a result, one of the tactics that women chose to utilize to change American
foreign policy behavior was to replace American foreign policy’s male values with female
values. These “female” values, however, reflected not so much the unified views of all
women in America, but rather the views of a particular, self-selected group of motivated and
determined women. As Sara Evans points out in Born for Liberty. “Those ‘female values’
really represented the politicized domesticity of middle-class women with its associated
prejudices towards blacks, immigrants and the working class.” 10 Because of this, the goals
of female foreign policy advocates did not militate against political, economic, or cultural
imperialism nearly as much as they lobbied against war and for international cooperation.

8 For discussions of gendered conceptions on the roll o f the state, see Linda Gordon, ed.,
W omen. The State, and Welfare, (Madison: University o f W isconsin Press, 1991) which
collects a number of important articles (including Paula Baker's "Domestication of
Politics") which examine the role of gender in the formulation of government policies;
similarly, Robyn Muncy's Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform. 1890-1935
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) describes the efforts by women reformers to
create a "female dominion," a governmental structure based on female (rather than male)
principles, and the way that this organizational structure shaped welfare policy. Muncy's
first chapter, "Origins of the Dominion," focuses on Jane Addams and Hull House; in
addition, Theda Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
Policy in the United States. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) describes the
origins, and limitations, of social policies in the U.S. as a result of gendered conceptions of
the state.
9 Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 495.
10 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America, New York: Free
Press, 1989. Page 172. See also Baker, "The Domestication of Politics," pp.
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Female activists concerned with American foreign policy began, therefore, to focus
on issues of international peace. They determined that America’s militaristic foreign policy
rested on the analogy that linked masculine action with foreign policy. Addams, for
instance, argued in her pamphlet “Patriotism and Pacifists in W ar Tim e” that the United
States, because it had transcended not only the nationalistic feelings that immigrants brought
to the US, but also the sectional feelings of the individual states, would be the perfect model
to create for a global federalism without nationalism.11 Lucia Ames M ead o f Boston urged
women to challenge the “pernicious notion ... that patriotism is somehow necessarily
connected with the idea of killing.” Real patriotism, she argued in “ Patriotism and the New
Nationalism,” meant “study and understanding of the great issues o f the time, not dying
young or watching loved ones die without opposition.” 12
Similarly, Anna Howard Shaw attempted to counter the prevailing definition of
manliness, albeit from a different angle. Shaw, a woman’s suffrage leader, argued that
America, through its rampant militaristic culture, “was teaching the wrong idea of what
constitutes manliness.” Contradicting the prevailing view that males are genetically inclined
to fight, Shaw argued that “nine boys out of ten fight simply because they are
cowards...They don’t dare not to fight.” This point was made often in the years leading up
to World War I. As one historian points out, “ [t]he assertion that real heroes were to be
found ... in homes, and not on the battlefields, was a frequent refrain among female speakers
and writers at this time.” 13
Turning to the education of young men as a means of eliminating the desire for
combat, women peace activists opposed the popularity of boy’s brigades, among which the
most enduring and popular is the Boy Scouts. At the turn of the last century, however,
11 See Jane Addams, Patriotism and Pacifists in W ar Time. New York: Garland, 1972,
especially pp. 6-7
12 Lucia Ames Mead, “Patriotism and the new Nationalism," Boston, 1906. Page 5. Quote
found in Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 505.
13 National Council of Women, Fourth Triennial Report. 1902. pp. 52-53; for comments on
Shaw and the typicality of her arguments, see Papachristou, “American W omen and
Foreign Policy,” p. 504.
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pseudo-military parades, uniform and drilling were eveiywhere, in the church, in the YMCA,
in after-school programs like the Scouting movement, as well as in the school itself.14
Members of the Grand Army of the Republic, a Civil W ar veterans’ group, argued that the
performance of military-style drills in school was essential to the future o f the nation. As
Cecilia O'Leary points out, these veterans argued that "there could be no 'land of the free' if
the United States was not also the 'home of the brave.'"15
The attempt to militarize schools met with a lot of opposition, from parents, teachers,
pacifists, and women's groups. The frustration of many women was voiced by Hannah
Bailey of the W om en’s Christian Temperance Union when she wrote in the 1893 Annual
report that “We seek to inspire children with a love of peace by making everything of a
military nature distasteful to them, but the sham parades, sham battles, sham drills, and sham
brigadeism tend to undo our work.” 16 Unfortunately for Bailey, worse was yet to come.
While women may have agreed that the goal of international peace was of
paramount concern, and that the performance of masculinity was linked to militarism, they
did not agree on the means of bringing about a peaceful world. Some women argued that
their particular natures could improve the world situation through the moderation of the
traditional male love of conflict. One of many who took this approach was Charlotte
Perkins Gilman, author of “The Yellow Wallpaper,” and a charter member of the
W om an’s Peace Party. Though described by one of her contemporaries as “perhaps the
leading theorist of the extreme American feminist movement,” 17 Gilman was a respected
speaker with views on everything “from child-care to architecture; from feminism to

14 For an excellent overview of this movement, see David I. MacLeod, Building Character
in the American Bov: The Bov Scouts. YMCA. and Their Forerunners. 1870-1920.
Madison: The University of W isconsin Press, 1983.
15 Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary. To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 182.
16 W om an’s Christian Temperance Union, Minutes of the Annual M eeting. 1893. p. 429.
Quoted in Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 504. For a good
overview of the debate over militarism in schools at the turn of the century, see O'Leary, To
Die For, pp. 181-186.
17 Marie Louise Degen, The History of the W om an’s Peace Party. New York: Garland,
1972. Page 25.
157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

physiology; from fashion to international relations.” 18 H er book T he M an Made World.
u

one o f 2,168 items published by Gilman, directed her outrage against “androcentric
culture,” and blamed men for the concept of war. Gilman attacked militarism head-on, and
did it in terms of the gendered roles that were so familiar to followers of Roosevelt. Where
someone like T R found glory and exaltation in combat, Gilman wrote that “[i]n warfare, per
se, we find maleness in its absurdest extremes. Here is to be studied the whole gamut of
basic masculinity, from the initial instinct of combat, through every form o f glorious
ostentation, with the loudest possible accompaniment of noise.” 19
While there were many people active in the peace movement, the most prominent
architect of the American peace movement was the noted social activist Jane Addams. Well
known and highly respected because of her work with Hull House in Chicago, Addams
brought her intellect, her social concerns and her practical knowledge of organizing and
lobbying to the peace movement, with impressive results.
Jane Addams was born in 1860 in Cedarville, Illinois, the fifth child of John and
Sarah Addams. Her mother died when she was three, and Jane developed a close
relationship with her father, who was the wealthiest and most influential man in Cedarville.
John Huy Addams had made his money through investments in the railroad, and had served
as a Republican State Senator in Illinois from 1854 to 1870. Jane Addams, therefore, grew
up as a child of privilege, with a secure economic background that her father had provided.
This economic stability, Victoria Bissell Brown points out, had a great influence on
Addam s’ life: “In the privileged world that Jane Addams inhabited as a child, there was
little conflict between doing well and doing good.”20
Addams attended Rockford Female Seminary, where she graduated as valedictorian
in 1881. Rockford was led by Anna Peck Sill, who guided the school in its mission of

18 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History o f Gender and Race in
the United States. 1880-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Page 122.
19 Degen, History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 26.
20 Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House, edited with an Introduction by Victoria
Bissell Brown, Boston: Bedford/St. M artin’s, 1999. Page 5.
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“turning out Christian wives, mothers and m issionaries.” Addams was impressed by Sill;
though Addams rejected the school’s prevailing message of Christian submission, she
embraced the model Sill provided: that of a driven and assertive woman who was in control
of her career and who was working hard to be a positive influence in her community.
A ddam s’ privilege and sense of social responsibility, combined with her rejection of
the traditional notion of a “woman’s place,” positioned her right in the heart of the
Progressive reform movement. Progressives, predominantly white, educated, middle and
upper class urbanites, were beginning to press for reforms in government in order to
improve American society at large. The movement often embodied contradictions such as
those experienced by Addams, as the wealthy worked to improve the lot of the poor, as oldstock Americans sought to aid new immigrants, and as women, unable to vote, sought to
effect change in the US political system.
Addams sought to effect change through her work at Hull House in Chicago.
Having been moved by a visit to Toynbee Hall in London, Addams and her good friend
Ellen Gates Starr decided to create a similar ‘settlement house’ in Chicago. Beginning in
September of 1899, Addams and her colleagues lived at Hull House and worked hard to
make it a center of education and community life for the diverse neighborhood of the
Nineteenth Ward. Addams' social activism attracted considerable attention in Chicago, and
through public speaking, writing and political action, Addams became well known nationally
as well. Her first book, Democracy and Social Ethics, published in 1902, was a collection
of essays on various topics that grew out of her experience in negotiating political and social
change.21
Her next book, Newer Ideals of Peace, was published in 1906, and extended her
vision from Chicago to the rest of the world. Chicago, however, still remained at the center
o f her thought - the city served as an analogy of what she hoped international relations
could become. The book itself is dedicated “To Hull House and its N eighbors,” and in a
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prefatory note, Addams writes that the book’s studies of “the moral substitutes for war
have been made in the industrial quarter of a cosmopolitan city where the morality exhibits
marked social and international aspects.”22 Addams hoped that Hull House could serve as a
means to bridge the growing class and societal divides brought about by industrialization,
immigration, and urbanization in domestic American society; similarly, she hoped that her
experience with the diverse population of Hull House and its environs could serve as a
model for behavior on the international plane. As Anne Firor Scott argues, the book “is an
extension and expansion of Democracy and Social Ethics, with the difference that it projects
the ideal of social morality upon the world scene.”23
Addams uses the phrase “moral substitute for war” in her prefatory note; Scott
traces the term to W illiam James, and argues that her Newer Ideals of Peace is the result of
Jam es’ idea. In fact, Jane Addams and William James shared a stage in 1904, where they
first broached these ideas together. Speaking at the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress in
Boston in early October, Addams declared that it was necessary to “discover a moral
substitute for war, something that will appeal to the courage, the capacity of men, something
that will develop their finest powers without deteriorating their moral nature, as war
constantly does.”24 When this new substitute was discovered, Addams believed that “the
childish notions of power” held by the militarists would begin to change, and that their
“boyish ideas of adventure,” and their “rabble conceptions of what pleasure and manliness
and courage consist in, will fall away from them as the garments of a child are dropped off
from his growing form .”23
Addams was clearly trying to break the connection between US foreign policy and
manly behavior. Similarly, Henry James declared that it was important that the idea of war
22 Jane Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace. New York: Macmillan Company, 1906. Page vii.
23 Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, edited with an Introduction by Anne Firor
Scott, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Page lxii.
24 Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Conference. Boston: 1904. Page 145.
Quotes in Linda Schott, "Jane Addams and W illiam James on Alternatives to War," Journal
o f the History o f Ideas, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April, 1993), pages 241-254 led me to this source.
2 Official Report, pp. 261-262.
160

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

be transformed to something more socially productive, though he believed that the idea and
appeal of war would never disappear from the human character. This indelible human
characteristic could be contained and controlled, however - “let the general possibility of
w ar be left open ... for the imagination to dally with. Let the soldiers dream o f killing, as
the old maids dream of marrying.”26
As Linda Schott has pointed out, Addams and James may have shared a similar
belief in the benefits that war provided to American society (social cohesion, and rise in
selflessness, for example), but they were divided in their approach to w ar’s negative aspects.
Addams saw the need for “a moral substitute for war,” a social force that would bring men
and women together in common cause - in other words, a means to bring men around to the
view already held by women. James, however, saw a solution that maintained the same
gendered divisions - men, as soldiers, would continue to dream of killing, while women,
fixated with marriage, would be occupied with their own separate sphere.27
Addams elaborated her views on peace in Newer Ideals O f Peace, first published in
1906. In the first sentence of the book, Addams presents “the claims of the newer, more
aggressive ideals of peace, as over against the older dovelike ideal. These newer ideals are
active and dynamic, and it is believed that if their forces were really made operative upon
society, they would, in the end, quite as a natural process, do away with war.”28 In Newer
Ideals. Addams articulated a new approach to international peace that has internalized, and
adopted, the linkage between masculinity and foreign policy. In doing so, Addams and her
colleagues hoped to promote international peace in a way that directly challenged the
masculinist-imperialist policies promoted by Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan and others. The
problem with Addams’ logic, however, was that it continued the very connection that gave
rise to the increase in militarism, namely the linkage between masculinity and international
affairs. Though Addams may have disagreed with TR on what ideal ‘m anly’ behavior was,

26 Official Report, p. 267.
27 Schott, "Jane Addams and William James on Alternatives to War," p. 243.
28 Jane Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace. New York: Macmillan Company, 1907. Page 3.
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she was still working within the analogy that TR constructed, namely that nations and
international conduct could be understood as extensions of men and manly conduct.
Addams extended her analysis of these “aggressive ideals of peace” through eight
chapters that trace the “ Survivals of M ilitarism in City G overnm ent,” “ M ilitarism and
Industrial Legislation,” before ending with the “Passing of the W ar V irtues.” It is here
that Addams grapples with James directly. While both James and Addams sought a
substitute for war that would give rise to the same social cohesion, but without the
accompanying death and destruction of war, they differed on the means and tactics.
A ddam s’ tactic was to imbue pacifism with the stirring force that militarism had in
American society at the turn of the century; an example of this can be found in her
description o f how “the international effort to rid the earth of tuberculosis” had
“discoverers and veterans, also its decorations and rewards for bravery. Its discipline is
severe; it requires self-control, endurance, self-sacrifice and constant watchfulness.”29 This
adoption o f the language of militarism for the purposes of intenational peace and
cooperation continues through the book, and is quite refreshingly optimistic. “We may
predict,” Addams writes, “that each nation quite as a natural process will reach the moment
when virile good-will will be substituted for the spirit of warfare.”30 Virile good-will
becomes defined through the book as the inversion o f the masculine imperialism as defined
by Roosevelt and his colleagues; the last chapter of the book even describes the “Passing of
the W ar V irtues.”
In this chapter, Addams described the change that she believed would occur with the
same kind of analogy that TR used to set up his original analogy at the M innesota State
Fair. Beginning with a description of a young boy, Addams wrote that

[t]he little lad who stoutly defends himself on the schoolground may be worthy of
much admiration, but if we find him, a dozen years later, the bullying leader of a
street-gang who bases his prestige on the fact that “no one can whip him,” our
29 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 25.
30 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 26.
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admiration cools amazingly, and we say that the carrying over of those puerile
instincts into manhood shows arrested development which is mainly responsible for
filling our prisons.31

This serves as a clear statement of Addams’ take on the Rooseveltian analogy that
equates manly action with national action, for Addams viewed T R ’s manly performance
model as an example of “arrested development.” Though Addams may have seen much
that was valuable in the “war virtues,” she, as opposed to Roosevelt, saw the progress of
civilization as dependent on their passing; Roosevelt, remember, saw the survival of
civilization in the preservation of the rugged (and militaristic) masculinity. As Addams
explained, “We may admire much that is admirable in this past life o f courageous warfare,
while at the same time we accord it no right to dominate the present, which has traveled out
o f its reach into a land of new desires.”32
Continuing in this vein, she argued “Let us by all means acknowledge and preserve
that which has been good in warfare, and in the spirit of warfare; let us gather it together and
incorporate it into our national fibre.” The purpose, though, is not to glorify combat, or the
traditional masculine/warrior virtues, but rather to build on, and to progress beyond them.
As Addams explained,
The task that is really before us is first to see to it, that the old virtues bequeathed by
war are not retained after they have become a social deterrent and that social
progress is not checked by a certain contempt for human nature which is but the
inherited result of conquest. Second, we must act upon the assumption that
spontaneous and fraternal action as virile and widespread as war itself is the only
method by which substitutes for the war virtues may be discovered.33

For Addams, it was an inescapable fact that masculine ideals and international action
are linked; history has its roots in the masculine “war virtues,” and as she explains in the
chapter “Militarism in City Government,” these military virtues have defined American
political action - even the right to vote was limited to those who could carry a gun. Though
this link between men, militarism, and international affairs appeared solid, Addams saw the
31 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 211
32 Addams. Newer Ideals, p. 210-211.
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solution in changing, or altering the form of masculinity - substituting virile and fraternal
action, in a cooperative international context, for the rugged individualism of Roosevelt.
A ddam s’ solution to T R ’s model of American foreign policy thus mirrored some of
the predominate strains of the Gilded Age in America. The historian Alan Trachtenberg, for
example, has described the Gilded Age as the age of incorporation; similarly, Jason
Kaufman has described the years between the end of the Civil W ar and the end of the Great
W ar as “The G olden Age o f Fraternity.” It is not surprising that A ddam s, like John Reed,
looks to brotherhood, cooperation and fraternal connections as the solution to Roosevelt’s
rampant rugged individualism.34
The problem however, is that Addams is unable to alter the source o f the problem,
namely that international affairs had become inextricably linked to conceptions of masculine
performance. The best that Addams could do was to try to alter the definition of
masculinity that defined the process of international relations. A shift from the manly and
rugged individualism that played itself out as unilateral economic imperialism to a model of
fraternal (albeit virile) cooperation, that would play itself out as a League o f Nations (for
example), would be a step in the direction of peace and international stability. It would,
however, mean that the root connection between manliness and US foreign policy remained
untouched.
Following the publication of Newer Ideals of Peace, (which Teddy Roosevelt
described as a “ bad book, a very bad book” )35 Addams remained involved with the
growing peace movement, and felt rather optimistic about the success that the international
peace movement was enjoying. This optimism was shattered in A ugust of 1914 as Europe
went to war, but the events gave Addams the opportunity to put her ideas into action. In the
fall of 1914 she helped to organize the Union Against Militarism with her colleague Lillian
33 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 211.
34 See Alan Trachtenberg. The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded
A ge. Boston: Hill and Wang, 1982; and Jason K aufm an’s For the Com m on Good?
American Civil Life and the Golden Age of Fraternity. New York: Oxford University Press,

2002.
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Wald o f the Henry Street Settlement in New York, and Paul Kellogg, the editor of Survey,
and journal that focused on social work.36
This organization did not entirely satisfy Addams, however. She had been active in
the woman suffrage movement for years, and her work on behalf of women had led her to
believe in the importance of women’s contributions to society. She had also come to
believe that women, as women, were naturally suited to the solving o f social ills. Foremost
o f the ills plaguing modern society was war.
As a result of this belief, and influenced by similar developments in the European
Peace movements, Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt (the “general o f the suffrage
m ovem ent” ) 37 called a conference in January of 1915 to help found a W om an’s Peace
Party.

The platform stated that:
Equally with men pacifists, we understand that planned for, legalized,
wholesale, human slaughter is today the sum of all villainies.
As Women, we feel a particular moral passion of revolt against both the
cruelty and the waste of war.
As Women, we are especially the custodian of the life of the ages. We will
not longer consent to its reckless destruction ...
We demand that women be given a share in deciding between war and peace
in all the courts of high debate - within the home, the school, the church, the
industrial order, and the state.38

This argument constructs women as a counterweight to men, and posits that women,
as mothers and nurturers, have the right, and the obligation, to be included in debates that
settle “questions concerning not alone the life of individuals but of nations” as well. This
construction, which challenged the traditional masculinist belief that war is the sole province
o f men, could also be perceived as a challenge to the “androcentric culture” of Charlotte
Perkins Gilman. Reminding ourselves of her famous lines, we read again that

35 Quoted in Degen. History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 18.
36 Degen. History o f the W om an’s Peace Party, pp. 21-24.
37 Aileen Kraditor. The Ideas of the W om en’s Suffrage Movement. 1890-1920. New York:
W.W. Norton, 1981. Page 271.
38 Degen, History o f the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 40.
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[i]n warfare, per se, we find maleness in its absurdest extremes. Here is to be
studied the whole gamut of basic masculinity, from the initial instinct o f combat,
through every form of glorious ostentation, with the loudest possible
accompaniment of noise.39

The patriotic rush to war which marked the capitals of Europe in August of 1914
illustrates what Gilman is getting at - the uniforms, the marching bands, the parades and the
enthusiasm of public performed patriotism. Within this rush to war, it was apparent to
many observers that “the outbreak of the World War, the apparent result of the
accumulating stupidities and sins of men as rulers, should bring the disillusionment of
feminists with a man-run world to a climax.” Though Addams was not as radical a feminist
as Gilman, she shared some of the same irritation with excessive displays of masculinity; as
one historian explained, “ [e]ven in Miss Addams, certainly no man-hater, there is distinct
evidence” o f this mode of thought. 40
Addams's concern with destructive masculinity can be seen in her earlier writing,
particularly in The Spirit of Youth, a book that looks at the problems of young people
growing up in the modern city. In particular she looks at how young men, with no real
outlet for their energies, wind up committing pointless crimes as a pastime (breaking
windows, stealing fruit, stealing bicycles for joyrides, etc), which lead them into worse
company and progressively more serious crime. Addams urged her readers to recognize
that the young need proper outlets for their natural energies; “This stupid experiment of
organizing work and failing to organize play” has resulted in young men who are
increasingly disrupting American society.41
The solution, Addams believed, was to do more than just control the problem
through the courts - for by the time young men are in court, the problem was already out of
hand. Instead, Addams argued, there should be room for young men and their interests in
39 Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Man-Made World. New York: Charlton Co., 1911. Page
211. Also quoted in Degen, History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 26
40 Degen. History of the W om an’s Peace Party, pp. 26.27.
41 Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, excerpted in Christopher Lasch,
The Social Thought of Jane Addams. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Page 86.
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modern society, but they should also be taught to control their behavior. Young men needed
to be free - indeed freedom was at the root of the American experience, but that freedom
needed to be tempered with responsibility and self-control. ‘T h e path to freedom open to
all in America could not be denied to the young, Addams understood, but that path was
‘made safe only through their self-control.’” This self-control was to be inculcated in
young men by their integration into the community, and their initiation into adulthood. 42
Similarly, on the international plane, nations that were caught up in the masculine
pageant of militarism needed to be led to channel their masculine energies in a different
way; these nations needed to find a substitute for war, such as those we have already
discussed. But because the rampant militarism was rooted in a masculine performance
model, the best way to counter the national masculinity of militarism was through a
concerted action by women.
This idea was originally suggested to Addams by the British suffragist Emmeline
Pethick-Lawrence, who, along with her Hungarian colleague Rosika Schwimmer, had made
a speaking tour of the United States in 1914. As Addams wrote in Peace and Bread in Time
of War. Pethick-Lawrence “hoped to arouse American women to join their European sisters
in a general protest against war.”43
Pethick-Lawrence argued for the involvement of women as women; as she wrote in
1914,
[I]t is vital to the deepest interests of the human race that the mother half of
humanity should now be admitted into the ranks of the articulate democracies of the
world, in order to strengthen them and enable them to combine more effectively in
their own defense against the deadly machinery of organized destruction that
threatens in the future to crush the white races and to overwhelm civilization.44
In a similar vein, Rosika Schwimmer, winner of the World Peace Prize in 1937, also
decried the excessive militarism of the era, arguing that women needed to get involved to

42 Elshtain. Jane Addams. p. 134, 135.
43 Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of W ar, edited by Blanch Wiesen Cook, New
York: Garland Publishing, 1972. Page 6.
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stop it. W omen were naturally more inclined toward peace, and they needed to become
involved in the peace process because any peace that did not include women would be of
short duration. As the World Peace Prize Award statement put it, Schwimmer was
motivated to act because “a war ended by militarists meant a peace dictated by militarism,
with new causes for future action.”45
In the same vein, Pethick-Lawrence, arguing for women's involvement in foreign
relations, explained that “the bed-rock of humanity is motherhood.” Because women bore
children, raised them, and maintained the family and the home, they were uniquely qualified
to mediate the conflict in Europe. While this attitude may seem dated and essentialist today,
it was a perception that was shared by many:
Women, it was said, might well stand aghast at the contemporary spectacle of ruin in
Europe, for they had no responsibility for the cataclysm. [The War] was solely the
doing of male government, which had disregarded the warnings of women and had
arrogantly denied them the vote.46

In this context, it is entirely logical that Pi thick-Lawrence should write that “ [tjoday,
it is for men to stand down and for the women whom they have belittled to take the seat of
judgem ent.” 47 The point that Pithick-Lawrence and the WPP were making is that the war
came about as the direct result of unchecked masculinity. Their solution was to introduce
women to the political mix - to counteract the previous trend of male dominated politics and
foreign policy. This end would be achieved by w om an’s suffrage, and by the mediation of
women in the conflict; negotiating, resolving, making connections and bringing about peace.
The problem, however, is that Addams, Pithick-Lawrence and Schwimmer were not
attacking the root of the problem, for substituting women for men does not challenge the
association of foreign policy with masculinity. Rather, it affirms it by acknowledging that
masculinity and militarism are linked. The famous adage of Carl von Clausewitz, that war is
44 Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, “Motherhood and W ar,” Harpers Weekly 1914, LIX, p.
542. Q uoted in Degen, History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 33.
45 Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, p. 34.
46 Degen, History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p. 34
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foreign policy by other means, is another expression of the same idea. Ultimately, the
inability of the W om an’s Peace Party to check the excessive militarism of the United States
was a direct result of their inability to disengage foreign policy from the conception of
manly behavior.
During the period from 1914 to 1917, the W om an’s Peace Party continued to
pursue attempts to mediate and negotiate an end to the conflict in Europe, but they met with
little success. Despite having meetings with various heads of state, belligerents as well as
neutrals, Addams, Catt and Emily Balch were unable to get a commitment for peace. With
the American entry in April of 1917, Addams was left in the cold, as public sentiment swung
toward the ultra-patriotic, in a manner identical to that sentiment that rushed through Paris,
Berlin and London in 1914.
In her address, “Patriotism and Pacifists in War Tim e,” given in many places
around the country, Addams continued to argue the same line that she had laid out earlier,
namely that “that war, although exhibiting some of the noblest qualities o f the human spirit,
yet affords no solution for vexed international problems.” Addams also attempted to
counter the “blind admiration for the soldier” and the “unspeakable contem pt for him who
... declares that fighting is unnecessary.” While she states that she does not find it
surprising that pacifists in war time are called “traitors and cowards,” she organized her
address to counter the allegation.48
Arguing that pacifists are not traitors because they are loyal to the values that the
United States embraced before the declaration of war, and stressing the courage inherent in
any action that goes so completely against popular sentiment as pacifism in war-time,
Addams attempted to disconnect US foreign policy from the powerful belief in the
redeeming pow er of manly performance. Towards the end of her talk, Addams stressed the
internationalism of the peace movement, and the example that the United States could
47 Emmeline Pithick-Lawrence, “National Efforts Crystalizing for Peace,” Survey, 1915,
XXXIII, p. 393-394. Quoted in Degen. History of the W om an’s Peace Party, p.36.
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provide to Europe, with its multiethnic makeup, and its system of constitutional law. It is
only pacifists, Addams argued, “who will at last create a political organization enabling
nations to secure without war, those high ends which they now gallantly seek to obtain upon
the battlefield.”49
In effect, Addams was claiming for the pacifist the same essential masculinity that
the militarists such as Theodore Roosevelt had already claimed for themselves. Addams
asked
can the pacifists of today be accused of selfishness when they urge upon the United
States not isolation, not indifference to moral issues and to the fate o f liberty and
democracy, but a strenuous endeavor to lead all nations o f the earth into an
organized international life worthy of civilized men?50

Addams believed that the answer was no, but she found that there were few that agreed with
her. In fact, despite her claim for the “strenuous endeavor” of pacifism, she was pilloried
in the press for cowardice and treason, and many of her W om an’s Peace Party colleagues
broke with her.
The press was vituperative in its assessment of Addams’ argument, and she was
inundated with articles, editorials and letters that criticized her position. The New York
Herald wrote
It may not be cowardice for an American to oppose a war in which the United States
is engaged, but it is something infinitely more despicable. It is bordering on treason
... America is fighting because she was forced to fight or become a nation of Jane
Addamses, and the sooner the Chicago pacifist lets that fact infiltrate into her brain
the sooner will she understand why this nation is going to fight for a righteous
peace.51

In a similar vein, The Cleveland News, linking Addams with Jeanette Rankin, who voted
against the war, wrote that
to accept a couple of foolish virgins as accurately typifying the attitude of a whole
sex toward war would be to do hideous injustice to thousands o f noble women who,
48 Jane Addams, “ Patriotism and Pacifism in W ar Time,” included in Addams, Peace and
Bread, as a supplement. Page 3.
49 Addams, “ Patriotism and Pacifism,” p. 22.
50 Addams, “Patriotism and Pacifism,” p. 22.
51 Degen. History of W om an’s Peace Party, p. 200
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in this as in other wars, were quick to perceive what it all was about and to lend their
aid with splendid discrimination and devotion.52

In both these quotes, we see that the linkage between pacifism and “strenuous
endeavor,” or manliness, that Addams had been trying to construct had been shrugged off
by the editorialists. In fact, the writers had made exactly the opposite connection - they had
linked Addams with cowardice (there could be nothing worse than “a nation o f Jane
Addamses,” according to the Herald), and with a lack of sexuality. Being a virgin is clearly
the same as being an idiot, according to the Cleveland News. In addition, being a virgin is
not at all the same as being a “woman.”
Womanhood, it is clear, was as connected to performance as was manhood; where
m en’s performance needed to be performed outside the home, a w om an’s performance
happened in the home. Real women, clearly, embraced what Roosevelt had urged in
“ National Duties;” they had sex, and they had children. “The willfully barren woman has
no place in a sane, healthy, and vigorous community,” as Roosevelt put i t . 53 Sex, the actual
sex act, is an important issue here; we must remember, that masculinity and virility are two
sides of the same coin; both are necessary to American foreign policy according to the
construction of the Rooseveltian model of ‘national duties’, and as expressed by men such
as Albert Beveridge. Women who had not had sex threatened the established order and
posed a threat to American global preeminence.
A ddam s’s belief that she could alter the linkage between masculinity and foreign
policy by linking manliness to pacifism was misplaced. Not only was she unable to make
that connection believable, but she failed to the extent that her own reputation and character
were irreparably damaged. As late as 1934, the year before her death, Addams was being
accused of treasonous acts. Elizabeth Dilling, the author of The Red Network: A W ho’s
W ho and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots described Addams as one of “reds” that

52 Degen. History of W om an’s Peace Party, p. 201
53 Theodore Roosevelt, "National Duties", in The Strenuous Life. New York: RF.Collier
and Son, 1901. Page 230.
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patriots must avoid. Dilling has grudging admiration for Addams, the com munist agent:
“One knowing of her consistent aid to the Red movement can only marvel at the smooth
and charm ing way she ... disguises this aid, and reigns as ‘queen’ on both sides o f the
fen ce .”54
Leaving aside the fact that neither “reds” nor “patriots” have any monarchical
inclinations, it is evident that A ddam s’ character, her bearing and her consistent approach to
the problems of world peace, like her approach to the people o f the neighborhood around
Hull House, is really what is at issue. Addams was simply not man enough to disengage
militant masculinity from US foreign policy.
These attempts to separate the conventional conception o f masculinity that included
militarism and violence from feelings of nationalism ultimately failed, as the United States
plunged into the First World War. The wartime experience, in fact, marked a real highwater mark of intolerance, as anything less than “ 100% Am ericanism ” was deemed
unpatriotic. Newspapers were shut down by the government, anti-war activists were jailed,
and women such as Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt and Lucia Ames Mead were
pilloried in the press as the coalition of progressives that had elected Woodrow Wilson in
1916 was jettisoned in a rush of patriotism.
This patriotism, unsurprisingly, took the traditional conflation o f masculine
militaristic ideals and reinforced them, making them all the more explicit. The nation relied
on men to fill the ranks of the armed services, and employed classic rhetorical means to
achieve that end. Recruiting posters played on the gender stereotypes with great effect.
One o f the more famous showed a uniform draped over a chair with the words: “It takes a
man to fill it.” This continued reliance on the linkage between masculinity and patriotism
was an indication that the attempts of women peace activists had failed to separate the two,
as well as failing to redefine the American national personality as anything other than
manly.

54 Quoted in Elshtain, Jane Addams. p. 19.
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The reason for this failure lies in the fact that women could not challenge the
original gender definitions that gained them a hearing on the national stage. Since the
women spoke as women, they had trouble arguing with men who were not only national
leaders, but who also had the privilege of speaking as Americans. The attempt to shift the
terms of the debate was doomed because the women were playing the game according to
male rules. As one historian has pointed out, “in politicizing women, the leadership (of
w om en’s peace groups) called upon them to play a role in a male arena, but to do so as
w om en.”55 In this way, they were naturally unable to challenge the rhetoric of manliness
promoted by Theodore Roosevelt and other militarists precisely because they were locked
into a gendered social position defined by men as well.
It was not until much later that women were able to begin to shape foreign policy, as
well as national identity, in a way that was less pernicious. Despite the lack of success,
however, women’s involvement with, and concern for, the direction of United States foreign
policy never disappeared. In Madeleine Albright’s tenure as Secretary of State during the
Clinton Administration, and Condoleeza Rice’s position as National Security Advisor (as
well as her more recent appointment as Secretary of State), women can be seen to have
reached their apogee of influence.
Rice, in particular, is an interesting example of the change in gendered conceptions
of foreign policy influence; many of the critiques of her policy positions have focused on
her "toughness", not on her pacifism . In this way she adheres more closely to the ideal
espoused by Roosevelt, than that espoused by any o f the women policy activists that argued
with him. We must not forget, however, that the seeds for Rice’s success were sown in the
years between 1898 and 1920, when women first explicitly challenged the conjunction of
the performance of manly acts and American international action.

55 Papachristou, “American W omen and Foreign Policy,” p. 509.
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CHAPTER V

“PLAY TH E M AN:”
W. E. B. DU BOIS, W ORLD W AR ONE, AND TH E “CO LO R LIN E”

In January o f 1912, W illiam Edgar Burghardt Du Bois published an editorial that
listed his New Year's resolutions. “I am resolved in this new year,” Du Bois wrote, “to
play the man - to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye, and walk to my work
with no shuffle or slouch ... I am resolved to be satisfied with no treatm ent which ignores
my manhood and my right to be counted as one among m en.” 1W. E. B. Du Bois was the
editor of the N A A C P’s journal The Crisis and an influential leader o f the African
American community, in part because of his important book The Souls of Black Folk.2
As an African American activist, Du Bois was well aware of how hard it could be for an
African American male to "play the man," much less to be "counted as one among men."
He was personally fam iliar with the slurs, slights and indignities of the everyday life of
African Americans in America in the early twentieth century.
The key to Du B ois’s New Y ear’s declaration is that he fram ed his determination
to meet these slights head-on as a resolution “to play the man.” Du Bois saw the
indignities o f the African American experience in the first decades o f the twentieth

1 W. E. B. Du Bois, “I A m Resolved,” The Crisis, January, 1912, p. 113.
2 See W .E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black F olk. Boston: Bedford Books, 1997. For an
excellent biography o f Du Bois, see David Levering Lew is’ W .E.B. Du Bois: Biography
of a Race. 1868-1919. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1993.
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century as an insult to his status as an American citizen, and also as “treatm ent which
ignore[d his] m anhood.” Countering this treatment required the assertion o f his own
manliness. Every tim e someone called him “boy, “ Du Bois w ould respond with the
carriage and actions that proved he was a man. The performance o f m asculinity was an
assertion o f A m erican citizenship. In this respect, Du B ois’s words are a clear exam ple
o f the cultural link between manhood and American citizenship that prevailed at the
beginning o f the tw entieth century.
It is also notable that Du Bois framed his discussion of m asculinity in terms of
perform ance; when he resolved to “play the man” in 1912, he im plied that in earlier years
he had played some other role. For Du Bois, manliness was a choice, even an aspiration.
It was not a simple m atter o f physiology. Du Bois’s comments were directed to a
prim arily African Am erican audience that included many male persons whose social
position had prevented them from playing the man, as citizens, as econom ic providers, as
com bat soldiers, and even as members of fraternal organizations. In 1912, his African
American audience would have understood Du B ois’s sentiments as a clarion call for
change; for an African American male to “play the m an” would have m eant taking on a
new social role
W.E.B. Du Bois believed in T R ’s analogy, and hoped to use it to raise African
Americans from “boys” to “men.” In making this transition, African A m ericans would
then win what Du Bois called their “full-manhood rights.” The assertion o f masculinity,
then, becam e the same as an assertion o f membership in American society; manliness and
A m ericanness becam e intertwined in Du B ois’ pursuit o f equality.
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The central part o f “play[ing] the man” for Du Bois was the requirem ent that he
“look the world in the eye.” The assertion o f masculinity that proves his rightful place in
the American polity cannot be achieved unless it be done in view o f the world; when Du
Bois looked “the world squarely in the eye,” he was doing m ore than staring down
American bigots on his way to work “with no shuffle or slouch;” he was proving his
masculinity not merely in an American context, but in the eyes o f the world.
Through his manly gaze, Du Bois hoped to win recognition from the rest of the world,
which in turn would guarantee the political equality he so rightfully deserved. In this
way, the achievem ent o f national political rights was predicated by a masculinity justified
by international, or world, recognition.3
This chapter will discuss the attempts by W.E.B. Du Bois to challenge and alter
the construction o f a foreign policy based on manly national perform ance, so as to
include a m asculinity based on that of African American men. Like John Reed and Jane
Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois attempted to alter the Rooseveltian construction o f national
masculinity. W here Reed attempted to incorporate the m asculinity o f socialist
brotherhood, and Addams hoped to engender a new definition o f masculinity, Du Bois

3 Increasing attention is being paid to Du B ois’ linkage o f masculinity and national
identity; see, for exam ple the discussion of Du Bois' involvement in W orld W ar I in
Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois. p. 554-556; M ark Ellis, “ ’Closing R anks’ and ‘Seeking H onors’:
W.E. B. Du Bois in W orld W ar I,” in The Journal o f Am erican H istory, Vol. 79, No. 4,
(June 1992), pp. 96- 124; W illiam Jordan, “ ’The Damnable D ilem m a:’ African American
A ccomodation and Protest during W orld W ar I,’” in Journal o f Am erican History, Vol.
81, No. 4, (M arch, 1994), pp. 1562-1583; and M ark E llis’ response to Jordan’s article,
“W.E.B. Du Bois and the Formation o f Black Opinion in W orld W ar I: A Comm entary
on ’The Damnable D ilem m a’”, Journal o f Am erican History, Vol. 81, No. 4, (M arch
1994),pp. 1584-1590; see also Gerald Horne, “Race From Power: US Foreign Policy and
the General Crisis o f ‘W hite Suprem acy,” ’ in Diplomatic History, Vol 23, No. 3
(Summer 1999), pp. 437-461 for an overview o f the relationship between ‘w hiteness’ and
US foreign policy.
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hoped to include African American men in the Rooseveltian national m asculinity model,
and thereby secure their place in American society. Focusing on the idea o f performance,
I will argue that Du Bois believed that the best way to achieve full citizenship rights for
African Americans was through manly action. W hile Roosevelt may have constructed
the analogy that a man needs to act in the nation in the same way that the nation needs to
act towards the world, Du Bois sought to utilize and co-opt that structure.
This cam e to a fine point during the First W orld War, when the United States was
trying to “make the world safe for dem ocracy.” Since the US was acting in Europe to
save dem ocracy, Du Bois believed that it made perfect sense for African A m ericans to
serve the nation in Europe. In terms of Roosevelt's analogy, as Black men fight for
dem ocracy in their nation, so the United States fights for dem ocracy in the world. In this
way, African American men would achieve the benefits o f dem ocracy at home, and win a
victory for international peace abroad. Essential to achieving these goals was the
performance of feats of masculinity; in other words, African Americans needed to “play
the man.”
Ever since he was young, Du Bois had been concerned with the intersection of
masculinity, patriotism and American citizenship. W illiam Edgar Burghardt Du Bois was
born in G reat Barrington, M assachusetts, in February o f 1868, the son o f a Haitian
im m igrant nam ed Alfred Du Bois, and M ary Silvina Burghardt, a free black woman
whose family had lived in western M assachusetts for generations. The young Du Bois
quickly made an impression at school, where he excelled, and attracted the attention of
Frank Hosmer, the Principal of G reat Barrington High School. H osm er, a progressive
man for his times, helped to make it possible for the young Du Bois to attend Fisk
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University, in Nashville, Tennessee. Du Bois him self had been hoping to attend Harvard,
but the expense and concerns about his preparation made it unfeasible. Du Bois traveled
south to Fisk in 1885, therefore, and spent the next few years in Tennessee, graduating
from Fisk in 1888. Du Bois then reapplied to Harvard, and was accepted as a junior.4
A t Harvard, Du Bois cam e under the influence o f W illiam Jam es, who had been
teaching there since 1872. James, the famous and influential philosopher and
psychologist, reigned at the center o f a University that stressed and rew arded manliness
above all else. As Kim Tow nsend explains in M anhood at Harvard: W illiam James and
O thers. James was a proponent o f a particular Gilded Age Anglo-Saxon construction of
manly behavior and a social critic whose philosophical and psychological solutions to the
anxieties o f turn-of-the-century America were rooted in a belief in the redeem ing
qualities o f masculinity. A ddressing the doubt and indecision many men experienced in
the increasingly fast pace o f modern American society, James advised them to “Hang
your sensibilities! Stop your sniveling complaints, and your equally sniveling raptures!
Leave off your general emotional tomfoolery, and get to W ORK like m en!”5
Du Bois, class of 1890, like Theodore Roosevelt (class o f 1880) and John Reed
(class o f 1910), was greatly influenced by the ethos o f m anliness that was central to
Harvard. M any of his undergraduate papers reveal his wrestling with the idea o f the
“Harvard M an,” and indicate that while he approved o f and encouraged manliness, he
challenged the race and class divisions that actually made “w hiteness” possible. In fact,

4 See Lewis, W.E.B. Du B ois. pp. 26-55, for a discussion o f Du Bois's childhood in
G reat Barrington, and pp. 56-78, for his experiences at Fisk.
5 Kim Townsend, M anhood At Harvard: W illiam James and O thers. New York: W.W.
Norton, 1996, p. 39.
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Du Bois saw a clear connection between the cultivation o f A nglo Saxon conceptions of
manly behavior and national tragedies such as the Civil War.
This connection was made most clear in his com m encem ent address, “Jefferson
Davis as a Representative of C ivilization,” a speech Du Bois was asked to deliver
because o f his stellar academic record. Du Bois began the speech with the line that
“Jefferson Davis was a typical Teutonic hero; the history o f civilization during the last
millenium has been the development o f the Strong M an o f w hich he was the
embodiment. The Anglo-Saxon loves a soldier - Jefferson D avis was an Anglo-Saxon,
Jefferson Davis was a soldier.”6
Du Bois argued that he “wished to consider not the man, but the type of
civilization which he represented: its foundation is the idea o f the strong man Individualism coupled with the rule o f m ig h t...” His analysis led him to see Davis, and
the civilization he represented, in a very clear manner: “The Strong M an and his mighty
Right Arm has become the Strong Nation with its armies. U nder whatever guise,
however a Jefferson Davis might appear, as man, as race, or as nation, his life can only
mean this: the advance of a part o f the world at the expense of the w hole.” This
connection is fascinating, and it is important as an early explication o f Du B o is’ version
of the connection between manliness and national identity. The US during the
antebellum era had nurtured the Jefferson Davis type, and the result was the Civil W ar; as
manly ideals went, so went the nation, Du Bois believed, and while the Civil W ar was a

6 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Jefferson Davis as a Representative o f C ivilization,” in W ritings.
New York: Library o f America, 1986. Page 811.
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tragic outcome o f masculinist thinking, Du Bois still believed in the positive connection
between national citizenship and m anliness.7
Looking at the situation o f the U nited States in 1890, Du Bois saw an opportunity
for a change in the manly type. W hile Jefferson Davis may have been the em bodim ent of
the “Strong M an” , African Americans represented “Submissive M an,” Du Bois argued,
and it is the melding o f the two that would mark the future o f civilization. In a kind of
Hegelian synthesis, Du Bois argues that the com bination o f both doctrines, that of the
Strong M an and of the Submissive M an guarantees a shift in the use o f power.
W hat then is the change made in the conception o f civilization, by adding to the
conception o f the Strong M an, that o f the Submissive M an? It is this: the
subm ission o f the strength of the Strong to the advance o f a ll.. . 8

The national synthesis o f African Am erican and Southern (or Anglo-Saxon)
conceptions o f masculinity leads, in Du Bois' analogy, to a check on the excesses of
Anglo Saxon masculinity, as well as on the extrem es of A frican Am erican submission.
As Anglo Saxon masculinity is limited, the corollary is that African American
masculinity m ust be improved. The result, therefore is the construction o f a new
paradigm o f national masculinity, in which strength (in cultural and econom ic, as well as
physical terms) is brought to bear not for individual gain, but for the benefit o f society as
a whole. African Americans, in Du Bois' analogy, are the key com ponent in what he
calls the “round and full developm ent” o f Am erican manhood.
This early address, delivered in 1890 in H arvard’s M em orial Hall (a building
dedicated to H arvard men who fell in the Civil W ar), lays out several key arguments that

7 Du Bois, “Jefferson Davis,” pp. 811-812.
8 Du Bois, “Jefferson Davis,” p. 813.
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Du Bois would continue to make for the rest o f life. First, Du Bois believed in the
importance o f personal m anliness - his writings consistently refer to the im portance of
manly carriage, and he conceived o f political struggle in terms o f the need for “ full
manhood rights.” In addition, Du Bois, like R oosevelt and others, saw the United States
as a man w rit large. The nation itself had the attributes o f a man, and international
behavior could be conceived in the same way as interactions am ong men. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, Du Bois saw African Americans as the key to transforming the
nature o f Am erican society, through their character. In many ways, as the “Jefferson
Davis” address dem onstrates, Du Bois saw this character as essentially masculine, and
therefore, in its m asculine qualities it was a different exam ple o f what masculinity could
be.
Du Bois continued to exam ine the connection between A m erican civilization and
masculinity during the years following his com m encem ent address. Following his
undergraduate years at Harvard, Du Bois stayed on to com plete an M A in history, and
proceeded to Germany to study at Friedrich W ilhelm University. Returning to the US,
Du Bois received his Ph. D. from Harvard in 1895, the first African American to do so.
Between 1895 and 1910, Du Bois made a name for him self as a writer, researcher and
teacher, in addition to being an organizer o f various meetings and conferences whose aim
was to help bring about full equality for African Americans. Du Bois' classic work The
Souls of Black Folk was published in 1903, bringing him to national prominence, while
also highlighting the debate between him self and Booker T. W ashington. O n the basis of
his national recognition, Du Bois was one o f the prom inent leaders invited to help put
together the new National A ssociation for the A dvancem ent o f Colored Peoples
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(NAACP). In addition, Du Bois was hired as D irector of Publications and research, with
his prim ary responsibility being editing and writing for the N A A C P’s journal The Crisis.
Du Bois' editorials for The Crisis make fascinating reading for it is in these
columns that he develops and articulates his program for African A m erican advancement
and full participation in Am erican society. These editorials included critical
com m entaries on m ajor events o f the day, with frequent discussions on foreign policy
issues. In fact, it is these foreign policy editorials in particular that provide the clearest
insight into Du Bois' conflation o f masculinity and national identity.
This linkage between masculinity, foreign policy and military service can be
found in a number o f Du Bois's editorials. Du Bois believed that military service in the
G reat W ar would dem onstrate the superior qualities o f African Am erican “m anhood,”
and that once that m anliness was dem onstrated, the United States could no longer prevent
African Americans from playing an equal role in their country’s future. Furthermore,
once African American manhood was dem onstrated, the linkage between Victorian
constructions of manliness and whiteness would forever be broken. In short, Du Bois
proposed to replace the m anliness through whiteness model with manliness through
warfare.9
Du Bois' argum ent is revealed in the editorials that he wrote for The Crisis, the
m agazine he ran and helped to found as the official journal o f the NAACP, between 1914
and 1918. Du Bois' linkage of manly action can also be found in some o f his other
writings from the same time period, including essays and letters. These documents,

9 For a discussion o f African American soldiers and the debate over participation in
W orld W ar One, see Cecilia O'Leary, To Die F or, pp. 208-219; for African American
soldiers and the Spanish Am erican W ar, see p. 143.
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though outside the realm o f official US foreign policy, are im portant attempts to
influence policy, for they shed light on a strategy aim ed at developing African American
support for the war in Europe, and they articulate an argument that had consequences for
dom estic as well as international affairs.10
These documents need to be considered in both their historical and social
contexts; they are im portant not only for their presentation o f the war as a potential
liberating force for African Americans, but are also im portant as expressions of
m asculinity and manly ideals. As historians such as Kristin Hoganson and Nicoletta
G ullace have pointed out, foreign and m ilitary policies and socialized constructions of
gender often go hand in hand; in addition, as Thom as Borstelmann has demonstrated,
foreign policy objectives abroad are often com plicated by racial inequities at hom e.11
Race and gender approaches to the study o f diplomatic history are important if we
are to fully understand a nation’s foreign policy. The formulation o f foreign policy
traditionally excluded women and minorities, and as Emily Rosenberg pointed out in
“W alking the Borders,” the very language that policy is written with often betrays
“gendered overtones.” The analysis of this language, she argues, “can provide fresh,

10 In addition, as David Levering Lewis points out, there is reason to believe that Du
Bois' wartime editorials were part o f w hat Lewis describes as a “deal” with the W ar
D epartm ent “to use the enormous influence o f his magazine tow ard rallying African
Americans behind the war in return for” a com m ission as an officer in M ilitary
intelligence that never materialized. See Lewis, W. E. B. Du B ois. p. 555.
11 See Kristin H oganson’s Fighting for American Manhood: How G ender Politics
Provoked the Spanish-Am erican and Philippine-A m erican W ars. New Haven: Yale
U niversity Press, 1998; N icoletta G ullace’s The Blood of Our Sons : Men. W omen, and
the Renegotiation o f British Citizenship During the G reat W ar. New York: Palgrave
M acmillan, 2003, as well as her article on the gendered imagery o f the ‘rape o f Belgium ,’
in “Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International law during
the First W orld W ar,” Am erican H istorical Review, Vol. 102, No. 3, June 1997, pp. 714-
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provocative insight into the wellsprings o f policy formulation and public legitim ation.”
Rosenberg continues by pointing out that in certain time periods, “cultural definitions of
masculinity and bellicose assertions o f national pow er appear to be linked. There have
likewise been historical ties between fem inism and pacifism .” 12 Du B ois’ decision to
promote African Am erican participation in the W orld W ar is an important exam ple of
this com bination o f masculinity and foreign policy, as well illustrating how the
intersection o f racial division in the domestic context can influence the developm ent of
foreign policy approaches.
Du B ois’ original position on the war was expressed in his editorial “W orld W ar
and the Color Line,” which appeared in the Novem ber 1914 issue o f the Crisis. Tracing
the roots o f the war to imperialism in Africa and Asia, Du Bois ’ perspective on the Great
W ar is in line with the writings o f J. A. Hobson, whose 1902 book Imperialism blamed
the war on the disruptive forces o f European capital. Du Bois argued that it was “not
merely national jealousy” that led to the war, but “rather the wild quest for imperial
expansion among colored races between Germany, England and France primarily, and
Belgium, Italy, Russia and Austria Hungary in a lesser degree...Today civilized nations
are fighting like mad dogs over the right to own and exploit these darker peoples.” 13
Elegantly inverting the trope of savagery and civilization, Du Bois makes clear his

747; Thom as Borstelmann, A partheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern
A frica in the Early Cold W ar. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
12 Emily Rosenberg, “W alking the Borders,” in M ichael J. Hogan and Thom as G.
Paterson, eds., Explaining the History o f American Foreign Relations. New York:
Cam bridge University Press, 1991. Page 32.
13 W. E. B. Du Bois, “W orld W ar and the Color Line,” The Crisis, No. 9, Nov. 1914.
Pages 28-30.
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opposition to an im perialist foreign policy, while staking his ow n claim to the high
ground o f civilization.
By linking European imperialism with slavery, Du Bois was able to make a case
for African Am erican concern about the events in Europe. But if all Europe is equally
guilty o f the crim e o f “white im perialism,” why choose sides? W hy is any side better
than the other? Du Bois argues that “ [a]s colored Americans, then, and as Americans
who fear race prejudice as the greatest o f warmakers, our sympathies in the awful conflict
should be with France and England; not that they have conquered race prejudice, but they
have at least begun to realize its cost and evil, while Germany exalts it.” 14
Du Bois and The Crisis urged African Americans to support those nations that
were working to moderate their racist and colonialist excesses, and to punish those
nations which are guilty of the worst racist and im perialist crimes. Du Bois prophesied
that the war would become “much wilder and wider ... when black and brown and yellow
stand up together and demand recognition as men!” 15 This com bination of international
relations and manliness is indicative of Du B ois’ approach not ju st to the First W orld
War, but to his approach to the plight of African Americans in the United States in
general; the reality of Jim Crow, racism and lynch law in early twentieth century
America, or “life behind the veil,” as Du Bois put it, served to limit African Americans'
participation in the political and social fabric of the United States, and hence the ability of
African Americans to lead their lives as “men.”
As Gail Bederm an has pointed out in M anliness and Civilization, the social
construction o f white male manliness was developed in opposition to com monly held

14 Du Bois, “W orld W ar and the Color Line,”pp. 28-30.
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ideas o f African American masculinity. “In the face o f social and cultural change,” she
writes,
middle class men had become fearful that their manhood was at risk. In order to
strengthen faltering constructs o f traditional manliness, they turned to race. By
envisioning themselves as “the white m an,” whose superior m anliness set them
apart from more primitive dark-skinned races, middle-class men reassured
themselves that manliness remained as strong as ever.16

This articulation of a racist definition through opposition model o f manliness is in
line with what Du Bois him self wrote in an essay titled “The Souls o f W hite Folk.”
Published in his book Darkwater in 1920, Du B ois’ essay makes clear the connection
between “w hiteness” and imperialism and world war. “The discovery o f personal
whiteness among the w orld’s peoples is a very m odem thing - a nineteenth and twentieth
century m atter indeed.” The reason for the development, Du Bois argues, is the
com petition for global dominance, a com petition that took European powers to parts of
the world populated by peoples with skin o f a different hue. “I ask soberly: ‘W hat on
earth is whiteness that one should so desire it?’ Then always, somehow, some way,
silently but clearly, I am given to understand that whiteness is the ow nership o f the earth
forever and ever, A m en!” 17 W orld W ar One was itself the end result o f this process of
whiteness: “Let me say this again and em phasize it and leave no room for mistaken
meaning: The W orld W ar was primarily the jealous and avaricious struggle for the largest

15 Du Bois, “W orld W ar and the Color Line," pp. 28-30.
16 Gail Bederman, M anliness and Civilization: A Cultural History o f G ender and Race in
the United States. 1880-1917. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1995. Page 75.
17 W. E. B. Du Bois, Darkwater: Voices from W ithin the Veil. N ew York: Harcourt,
Brace and Howe, 1920, pp. 29-52. The quote is on page 30. “The Souls of W hite Folk"
was originally published in The Independent, No. 69, August 18, 1910, pp. 339-342.
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share in exploiting darker races.”18 The United States, Du Bois believed, was at least as
bad as the European colonial powers, for the US had its legacy o f slavery, and its
continuing racial conflict, particularly lynching. In Du B ois’ words,
It is curious to see America, the United States, looking on herself, first, as a sort
of natural peacemaker, then as a moral protagonist in this terrible time. No nation
is less fitted for this role. For two or more centuries A m erica has marched
proudly in the van of human hatred - m aking bonfires o f hum an flesh and
laughing at them hideously, and making the insulting o f millions m ore than a
matter o f dislike - rather a great religion, a world war-cry: Up white, down
black... 19

Bederman agrees with Du Bois that the central defining issue in the developm ent
of whiteness was lynching. Portrayed in the N orthern press in gruesom e detail, lynching
narratives and photographs enabled Northern white men to pride themselves on their
relative level of "civilization" and righteousness. As Bederm an explains, “Southern
lynching encouraged Northern white men to see themselves as manly and powerful, and
gave them a rich ground on which issues of gender, sexuality and racial dom inance could
be attractively com bined and recombined to depict the overw helm ing power o f their
civilized white m anliness.”20
In her discussion of Ida B. W ells’ anti-lynching cam paign in G reat Britain in 1893
and 1894, Bederm an explains the tactic behind W ells’ trip to England. Because
Americans during the Victorian period looked to Britain as the arbiter o f civilization,
Wells took her cam paign to end lynching in Am erica to England. By portraying white
Southerners as uncivilized and unmanly, W ells was able to enlist English help in

publicizing the horrors o f the crime. Americans m ight not listen to the outrage of African

18 Du Bois, “Souls o f W hite Folk,” p. 49.
19 Du Bois, “ Souls o f W hite Folk,” p. 50.
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Americans, but they would certainly respond to any British indictments. As Bederman
explains, “ [b]y enlisting ‘Anglo-Saxons’ as her allies, W ells recruited precisely the
spokesmen most able to disrupt the linkages between m anliness and whiteness which
kept white Americans tolerant o f lynching.”21
Du Bois was well aware o f W ells’ work, for they had both w orked hard to create
the NAACP, the parent organization that published The Crisis. Du Bois extended W ells’
discourse o f savagery and civilization to the war that was currently raging in Europe and
through African American participation in the war, hoped to generate the same kind of
global support for African Americans that Wells had been able to generate in her antilynching campaign.
Du Bois brought the question of the linkage between white men and “civilization”
to the fore in a September, 1916 editorial in The Crisis. In the wake o f reports o f the
gassing and bombing of civilian targets, Du Bois argued that “civilization has met its
W aterloo.” Then, turning from Europe to look at the United States, Du Bois wrote that
The civilization by which America insists on measuring us and to which we must
conform our natural tastes and inclinations is the daughter o f that European
civilization which is now rushing furiously to its doom ... Brothers, the war has
shown us the cruelty o f the civilization of the West. History has taught us the
futility o f the civilization of the East. Let ours be the civilization of no man, but
o f all men. This is the truth that sets us free.22

By arguing for a civilization of “all men,” Du Bois hoped to disconnect the racial
aspects o f the American definition o f civilization; rather, civilization would be
determ ined by the “reassembling o f old ideals,” particularly those o f Victorian

20 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, p. 46.
21 Bederman, M anliness and C ivilization, p. 61.
22 W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Battle of Europe,” The Crisis, No. 12, Sep. 1916, pp. 216-217.
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masculinity, among which honor is paramount. It was in this context that Du Bois
expressed some of his ideals in the editorial titled “I A m Resolved.” It is worth
remembering the language:

I am resolved in this New Year to play the man - to stand straight, look the world
squarely in the eye, and walk to my work with no shuffle or slouch ... I am
resolved to be satisfied with no treatment which ignores my manhood and my
right to be counted as one among men.23

Du Bois believed that the performance o f m asculinity would help to create a new
civilization, an American civilization that has the hallmarks o f neither East nor W est.
Rather, it will be brand new, and will include African Americans as equal partners.
This is a bold move by Du Bois, for he is using a construction o f m asculinity that
was originally predicated on the American im perial project, a project that did not see men
of color as equal partners at all. In fact, white male m asculinity as proposed by TR and
seconded by Albert J. Beveridge, and as learned at Harvard by Du Bois, owed its
existence, and its survival, to the continual subjection o f darker skinned men.
Du B ois’ decision to “play the man” is rooted in long held beliefs. In fact, as Kim
Tow nsend points out in M anhood at Harvard, “manhood was the goal tow ard which Du
Bois strove in much of his writing.” In his classic work The Souls o f Black Folk. Du
Bois described the situation o f African Americans as a “double consciousness;” where
African Americans perceive themselves as part American and part African. This is a
justly fam ous phrase, yet the following paragraph is often forgotten. Du Bois writes that
“[t]he history o f the American Negro is the history o f this strife, - this longing to attain
self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this
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merging he wishes neither o f the older selves to be lost ...He sim ply wishes to make it
possible for a man to be both a Negro and an A m erican...”24
That was the key to the entire problem - how can African Am erican men achieve
“ self-conscious manhood” in a nation where men o f color were called “boy,” where
harassm ent and intimidation prevented their voting, and where lynch mobs punished
those men who had the temerity to claim the “full manhood rights?” How can an African
Am erican “play the man” if it will get him killed?
Du Bois had these questions in mind when he wrote the editorial “Awake,
A m erica,” that appeared in the September 1917 issue o f The Crisis. Arguing that the
United States needs to enter the “war for liberty with clean hands,” Du Bois goes on to
say that “W e cannot lynch 2,867 untried black men and women in thirty-one years and
pose successfully as leaders o f civilization. Rather, let us ... raise our hands to heaven
and pledge our sacred honor to make our own America a real land of the free ... [and] To
insist that individual dessert and ability shall be the test o f real A m erican manhood and
not adventitious differences of race or color or descent.”25
Du B ois’ formulation of a new idea of civilization, one that em phasizes an
A merican manliness that is built not on spurious conceptions o f m asculinity defined
through lynching, but rather through ability was continually juxtaposed with the
European war. Du Bois extended his idea of the “real land of the free” for African
Americans when he wrote o f “The Black Soldier” in the June 1918 issue of The Crisis.

23 W. E. B. Du Bois, “I Am Resolved,” The Crisis, January, 1912, pp.
24 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls o f Black Folk. Boston: Bedford Books, 1997. Pages 3839.
25 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Awake, A m erica,” The Crisis, No. 14, Sep. 1917, pp. 216-217.
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This war is an End and, also, a Beginning. N ever again will darker people o f the
world occupy ju st the place they had before. O ut of this w ar will rise, soon or
late, an independent China, a self-governing India, an Egypt with representative
institutions, an Africa for the Africans and not merely for business exploitation.
O ut o f this war will rise, too, an American Negro with the right to vote and the
right to w ork and the right to live without insult.26

Du Bois was remarkably prescient. One o f the major consequences o f the end of
the First W orld W ar was the loosening o f colonial bonds and the rise o f Asian
nationalism, particularly in China and India, with events in Turkey, Persia and French
Indo-China also proceeding rapidly. In the contemporary Am erican context, however, as
David Levering Lewis explains, Du Bois1prediction o f “the underm ining o f European
dominion over darker races and the radical redrawing of the color line in the United
States invited a federal indictm ent.”27 The world may have been ready for Revolution,
but with the recently passed Sedition A ct o f May, 1918, the United States did not want to
hear about it.
It was in this dangerous domestic context that Du B ois’ most provocative editorial
appeared. “Close Ranks,” from the July, 1918 issue of The Crisis, urged all African
Americans to com e together and support the American effort in the First W orld War:
This is the crisis o f the world ... W e o f the colored race have no ordinary interest
in the outcome. That which the Germ an pow er represents today spells death to
the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for equality, freedom and
dem ocracy. Let us not hesitate. Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special
grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white fellow citizens
and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy. W e m ake no ordinary
sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly, with our eyes lifted to the hills.28

26 W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Black Soldier,” The Crisis, No. 16, Jun. 1918, p. 60
27 Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois. p. 505.
28 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Close Ranks,” The Crisis, No. 16, Jul. 1918, p. 111.
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Du B ois’ editorial was immediately controversial. For one thing he em braced
American involvem ent in a European war, a war which marked a radical break with
American foreign policy precedent. But even more controversially, Du Bois
recom mended that African A m ericans’ “special grievances” should be set aside for the
sake o f the war.
Du B ois’ position was particularly controversial because the second decade o f the
twentieth century had in fact brought African Americans extraordinary grievances;
President W oodrow W ilson had courted the African American vote during the 1912
election,29 but once in office had refused to do anything to repay their support. W ilson
had, on the other hand pushed for segregation in the Federal G overnm ent where none had
existed before, refused point blank to condem n lynching which had reached epidemic
proportions, and had even gone so far as to praise D.W. G riffith’s infam ous m ovie “The
Birth of a N ation,” which he compared to “writing history with lightning,” and had
described its vicious racist characterizations o f African Americans as “all so terribly
true.”30
The war itself had only added to African American grievances; the Army planned
to have African Am erican soldiers serve primarily in support units, w orking with pick
and shovel rather than fighting with guns and grenades. Originally there was to be no
training or recruitm ent o f African American officers; finally, after intense lobbying by
The Crisis, and others, a training camp was provided, but even then none o f the

29 See A rthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the W hite H ouse. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1947, pp. 501-505.
30 Quoted in Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois. page 506.
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candidates were to be com missioned above the rank o f Captain, and those that held a
higher rank were removed or retired.31
So the question that readers of The Crisis asked them selves in July o f 1918 was
how can someone as adam ant about the injustice done to African A m ericans as W. E. B.
Du Bois come out in favor o f participation in a European war led by a segregationist
President where fighting would be done in a Jim Crow army?
The answer was that Du Bois believed that the G reat W ar provided an opportunity
for A frican American men to perform their masculinity, and thereby claim their
citizenship at home. Holding firmly to Roosevelt’s analogy, Du Bois believed that
victory abroad would lead inexorably to victory at home; that with a victory over the
Kaiser behind them, African American men would be welcom ed back to the US as full
citizens, and as men.
Following “Close Ranks,” Du Bois ran an editorial that elaborated on the ideas of
racial solidarity and the postponement of African American civil rights activism. Titled
“A Philosophy of W ar,” the editorial lays out Du B ois’ reasons for African American
participation in the war in Europe, and is worth quoting at length.
First: This is OUR country. W e have worked for it, we have suffered for
it, we have fought for it; we have made its music, we have tinged its ideals, its
poetry, its religion, its dreams; we have reached in this land our highest modern
development, and nothing, humanly speaking, can prevent us from eventually
reaching here the full stature o f our m anhood ...
Second. O ur country is not perfect. Few countries are ... W e m ust fight,
then, for the survival of the Best against the threats o f the W o r s t...
Third. But what o f our wrongs? cry a million voices with strained faces
and bitter eyes. O ur wrongs are still wrong. W ar does not excuse
disfranchisement, “Jim -Crow ” cars or social injustices, but it does make our first

31 For an in depth discussion of the status of African Am erican soldiers during W orld W ar
One, and the lobbying efforts o f Du Bois and the Crisis, see Lew is, W. E. B. Du B ois.
pages 528-574.
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duty clear. It does say deep to the heart o f every Negro American: W e shall not
bargain with our loyalty. W e shall not profiteer with our country’s blood ... Our
duty lies inexorable and splendid before us, and w e shall not shirk.
Fourth. Calm and with soul serene, unflurried and unafraid, we send a
hundred thousand black sons and husbands and fathers to the W estern Front, and
behind them, rank on rank, stand hundreds o f thousands m ore ...
Fifth. Protest, my brother, and grumble. I have seen the vision and it shall
not fade. We want victory for ourselves - dear God, how we w ant it - but it must
not be cheap bargaining, it must be clean and glorious, won by our own
manliness, and not by the threat of the footpad ...32

The vision that Du Bois describes is full equality for African A m ericans, and his
method o f attaining this goal is typical for Du Bois. No “cheap bargaining” (a dig at
those who hoped to use the war as a means to push for greater civil rights), but rather the
attainm ent of equality through “manliness,” in a “clean and glorious” fashion.
Statements o f this sort did little to stem the tide o f disapproval stem m ing from Du B ois’
“Close Ranks” editorial of the month before.
The fall out from “Close Ranks” was bad enough that Du Bois had to publish an
editorial response that addressed the issue. Readers had been incensed by the editorial,
and some accused Du Bois of “crass moral cow ardice,” as well as arguing that he had
“seldom packed more error into a single sentence.” Du Bois was com pelled to respond,
and in the September, 1918 issue published an editorial titled “O ur Special G rievances”
that attempted to address the controversy.
The leading editorial in the July Crisis, called “C lose R anks,” Du Bois wrote,
“has been the subject o f much com ment To a few it seem ed to indicate some
change o f position on the part o f the National A ssociation for the A dvancem ent of
Colored People and The Crisis. It is needless to say that it indicates nothing of
the sort. This Association and this m agazine stand today exactly where they have

32 W. E. B. Du Bois, “A Philosophy in Time o f W ar,” The Crisis, 16, August, 1918, pp.
164-165.
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stood during the eight years of their work; viz., for the full m anhood rights o f the
American Negro.33

Du Bois was being disingenuous; though he wrote that “it is needless to say” that
there was no change o f course (as if shifting from castigating W ilson for his
im plem entation o f segretationist policies in the federal governm ent to wholesale
collaboration with his largest project was consistent), Du Bois clearly needed to write
something. If a large proportion o f the m agazine’s readership believed that a shift in
policy had occurred, a shift in the central defining m ission o f the organization as well as
in the editorial direction of the magazine, then the issue did need to be addressed, protests
to the contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, Du Bois was being consistent in his
devotion to the developm ent o f African American manhood, and with the articulation of
the underlying Victorian ideals o f civilization that needed to go along with it.
Du Bois remained determ ined to forge a connection betw een military service, full
participation in American political, econom ic and social life, and his vision of the future
of civilization. In “Returning Soldiers,” published as an editorial in the May 1919 issue,
Du Bois pushed towards this goal by attempting to break the cultural association of white
men with civilization, and to connect it to African American veterans.
W e are returning from war. The Crisis and tens o f thousands of black men were
drafted into a great struggle. For bleeding France and w hat she means and has
m eant and will mean to us and humanity, and against the threat o f German race
arrogance, we fought gladly and to the last drop o f blood; for A m erica and her
highest ideals, we fought in far off hope; for the dom inant Southern oligarchy
entrenched in W ashington, w e fought in bitter resignation.34

33 W. E. B. Du Bois, “O ur Special Grievances,” The Crisis, No. 16, Sep., 1918, pp. 216217.
34 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Returning Soldiers,” The Crisis, No. 18, M ay, 1919, pp. 196-197
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It is im m ediately clear that not only are A m erica’s African A m erican soldiers
returning home, but also that Du Bois him self was returning to the fray. "Returning
Soldiers" concludes with the lines:
W e return.
W e return fro m fighting.
W e return fighting.
M ake way for dem ocracy!35

Du Bois's writing is extremely powerful; “Bleeding France” echoes “bleeding K ansas,”
site o f bloody battles over the issue o f slavery and freedom. Furtherm ore, Du B ois’
writing declares that though one war has ended, another is ju st beginning.
Though African Americans served their country in France, Du

Bois argued that

the fight was not over. As Du Bois put it, “by the God o f Heaven, we

are cowards and

jackasses if, now that the war is over, we do not m arshal every ounce o f our brain and
brawn to fight a sterner, longer, and more unbending battle against the forces of hell in
our own land.”36
Du Bois was right; the battle would take much longer, and now, more than eighty
years later, it is still not entirely won. The returning African A m erican soldiers were not
welcom ed as citizens, nor were they granted their "full m anhood rights." In the summer
of 1919, know n to U.S. history as Red Summer, race riots and lynching rose to new
heights, as A frican Americans were forcibly pushed into the second-class citizenship that
participation in the W ar was supposed to get them out of.37

35 Du Bois, “Returning Soldiers,” p. 197
36 Du Bois, “Returning Soldiers,” p. 197.
37 See Cecilia O'Leary, To Die F or, pp. 217-219 for discussion o f the com plicated issue of
African Am erican citizenship; see also David Levering Lewis, W .E.B. Du Bois: The
Fight for Equality and the American Century. 1919-1963. New York: Henry H olt and
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But the connections that Du Bois was able to make betw een A frican American
manhood and American civilization have proved durable and strong. Those connections
also helped to place the situation o f the African American in a global context; it became
impossible to assert that an individual such as M artin Luther King was somehow less a
man, or uncivilized, when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.
A nother important contribution was Du B ois’ vision o f international relations as a
force for domestic change. In this case, we have seen how Du Bois was able to view the
First W orld W ar not only in terms o f imperialism and international conflict, but also as an
opportunity for individual struggle within an individual nation, w hether it was the United
States, or India, China or colonial Africa, as he so presciently observed.
W hile he may have seen the link between domestic and international affairs, and
even understood that the performance of masculinity was at the heart o f both, he was
unable to effect change by claiming manhood for African A m ericans through the
performance of manly acts of heroism on the fields o f France. The m anhood that he
sought was constructed as an ideal by white men who gained their m anhood through the
oppression of others; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that Du B ois’ attempts to
“play the man” would be met with opposition, and even violence, by the white men
whose identity was defined in opposition to his own. Clearly, W. E. B. Du B ois’ struggle
to achieve his “full m anhood rights” would have continue by other means than through
the use o f US foreign policy.

Company, pp. 1-11, for a discussion o f the im m ediate post-W orld W ar position of Du
Bois.
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CHAPTER VI

“ACTING LIK E A M AN ... LIKE A W OODROW W ILSO N :”
W O O DRO W W ILSO N AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Thom as W oodrow W ilson is often contrasted with Theodore Roosevelt, because
o f his policies as well as his personal demeanor. W ilson, a Dem ocrat with Southern
roots, cam e across as dry, academic, ministerial, and removed when com pared with
Roosevelt, a Republican with a Northern (and W estern) background, who was energetic,
spontaneous, and vivacious. But when it comes to discussing issues o f m asculinity, and
the com bination of manly action and foreign policy in particular, the two Presidents
shared many similarities.
The com m on perception is that Theodore Roosevelt was the em bodim ent of
manhood, while W oodrow W ilson was not. This is not only unfair, but also inaccurate.
The truth is that W ilson was just as concerned with dem onstrating manly behavior and
performing his m asculinity as Roosevelt was. He also agreed with R oosevelt’s equation
o f manhood with statehood, and sought to shape policies that would enact a national
masculinity. But W ilson followed an older model o f masculinity, one that predated the
manliness that Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues promoted.
N onetheless, W ilson deserves the same attention as R oosevelt for his foreign

policy had ju st as great an im pact as T R ’s. W hile Roosevelt’s vision of masculinity
shaped American foreign policy and pushed it in a particular direction (with specific
consequences), W ilson’s own take on American manliness played an equally strong role
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in shaping what some have considered to be a dom inant strain in Am erican foreign policy
- that o f liberal internationalism .
W ilson's reputation as a foreign policy president rests, to a large extent, on what
George Kennan called the "association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones: the
carrying-over into the affairs o f states o f the concepts o f right and wrong, the assumption
that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgm ent."1 His belief in the efficacy of
international organizations, his decision to involve the US in W orld W ar I as an
"associated" but not "allied" power, and his obsession with the League o f Nations are
cited as evidence to support Kennan's view.
This reputation sets W ilson apart from that o f other Presidents, notably Theodore
Roosevelt, who has been widely perceived as an aggressive, boisterous and militaristic
leader, more inclined to use pow er than reason to further state policy. Roosevelt's role as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the Spanish-American W ar, his
adventures as a Rough Rider, his advice to "carry a big stick," his advocacy of gunboat
diplom acy, and his seizure o f the Panam a Canal all lend weight to this view.
There are a num ber of problems, however, with a portrayal o f the idealistic,
legalistic and moralistic W ilson in sharp contrast to the realistic, imperialistic and
militaristic Roosevelt. Indeed, a case can be made that the two men are more similar than
dissim ilar, and that any o f the adjectives used above to describe one man can be applied
to the other.
For exam ple, W oodrow W ilson was not the first President to believe in the
im portance of international organizations. Theodore Roosevelt brokered the Portsmouth
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N aval Treaty, thereby bringing an end to the Russo-Japanese W ar, and won him self a
N obel Peace Prize in the process. His reputation as a peacem aker was such that he was
asked to help resolve the M oroccan 'open door' crisis o f 1905 - 1906. The successful
result o f the ensuing conference at Algeciras was widely seen as having prevented a
European w ar.2 In addition, the Pan-American Conferences o f 1902 and 1906 sought to
establish legal instrum ents for the improvement of Latin American sovereignty and
com m erce.3 Even more telling was Roosevelt's submission o f the Alaskan boundary
dispute to arbitration. Though historians debate the extent to which Roosevelt would
have submitted to the judgm ent had it not been in America's favor, nonetheless,
Roosevelt did moderate his position in the dispute, and ceded two o f the four islands at
stake in the issue, thereby allowing Britain and Canada to save face.4
It appears that the image of the Rough Rider has obscured the reality. Richard
Collin writes that "[ijgnored in the convenient imagery o f the big stick and the slogan o f
im perialism is Theodore Roosevelt's close work with the Hague Convention of 1907 and
the W orld C ourt for arbitration of international disputes , ...[and his] diplomacy in
moving Latin American countries to full participation in international law tribunals." In
addition, it can be argued that Roosevelt was not an imperialist; though American troops

1 George Kennan. Am erican D iplom acy. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1984. Page
100.
2 Nathan M iller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life. New York, W illiam M orrow, 1992. Pages
449-451.
3 Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panam a Canal, the M onroe
Doctrine, and the Latin American Context. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1990. Page 492.
4 See Richard Collin, Theodore Roosevelt. Culture. Diplomacy and Expansion. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985, pp 184-185; and Frederick W. M arks III,
V elvet on Iron: The Diplom acy o f Theodore Roosevelt. Lincoln: University o f N ebraska
Press, 1979, pp 108-111.
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intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1905 and in Cuba in 1906, the interventions
helped to restore order and, once order and stability were achieved, the troops were
withdrawn as soon as possible. As Richard Collin has argued, Roosevelt's Caribbean
diplomacy was "an exam ple of anti-colonialism and anti-im perialism at its b e s t." 5
Similarly, the "realist" school o f thought, as exem plified by G eorge Kennan, that
views W oodrow W ilson as legalistic and disinclined to foreign involvement, should be
revised. In fact, it can be argued that W ilson was more like R oosevelt than Roosevelt
was, swinging the big stick frequently. W ilson sent warships to Vera Cruz in 1914, and
sent the U.S. Army under General Pershing into northern M exico in 1916 in an attempt to
capture Pancho Villa. He sent troops to Haiti in 1915, and to the D om inican Republic in
1916, and refused to pull out the troops that his Republican predecessor had sent to
Nicaragua. These interventions were all done in the name o f m aintaining order, a central
principle in Roosevelt's Caribbean Policy.6
W hile the common perception of W ilson is that he was an anti-im perialist,
W illiam Appleman W illiams argued that W ilson was trying to create a system that would
"establish conditions under which America's preponderant econom ic pow er would extend
the American system throughout the world without the em barrassm ent and inefficiency
o f traditional colonialism ."7 In Velvet on Iron. Frederick Marks argues that W ilson

5 Collin, Theodore R oosevelt, pp. 188-189.
6 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: W oodrow W ilson and the Q uest for a New W orld
O rder, Princeton: Princeton, NJ, 1992, p. 84.
7 W illiam Applem an Williams, The Tragedy of American D iplom acy. New York: W.
W. Norton, 1959, page 52.
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“believed that pow er was o f primary importance in the search for peace.”8 W ilson was
clearly very com fortable with the use of force.
In many ways, then, the two men were more similar than dissim ilar in their
approach to U.S. foreign policy; what was most similar was their strong belief in the
im portance of national masculinity. W hile Roosevelt believed in “the essential manliness
of the American character,”9 and equated "man" with "nation," likew ise W ilson stated
that “there is no difference between men and nations” when it com es to questions of
honor and modes of behavior. Nations, both Roosevelt and W ilson believed, should act
like men.
Though they shared a belief in the importance of manliness, Roosevelt and
W ilson had differing opinions o f what constituted manly behavior. Their conceptions of
manliness, shaped by different backgrounds, rooted in different regions o f the nation, and
representing an older, gentler view of masculinity on the one hand, and a newer,
strenuous masculinity on the other, prove to be a defining difference between the two
men. The result was that W ilson and Roosevelt saw national m asculine performance, and
the United States' role in the world, in very different ways.
Having discussed Roosevelt earlier, as well as his com rades-in-arm s Alfred
Thayer M ahan, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge, it is necessary to consider
W oodrow W ilson's opposing foreign policy ideas. By tracing W ilson’s foreign policy
prescriptions back to the source, and considering his definitions o f m anly behavior, we
will get a much more accurate understanding o f his foreign policy ideas than if we were

8 See M arks. V elvet on Iron, pp. 135-136.
9 Theodore Roosevelt, “National Duties,” in The Strenuous L ife. N ew York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1926, p. 229
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to focus, for exam ple, on the differences and tensions between idealism and realism.
W ilson, we will see, believed that a nation, ju st like a man, should incorporate both
values; the nation, as well as American men, should focus on heaven while living in the
world.
In order to make sense of W oodrow W ilson’s conception o f m anly behavior, and
hence his foreign policy, we must begin with a look at W ilson’s childhood and
upbringing; for as W ilson said himself, “a boy never gets over his boyhood, and never
can change those subtle influences which have become a part of him .” 10
Thomas W oodrow W ilson was born in Virginia on D ecem ber 28, 1856, the son,
grandson and nephew o f prom inent Presbyterian ministers. The years o f young Tom m y’s
childhood were those that built up to the conflagration o f the Civil W ar, and W ilson had
indelible memories o f the conflict.11 W hile his parents were ostensibly northerners, his
father and his uncle Jam es both embraced the Southern cause, his uncle even heading the
Confederate Chemical Laboratory during the Civil War.
While young Tom my did have early memories o f the W ar Between the States, his
childhood was marked more by religion than by conflict, and, unsurprisingly, his father
took center stage. Tom m y's father Joseph Ruggles W ilson was an im posing man, a
success in his profession, a professor of theology and o f rhetoric at Colum bia Theological
Seminary, who also served as pastor of the First Presbyterian Church o f Colum bia, South
Carolina. Young Tom m y literally looked up to his father, the leader o f the congregation,
the minister in the pulpit on Sunday mornings. As father, preacher, and professor, Joseph

10 W oodrow W ilson, “A n Address on Robert E. Lee,” ca. Jan 19, 1909, in Link, et al.,
eds., The Papers o f W oodrow W ilson. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966 - ; Vol. 18, p. 635.
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W ilson served as the center o f Tom m y’s religious and scholastic world, com bining
religion with an education that laid particular stress on reinforcing his son's development
in his own subject of rhetoric.
Given the influence of his father, and his family background, it is perhaps
surprising that Tom my W ilson did not become a m inister himself. W hile there may have
some expectation that he would follow his father and grandfather’s profession, W ilson
biographer John M ulder points out that that course may have lost its appeal following a
dispute that his father had with his superiors in South Carolina; the result o f the conflict
was that Rev. W ilson moved his family to a better paying, and easier, position in
W ilmington, North Carolina as a result.12
Though he did not becom e a minister, Tom my did em brace his father's
Presbyterian covenant tradition. Thomas Knock and John M ulder both point out the
im portance that covenant theology had on the young Tom my W ilson. In a Christian
context, “covenant” is synonymous with the relationship between God and the people he
created; God agrees not to punish or destroy His progeny, while hum anity agrees to
follow His commandments. The covenant, then, provides a structure around which
believers organize their actions here on earth.
There is a strong history of the covenant tradition in Am erican history. Early
puritan divines in New England, for example, saw the success of the new settlements as a
function of the ability of their flock to adhere to G od’s wishes; the frequent jerem iads
directed by Jonathan Edwards and Cotton M ather at their flocks are testim ony to the

11 Arthur S. Link, W ilson: The Road to the W hite H ouse. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1947. Page 1.
12 See M ulder. W oodrow W ilson: The Years of Preparation, pp. 14-17.
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im portance o f the m aintenance o f this covenant. John W inthrop’s serm on aboard the
Arbella, for instance, that described the soon to be form ed M assachusetts Bay colony as a
“city upon a hill,” used that term specifically in the context o f reinforcing the covenant.
The colony would be an exam ple to the rest o f the world and would prosper if the
covenant with G od were kept. God, in bringing the colonists safely across the Atlantic,
had done His part, and now the colonists m ust keep their part o f the bargain.13
W ilson believed strongly in the covenant tradition, as both Knock and M ulder
explain, though the word covenant did not have exclusively religious connotations.
W ilson was proud o f the “stern, Covenanter tradition that [was] behind [him],” 14 and
showed an interest in covenants, constitutions, and agreements o f various forms at an
early age. John M ulder sees in W ilson’s penchant for covenants the root of his future
political life, and Thom as Knock agrees: “In his father’s well-ordered philosophy o f life
and politics, W ilson apparently found both intellectual and em otional self assurance.” 15
This can be seen in his use of covenants with his college friends, his description of his
marriage as a “com pact,” the writing o f a constitution for the Liberal Debating Club, and
his frequent reshaping o f debating clubs, including those at the University of Virginia,
Johns Hopkins and W esleyan. W ilson clearly found this work interesting and satisfying;
as Thomas Knock writes,
W riting constitutions, or covenants, served a number o f functions: they brought
order and rationality to anarchic conditions; they prom oted the duty to perform

13 For an exam ination o f the covenant theology and American history, as well as an
exploration o f jerem iad tradition in American history and culture, see Sacvan Bercovitch,
The American Jerem iad. M adison: U niversity of W isconsin Press, 1980.
14 Link. Wilson: The Road to the W hite H ouse, p. 1.
15 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 4.
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good works, and they could be applied to virtually any sphere of human endeavor
- even to affairs o f the heart or to the setting o f goals for a career in politics.16

One o f W ilson’s early covenants, an agreement that he made with his Princeton
classmate C harlie Talcott, bears close exam ination in this regard. This pledge, written as
they were preparing to leave school, indicates the degree to which W ilson had taken
covenant theology to heart. Rem em bering the event several years later in a letter to his
fiancee Ellen Axson, W ilson explained that
I had then, as I have still, a very earnest political creed and very pronounced
political ambitions. I rem em ber forming with Charlie Talcott (a class-m ate and
very intimate friend o f mine) a solemn covenant that we w ould school all our
powers and passions for the work o f establishing the principles we held in
common; that we would acquire knowledge that we m ight have power; and that
we would drill ourselves in all the arts o f persuasion, but especially in oratory ...
that we might have facility in leading others into our ways o f thinking and
enlisting them in our purposes.17

This is classic W ilson; the “solemn covenant,” the devotion to “principles,” and
the determ ination that he would lead others into his way of thinking, and “enlist them in
our purposes.” W hat is also important to realize is the similarity of W ilson’s plan to the
role o f a minister; the devotion to principles, as well as the desire to lead people to a
particular perspective, but perhaps most of all, W ilson’s focus on oratory. Oratory and
rhetoric, o f course, were his father’s specialty, and it is telling that W ilson focuses on it in
this early outline o f his life plan. W ilson, it appears, wanted to em ulate his father, to
becom e like his father, only in the political arena. This model, o f the politician with the
ministerial approach, would define W ilson for the rest of his life.

16 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 5.
17 W oodrow W ilson to Ellen Louise Axson, October 30, 1883, in Papers o f W oodrow
W ilson, vol. 2, p. 500.
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It is clear that W ilson’s fondness for covenants was rooted in his father's Christian
teachings, and in his attachm ent to his father. W ilson spoke often to friends and
acquaintances o f “incomparable father” and the two were indeed very close; “the letters
between the tw o,” Ray Stannard Baker, W ilson’s official biographer wrote, “can be
called nothing but love letters.” Their relationship was so enduring that even after he was
married, W ilson consulted his father in everything he did: “Until he was forty years old”
Baker writes, “W ilson never made an important decision of any kind without first seeking
his father’s advice.” 18
By every indication, this relationship was intensely close, m eaning a great deal to
both father and son. Joseph W ilson took an active part in guiding his son in his life
choices, steering him towards a career as a lawyer; the law would provide an excellent
opportunity to do good, while the profession itself would require the use of rhetoric and
the developm ent o f clear thought.
Young Tom m y, however, began a process of redefinition. W hile he had always
been “Tom m y” as a child, at Princeton the future President had begun to sign his name T.
W oodrow W ilson, and eventually, shortly after he graduated in 1879, simply as
W oodrow Wilson. This is an interesting transformation, as Cooper and others have
pointed out, for it illustrates in a very literal fashion the youth’s desire to com bine both
his maternal and his paternal sides in his future persona. W ilson explains the shift in a

18 Ray Stannard Baker, W oodrow W ilson. Life and Letters. 8 vols., G arden City:
Doubleday, 1927-1939. Volume 1, p. 30.
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letter to his friend Robert Bridges by stating that he was doing it “at my m other’s special
request, because this signature embodies all my family nam e” 19
The shift in identification is also eloquent of W ilson’s connection to his mother.
W hile W ilson received a great deal of affection from his parents, John M ulder points out
that “W ilson’s mother, in particular, tried to shield her son from the w orld o f violence
and w ar by lavishing love and affection on him .”20 W ilson, as pointed out in the
Introduction, described him self as a “m am m a’s boy,” and it was his m other’s character
that W ilson sought in women as an adult. Fortunately, he found a very near facsim ile in
his first wife, Ellen Louise Axson. As John M ulder points out, “W ilson craved and
sought the same supportive love and tried to create the same sense o f intimacy and
privacy in his own family.”21 W ilson’s marriage to Ellen Axson seem ed to provide him
with the steady, uncritical and supportive female companionship that he required.
The change o f his name, from Tom my to T. W oodrow to W oodrow , illustrates an
attempt to increase his identification with his mother. This shift was given particular
emphasis by Sigm und Freud in a biography of W ilson that the psychoanalyst wrote with
W illiam Bullitt, a diplomat who had served on the Versailles Peace com m ission. Freud,
like Cooper and M ulder, saw a strong link between W ilson’s attachm ent to his mother,
and his love for his w ife .22
Freud’s view o f W ilson hinges on his approach to sexuality; Freud believed that
all people are bi-sexual, and as a result there exists a tension between the m asculine

19 W oodrow W ilson to Robert Bridges, Novem ber 7, 1879 in Papers o f W oodrow
W ilson. Vol. 1, p. 583.
20 John M ulder, W oodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation, p. 30.
21 John M ulder, W oodrow Wilson: The Years o f Preparation, p. 31.
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aspect and the feminine aspect within each individual. Freud believed that because
W ilson believed so strongly in his father, he wound up identifying with his mother. His
name change, where he begins to em phasize “W oodrow ,” is an exam ple o f this. Freud
goes on to argue that through this identification with his mother, W ilson could actually
becom e closer to his father - that in fact as a “W oodrow W ilson” he could win his
father’s love, and love him safely in re tu rn .23
W ilson’s father sent W ilson a letter that illustrates the connection between
W ilson's personal, masculine, identity, and his relationship to his father. The letter was
sent while W oodrow W ilson was at law school, during a period when he was having
difficulty dealing with the faculty - he had in fact skipped some classes, and W oodrow
had inform ed his father o f the fact that he was in trouble. His father wrote to assure him
o f his continued affections, and to praise him for handling the whole situation “ like a
m an:”

I desire that you and I should look the whole matter squarely in the face - I say
‘you and I ’ - for believe me, we are as truly identified ... as if we were one and
the same person ... Truly thankful I am that you have not sought to conceal aught
from me, or to minify the evil, - but that you have, like a man (may I add, like a
W oodrow-W ilson?) fully set it all fo rth .. .24

This letter is interesting for the light it sheds on W ilson’s relationship with his
father, and on the significance o f the name change. First, W ilson and his father were

22 Sigmund Freud and W illiam Bullitt, Thom as W oodrow W ilson: A Psychological
Study. New York: Avon, 1966. See pp. 27-98.
23 Freud, W ilson, pp. 62-66. For more on Freud and sexuality, see Sigm und Freud, On
Sexuality. New York: Penguin, 1991, which contains most o f his w ritings specifically on
the subject.
24 Joseph Ruggles W ilson to WW, in W W P. vol. 1, p. 660.
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close - his father addresses him as “dearest,” for exam ple - but it is interesting that the
elder W ilson has the same sense o f connection, the feeling o f being “one and the same
person” that the younger W ilson also felt.
His father’s mention o f the name change is also fascinating, because his father
uses a hyphen between the two names - thereby giving them equal w eight as identifiers
o f who W ilson really was. He was not only a W ilson, in other words, he was a
W oodrow-W ilson, and more the man because o f it, something w hich his manly facing up
to adversity indicated.
The letter also ends in a fascinating way. After adm onishing his son not to err
again, he ends by writing the following:

My own precious son, I love you and believe in you. God bless you now and
ever: and that He may do so, seek more and more His guidance who is yr.
supreme father
Your affc. (earthly) father25

This letter is fascinating - it appears that the line between reality and religion is
beginning to blur in W ilson’s family relationship. The connection between W ilson’s
father and God is made explicit, as is the idea of faith - “ I believe in you,” he writes.
W oodrow has faith as well - he already relied on his father to mediate between him self
and the Lord through his position as minister - but here it becom es unclear as to whether
there really is much of a separation at all. The elder W ilson feels it necessary, after all, to
put in a parenthetical rem inder to his son that it is his “earthly” father that is writing to
him, and not God.

25 Joseph Ruggles W ilson to W W , in W W P, vol. 1, p. 660.
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Freud picks up on this; indeed, it would have been surprising if he had not.
Arguing that most young boys are in awe o f their fathers, Freud extended his analysis to
W ilson in particular. Building on W ilson’s desire to em ulate, and his identification with,
his father, Freud wrote that W ilson “could scarcely have avoided identifying his father
with the A lm ighty.” This is rather powerful stuff, but the consequences o f this
identification are stronger still. As Freud put it, “if his father was God, he him self was
G od’s Only Beloved Son, Jesus Christ.”26
Freud was not the only person who saw in W ilson the persona o f the Messiah.
W hen W ilson toured Europe on his way to the Versailles Peace conference in 1919, he
was met with banners that referred to him as “The Savior of H um anity,” The God of
Peace,” and “The M oses from Across the A tlantic.” Similarly, Lloyd George, B ritain’s
Prime M inister who was seated between W ilson and Georges Clem enceau of France at
the Peace conference, rem arked that he sometime felt that he was seated between Jesus
and Napoleon. Clemenceau him self said that “talking to W ilson is something like talking
to Jesus Christ.” These com ments, sarcastic though they may be, say much about
W ilson's demeanor, bearing, and approach to foreign policy problem s. Indeed, there is
much in W ilson’s later life that indicates that thoughts o f being a modern day Savior
were not entirely foreign to W ilson him self.27
W oodrow W ilson’s identification with Jesus was understandable. For W ilson, the
son o f a minister, it made sense to em ulate Jesus. Jesus was a man, in fact the ideal man,
and had been so for nineteen hundred years. The whole Christian project, to a large
extent, is rooted in the attempt to live life like the man that was Jesus; to be Christian, a

26 Freud. W ilson, p. 87.
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follower of Christ, m eant living according to his model - the model o f a particular kind
o f manliness. In this way, to be Christian was to be manly. A nd W oodrow W ilson was a
Christian - he lived his life secure in the know ledge that God was guiding him, and that
his successes were ordained by the Almighty.
W ilson was not the only man who saw Jesus as the ideal man; in fact, after the
Civil W ar, the manly nature of Jesus Christ was used as an exam ple o f the new strenuous
masculinity. W hile W ilson’s manliness was rooted in an older, antebellum version of
Christian manliness, there were increasingly successful attempts to link Christianity with
new constructions of masculinity.
During the late nineteenth century, there was a push to transform the way that
religion was marketed to young men. Just a few decades earlier, during the years leading
up to the Civil W ar, religion had becom e firmly linked to women and femininity, and
accordingly religion cam e to place new restraints on male behavior. As M ichael Kimmel
explains,
Religion had been w om en’s domain, and the sentimental piety and obsessive
m oralism were experienced by men as a brake on manly exuberance, and a
constraining critique of m arketplace com petition.28

As a result, ministers found themselves increasingly in a world o f women, for as the
nineteenth century progressed, male involvem ent in the church declined.
As religion became increasingly feminized, the m essage and content of sermons
began to change as well. The result was the prom otion o f a new and different ideal of
Christian male behavior. This new ideal em phasized the gentle, loving, and caring

27 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 199.
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aspects of the Biblical Jesus and the Christian God, and m inim ized the terrible aspects of
the Puritan G od o f Cotton M ather and Jonathan Edwards. In some ways the new
Christian ideal was seen as a sim ple antidote to the brutal, un-churched masculinity o f the
nineteenth century. One M ethodist m inister wrote of the beneficial changes that occurred
when men accepted Jesus:
It is w onderful to see a great burly man, mostly animal, who has lived under the
dom ination o f his lower nature and given rein to his natural tendencies, when he
is bom of G od and begins to grow in an upward and better direction. His
affections begin to lap over his passion ... The strong man becomes patient as a
lamb, gentle as the mother, artless as the little child.29

This was the Christian manliness that W ilson em braced, the Christianity that took the
animal, base passions, and elevated them, softened them, controlled them, until the
formerly “mostly anim al” man has becom e as “gentle as the m other.” This approach to
religion may appear womanly or fem inized now, but we must rem em ber that it was
considered manly th e n .30
W oodrow W ilson was out of step with his times. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the interpretation of religion had begun to change, and constructions of
manliness along with it. By that time, the inherent femininity of religion had become
established in Am erican culture, and men were deserting the church in droves. The
relationship between religion and the claustrophobic com bination o f femininity and
cloying civilization had become so com m onplace by the late 1800s that M ark Twain was

28 M ichael Kimm el, M anhood in America: A Cultural H istory. New York: Free Press,
1996. Page 175-176.
29 Kimmel, M anhood in A m erica, p. 176.
30 See Ann Douglas, Fem inization o f Am erican C ulture. New York: Knopf, 1977, for an
in-depth explanation o f this Nineteenth Century gender construction.
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able to set the plots o f both The Adventures of Tom Saw yer, and The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn into action by confronting the young boy protagonists with the threat of
church.
Huck expresses the tension between boyhood and church well. A fter various
hum orous descriptions o f church experiences (“I hate them ornery sermons! I can ’t catch
a fly in there, I can ’t chaw, I got to wear shoes all Sunday”), and o f the differences
between heaven and hell (“ [Aunt Sally] was going to live as so as to go to the good place.
W ell, I couldn’t see no advantage in going where she was going, so I made up my mind I
w ouldn’t try for it”), Huck ends his narrative by stating that he was going to light out for
the territories because he can ’t stand it when Aunt Sally tries to “sivilize” him.31
By the turn o f the century, boyhood and religion were understood to be mutually
opposed. Expressions o f the rebellion against the constraints that religion placed on
boyhood and m asculinity appeared not only in popular "boy’s books" o f the time
(Thomas Bailey A ldrich’s Story of a Bad Boy, for instance), but also in magazine articles
and essays that appeared in H arper’s and The Atlantic, among others. The femininity of
American religion got to the point that prominent men began to look for an alternative
view o f Christianity. As Howard Alan Bridgman asked in 1890, “Have we a Religion for
M en?”32
The answ er was yes. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a
movem ent arose which sought to redefine religion, particularly protestant Christianity, in
a way that w ould stress religious teachings while em phasizing a new masculinity. This

31 M ark Twain, The Adventures o f Tom Saw yer, in M ississippi W ritings. New York:
M odern Library, 1982, page 212; Adventures of Huckleberry F inn, also in M ississippi
W ritings, page 912.
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new Christian masculinity defined itself by its distance from women, as well its
opposition to earlier models of Christian manliness. The movem ent became known as
M uscular Christianity in part because o f the importance placed on Jesus’ artisanal roots;
proponents of this Christianity held that since Jesus and Joseph w orked as carpenters,
they were m uscular and powerful. As Billy Sunday put it, Jesus was “no dough faced,
lick-spittle proposition. Jesus was the greatest scrapper that ever lived.”33 Books such as
The M anhood o f the M aster. The M anliness of Christ. The M anly C hrist, and The
M asculine Power of Christ testified not only to the popularity o f the vision o f a Jesus
with biceps, but also the desire to reclaim the church from effem in acy .34
M uscular Christianity, which aimed to change established views of manliness as
well as Christianity, was not embraced at the higher social and ecclesiastical levels. The
appeal o f M uscular Christianity lay in its valorization of the working class roots of Jesus,
and in the value of toil and hard work. At a time when industrialization was increasing
social stratification, and it was becoming increasingly possible for the upper classes to
enjoy a life of com parative leisure, M uscular Christianity valorized labor, sweat and
muscles, as well as decrying weakness, wealth and an academic approach to the Bible.
As Sunday him self said, biblical scholars were “ anemic rank sceptics” who could
“dissolve the atoning blood of Jesus into mist and vapor.”35

32 Douglas, Fem inization o f American Culture, p. 98.
33 Douglas, Fem inization o f American C ulture, p. 327.
34 For an extended discussion of muscular Christianity and the manly Jesus, see Clifford
Putney, M uscular Christianity: M anhood and Sports in Protestant America. 1880-1920.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001; see also Kimmel, M anhood in A m erica, pp.
177-179.
35 Q uoted in Kimm ell, M anhood in A m erica, p. 179
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W oodrow W ilson’s father, though not actually a theologian, certainly fit Sunday’s
description o f an academic Christian. As a professor o f rhetoric, and pastor o f a socially
prom inent Presbyterian church, the elder W ilson did not fit into this new, dynamic,
working-class paradigm. N either did his son. The younger W ilson identified with his
mother, and em ulated his ministerial father, the em bodim ent o f the masculine ideal of the
previous generation. The younger W ilson was not a member o f the m en’s club as
represented by Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Seton, D aniel C arter Beard and other
advocates o f the strenuous life.
Sigmund Freud would likely have agreed with Roosevelt and his colleagues;
Freud wrote in his study o f W ilson that “his m asculinity was feeble.”36 Freud's
judgem ent rests on a particular construction o f manhood, though W ilson’s masculinity
belonged to an earlier era; W ilson modeled him self on his father, and he upheld the ideals
o f the mid-nineteenth century. Though W ilson may have been out of step with his times,
and Freud's, he was ju st as much an advocate of m asculinity as TR.
W ilson's earlier model of masculinity had different values than those espoused by
Theodore Roosevelt and his friends. This earlier masculine mode o f thinking stressed the
collective over the individual, and emphasized social justice, high moral purpose, and the
power of institutions. All of these aspects can be seen in W ilson’s construction of
masculine action, and all can be seen in his foreign policy.37
The meaning o f masculinity is constantly shifting. Though manliness is a concept
with incredible pow er that has been used to justify many things, including the foreign

36 Freud, W ilson, p. 97
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policies and actions of both W oodrow W ilson and Theodore Roosevelt, it is an amazingly
elusive term that is nearly impossible to define. An action that W ilson would have
described as inherently manly, would have been described by others as weak and
effeminate. Because the definition o f manliness began to change, evaluations o f conduct
shifted in their emphasis, and the rules o f manly behavior were transformed.
It is an irony o f fate that W ilson, who was born before Roosevelt, and who
em bodied an earlier code of conduct and an increasingly dated construction of
masculinity, had to serve as President after him. By the time W ilson reached national
prominence, he was forced to contend with a new paradigm o f m anly behavior that had
been established by advocates of strenuous masculinity, most notably Theodore
Roosevelt.
Though W ilson believed him self every bit the man that TR was, due to
irreversible changes in American culture and society, W ilson was unable to make his
model of manliness stick. As a result, his foreign policy ideas have been handed down to
us with the taint of weakness and misplaced idealism.38 This appraisal of W ilson and his

37 The League of Nations is the most obvious example of the way that this mode of
thought became reflected in W ilson's conception of international relations, but there
numerous other examples.
38 W ilson has suffered particularly at the hands o f the "realist" school, historians and
political scientists who see in W ilson a naive idealism that got in the way of a "realistic"
assessm ent o f the global situation, and an effective use o f American power. See, from
among many examples, George Kennan, American D iplom acy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 55-73; Henry Kissinger, D iplom acy. N ew York: Touchstone,
1995, pp. 225-227; W alter M cDougall, Promised Land. Crusader State. Boston:
Houghton M ifflin, 1998, pp. 129-146, 158-161. By the end o f the Cold W ar, W ilson had
becom e the exam ple to be avoided for many policy makers; Zbigniew Brzezinski,
National Security A dvisor in the Carter Administration, wrote that "Carter seemed to
resent my efforts to make him into a successful Trum an rather than a W ilson."
Brzezinski's implication is that Carter would have been more successful had he been
Trum anesque rather than W ilsonian; if he had been "realistic" rather than "idealistic,"
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foreign policy has a lot to do with the ascendancy o f Theodore R oosevelt and his model
o f strenuous masculinity; but it is important to understand that W ilson’s choice to rely on
an earlier model of masculinity offers one o f the most successful o f the challenges to
Roosevelt’s model. Throughout the twentieth century, A m ericans have often returned to
W ilson’s internationalism , and as often, they have rejected it in favor o f a more
Rooseveltian model.

“Nations M ust Unite as M en Unite:” W ilson and the League o f Nations
Perhaps the best exam ple of W oodrow W ilson's internationalism , and its rejection
by proponents of Rooseveltian national masculinity, can be found in the debate over the
Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations following the end o f the First W orld
War. W hile both sides in the debate prized manly performance, at the heart o f the
disagreem ent were competing ideas of what US foreign policy should be, and how the
United States should approach relationships with other nations. These relationships, as
discussed earlier, have been conceived, articulated, and debated in the language of
American masculinity. W hile both sides, represented most clearly by W oodrow W ilson
on the one hand and Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge on the other, believed
in the im portance o f manly performance, and both viewed the nation as a man, because of
their different beliefs in ideal masculinity, their beliefs, policies and approaches were
radically different.

strong rather than weak - and this in a Democratic adm inistration that made human rights
a central part o f foreign policy. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Pow er and Principle. New
York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1985, p. 30-31.
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The previous chapters have discussed some o f these different beliefs and
approaches. W e have already exam ined W oodrow W ilson’s background, and considered
how R oosevelt’s manly ethos became the paradigm for US foreign policy in the hands of
M ahan, Beveridge and Lodge. In addition, we have exam ined critiques o f Rooseveltian
manliness by John Reed, Jane Addams and W.E.B. Du Bois. W e now turn to examine
some exam ples o f W ilsonian masculinity, as enacted in US foreign policy.
Following a successful teaching career at Princeton, which was capped by his
presidency of the University (1902-1910), W ilson was elected G overnor of New Jersey in
1910, serving from 1911 to 1913. Having acquired a reputation as a reform er during his
time at Princeton, as well as during his two years as Governor, W ilson was approached
by Democrats who asked him to consider a run for the W hite House. W ilson accepted
the challenge. Running for President in 1912, in an election that focused almost
exclusively on domestic affairs, W ilson defeated both the incum bent W illiam Howard
Taft and Roosevelt to take the White House. Elected in November, W ilson took office in
March of 1913. Shortly before taking office he confided that “ [Ijt would be an irony of
fate if my adm inistration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs.” Ironic or not, foreign
affairs pressed themselves upon him from the very beginning of his term .39
W ilson’s campaign for the White House had focused prim arily on promoting his
“New Freedom ” platform, a platform that articulated a more progressive social and
economic agenda than either Taft or Roosevelt (who ran as a Progressive), and foreign
policy had not been much o f a topic. In fact, during the first few months of his

39 For W ilson's pre-Presidential career, see A rthur S. Link, W ilson: The Road to the
W hite H ouse, pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. For description o f his
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Presidency, W ilson focused on achieving his dom estic agenda and breaking down what
he called the “triple wall o f privilege” - the high tariff rates, the banking system, and the
proliferation o f trusts that W ilson argued were creating class divisions in the United
States.40
W hile W ilson was thus occupied, the Revolution in M exico w hich John Reed had
been covering was developing. H uerta’s counter-revolutionary coup against Francisco
M adero in February of 1913 sparked a C onstitutionalist opposition that quickly took up
arms against him. Huerta had been encouraged to overthrow M adero by European and
American diplomats, and the European powers were quick to recognize the new regime.
Then, in October of 1913, Huerta proclaimed a dictatorship. This act thrust the M exican
situation onto the agenda, and W ilson was com pelled to deliver his first foreign policy
speech as President.41
Speaking in Mobile, Alabama, W ilson denounced European im perialism in
M exico, and made a direct connection between the effect of powerful econom ic interests
in domestic politics and the effect of international econom ic interests on M exico. “We
have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States,” W ilson
declared. “Therefore, we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of
America who have to contend with such powers, not only from within their borders, but
from outside their borders also.” W ilson went on to explain that Am erican “sym pathy”

time as president of Princeton, see pp. 37-91; as G overnor of New Jersey, see pp. 205307.
40 For a detailed exam ination of W ilson's cam paign, see Link, The Road to the White
H ouse, pp. 467-528.
41 For the situation that led to W ilson's M obile speech, see Thomas Knock, To End All
Wars: W oodrow W ilson and the Quest for a New W orld O rder. Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1992, pp. 24-27.
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should take the form of a new foreign policy, which was based on “terms o f equality,
’’would help to create a “family o f mankind devoted to the developm ent of true
constitutional liberty.” 42
W ilson’s speech staked out new territory for US foreign policy, and served notice
that R oosevelt’s “Big Stick” and the “Dollar D iplom acy” o f the Taft years would be laid
to rest. As Thom as K nock points out, “ [t]he M obile Address was the first indication that
W ilson m ight seek a potentially radical departure in Am erican foreign policy.”43
Though W ilson may have believed in the idea o f “fam ily,” it was a family where
W ilson/the United States was the father figure, and where the Latin American nations
were expected to mind their manners, and listen to what Professor W ilson, if not Uncle
Sam, had to teach. W ilson had made this clear on an earlier occasion, stating that “he
was going to teach the South American Republics to elect good m en;”44 the definition of
‘good m en,’ of course, varies according to the individual; manliness, like beauty, is in the
eye of the beholder.
Professor W ilson must have been a harsh grader, for as father figure, he was a
stern paterfam ilias - under his direction the United States felt it necessary to school
M exico in appropriate behavior. Two key incidents illustrate W ilson’s professorial
national m asculinity in action. First, in Tampico in early April of 1914, a group o f sailors
was detained by the local m ilitary com mander who was loyal to Huerta. W hen he
realized that the sailors were Americans, and not Constitutionalists, they were released

42 Address to Southern Com m ercial Congress, O ctober 27, 1913, in A rthur S. Link, ed.,
The Papers o f W oodrow W ilson, vol. 28, pp. 448-452.
43 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 26.
44 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters o f W alter Hines Page. 3 vols., G arden City:
Doubleday, 1924-1926. V olum e 1, p. 204. Quoted in Knock, To End All W ars, p. 27.
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with apologies. Adm iral M ayo, of the squadron that the sailors were attached to, insisted
on a 21-gun salute, which the local com mander refused to give. W ilson backed up his
Admiral, and the issue quickly became a sticky affair of honor for both sides.
Before it could be resolved, however, W ilson ordered the squadron to occupy the
city o f V eracruz to prevent a large delivery o f weapons from G erm any from being
delivered to H uerta’s forces. This occupation cam e at a high price, how ever - before it
was com pleted, more than two hundred M exicans, soldiers as well as civilians, had died,
as had nineteen American marines.
W ilson’s actions caused an immediate reaction, both at hom e and abroad. In
M exico, Venustiano Carranza denounced the action, not just because o f the affront to
M exican sovereignty and the loss o f life, but also because the A m erican action helped to
portray H uerta as the defender of Mexico. At home, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore
Roosevelt saw W ilson as a bumbling idiot who either did too much or nothing at all.
Lodge and Roosevelt were not alone in their criticism of W ilson’s attem pts to take
M exico to school. As Thomas Knock points out, “to most contem poraries and historians,
his entire approach was arrogant, contradictory and im perialistic.”45 W ilson’s first
attem pt to impose order on the classroom was not much o f a success.
Though the Tam pico and Veracruz incidents were failures, W ilson learned from
his experience dealing with the warring sides o f the M exican Revolution. The lesson that
W ilson took from Veracruz was that military intervention, at least unilateral military
intervention, was not the answer. There were both domestic and foreign political risks, in

45 Knock. To End All W ars, p. 27.
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addition to the military costs. This experience was to prove decisive and led him to
consider the idea o f collective action in international affairs.
As a result o f his experiences with M exico, W ilson becam e m ore interested in the
idea o f collective security, which had often been put forward by individuals and groups
that have been described as “progressive internationalists.” A m ong these groups were
organizations such as the W om an’s Peace Party and the A m erican U nion Against
M ilitarism. Both of these organizations, discussed briefly in the chapter on Jane Addams,
sought to solve contentious international relations problem s through collective action; the
W P P ’s Platform, for example, called for a ‘“ Concert o f N ations’ to supersede ‘Balance of
Pow er.’”46
This idea influenced W ilson a great deal; in a meeting with Jane Addams, W ilson
stated that the W P P ’s ideas were “by far the best form ulation w hich up to the moment has
been put out by anybody.” As Thomas Knock explains, “ [t]he fact was that the W om an’s
Peace Party had furnished W ilson with a pioneering American synthesis of the New
Diplom acy during the critical year in which his own thinking acquired a definite shape.”47
It should also be stressed that this synthesis was the product o f a com m itted group of
women who had come together specifically to promote w om en’s perspective on
international conflict. This synthesis, which sought to create a “concert o f nations,” was
the direct result o f a new approach to world peace through collective security.
W ilson’s new, woman-inspired direction was appreciated by members of the
Am erican left, but among manly conservatives such as Roosevelt and Lodge, W ilson’s

46 See M arie Louise Degen, History o f the W om an’s Peace Party. New York: Garland
Press, 1972, pp. 38-46.
47 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 52.
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move to repudiate a foreign policy based on the manly national perform ance model, and
replace it with a feminine collective action model was foolish and naive. They became
even more incensed when W ilson argued that the United States should not act to protect
American interests in M exico, but should rather let the Revolution take its course.
W ilson made his case for this new policy in a speech in Philadelphia on the 4th of
July, 1914. W ilson stated that he was “willing to get anything for an A m erican that
money and expertise can obtain, except the suppression o f the rights o f other m en.”
W hile Americans m ight lose property in the upheaval, that needed to be understood as
beneficial in the long run, for “back of it all is the struggle of a people to com e into its
own.”48
W ilson’s new approach as indicative of a deeper difference betw een W ilson and
Roosevelt. The situation in Mexico, one historian argues, “prom pted the virtually
inevitable contrast between [W ilson’s] behavior and conduct of the nation’s foreign
relations and those o f Roosevelt.” W ilson’s handling o f the M exican crisis made it clear
that it was not merely approaches to foreign policy that separated the tw o men, it was
also their personal conduct, their codes of masculinity.49
This is an important point because W ilson’s foreign policy was close to what
socialists such as John Reed (who met with W ilson in June) were hoping for. As we saw
earlier, Reed and W ilson had a num ber of similarities in approach, but where Reed was
looking to create a foreign policy o f international brotherhood, W ilson’s model was
different. The United States did not look at M exico fraternally but paternally - the way a

48 Speech, July 4, 1914, in Link, ed., Papers o f W oodrow W ilson, vol. 30, 251-254.
49 W illiam C. W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an A m erican Foreign
Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p. 183.
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father looks at a child, the way a professor looks at a student, the way a m inister looks at
a member o f the congregation; that is with a m ixture of concern for their ignorance and a
sense o f responsibility for their future development.
Less than a m onth after W ilson’s speech in Philadelphia, war broke out in Europe.
W ilson was quick to declare American neutrality, on August 4th, 1914, im m ediately
following Britain's declaration of war on Germany. W ilson’s goal was to keep the United
States from becom ing involved in the conflict. That would take some doing; many recent
immigrants still had strong connections to the various com batants in Europe. M any
German and Irish im migrants, for example, felt strong sympathy for the C entral Powers,
while many Americans with connections to Britain and France favored the A llies.30
A nother threat to American neutrality was trade. The United States saw an
opportunity to trade with the nations of Europe, which had discovered that the w ar would
not end quickly; they needed supplies, such as armaments, raw materials and food, which
the United States was happy to supply - for a price. Eventually this policy of arms sales
led to greater problems.
The first problem was paying for the armaments. To begin with, the warring
nations paid for their materiel with the gains from American securities and investments
that they sold off, but soon that money ran out as well. The financier J.P. M organ was
approached, and despite adm inistration qualms about neutrality, in late 1915 M organ
established a line o f credit for the Allies. The central powers were effectively denied

50 For more on W ilson and American neutrality, see Arthur S. Link, W ilson: Revolution.
War, and Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979; for a look at the social
divisions on the hom e front, see David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First W orld W ar
and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980
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assistance; by the end o f the war, the Allies had borrow ed m ore than $2 billion, while
Germany had received only $27 m illio n .51
This inequity in trade and finance made it difficult for G erm any to fight, and with
G reat Britain receiving substantial aid from the United States, G erm any believed that it
needed to do something to redress the inequality. The Germ an solution was to use
submarines in an attem pt to pare down the trade advantages that England enjoyed, and
thereby even the military balance.
This tactic had fateful consequences, for it was the G erm an subm arine warfare
that ultimately served to bring the United States into the war. D espite the questionable
nature of Am erican neutrality, the German U -boat war prom pted public outrage. The
sinking of the Falaba in M arch of 1915, in which one A m erican was drowned, and the
loss o f the G ulflight on M ay 1st, were only the prelude to the crisis provoked by the
sinking of the Lusitania on M ay 7th.
The loss o f 128 Americans out of the total of 1200 passengers that the Lusitania
carried came as a shock, and both Roosevelt and W ilson acted characteristically, and
according to their deep-seated beliefs in ideal manly behavior. W ilson continued to argue
for American neutrality, stating that the United States must hold itself above the fray:
The exam ple o f Am erica must be a special example; the exam ple not merely of
peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and the
elevating influence o f the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man
being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it
does not need to convince others by force that it is right.52

51 See Akira Iriye, The Globalizing o f America. 1913-1945. New York: Cam bridge
University Press, 1993. Pages 25-26.
52 “A ddress in Philadelphia to Newly Naturalized Citizens,” M ay 10, 1915, Papers of
W oodrow W ilson, vol. 33, p. 149.
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Roosevelt, o f course, saw things differently. Having described German
submarine warfare as “piracy, pure and sim ple,” he continued in the same vein, but made
it clear that “none of those old time pirates com m itted m urder on so vast a scale as in the
case o f the Lusitania.”53 Following the loss of the Arabic, in which a further two
Americans lost their lives in August, R oosevelt was apoplectic: “It is our own attitude of
culpable weakness and timidity - an attitude assum ed under pressure of the ultra-pacifists
- which is primarily responsible for this dreadful loss o f life and for our national
hum iliation.”54
The m asculine models of foreign policy could not be more clearly opposed than
this. W ilson believed in the manliness of self-control, of restraint, and in the use o f the
intellect to solve problems rather than the use of physical force. There is no need to use
force to “convince,” he argued. In addition, the use o f force has limitations; it is peace
that is “the elevating influence of the world.” For Professor W ilson, concerned about the
progress of his class, it is peace that will raise the students, peace that will serve to
educate them in the means to a better life.
Roosevelt, however, was the product of a different culture, a boy culture, that
believed in drawing the line and standing up to bullies. Roosevelt saw the root cause of
the sinkings as American weakness, not German militarism, and not global war. If the
US acted more like a man, and not with “ weakness and tim idity,” the situation would
never have been created. Roosevelt had no patience with weaklings - particularly those
who believed that strength showed through restraint. By virtue o f their weakness,

53 See Herman H agedom , W orks o f Theodore R oosevelt. National Edition, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Vol. 18, p. 377.
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weaklings begged to be abused. It enraged R oosevelt to see the United States, the nation
he had led, the nation he had provided with a ‘big stick,’ wind up in such a predicament.
Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others who were concerned about American
‘w eakness’ began to push to make sure that the United States was ‘prepared’ for the
conflict in Europe which they saw as inevitable. N ot surprisingly, it was the
Republicans, the party of Roosevelt, Lodge and Beveridge, that took the lead in the
preparedness issue. Lodge, for exam ple, argued that
Armies and navies organized to m aintain peace serve the ends o f peace because
there is no such incentive to war as a rich, undefended, and helpless country,
which by its condition invites aggression.55

From the very beginning, Lodge had ju st one view o f the conflict. W here W ilson
had staked out a position of neutrality, Lodge was an Anglophile, with many close friends
who were British, including the British Am bassador Cecil Spring Rice, who was also an
intimate of Theodore Roosevelt. W hile Lodge realized that American sentiment was
strongly behind W ilson and neutrality, he believed that the United States and the Allies
were engaged in a battle to save ‘civilization’ from a militaristic threat; as Lodge wrote to
Professor J.J. M cCook of Harvard, “The issue to me is very simple. It is whether
dem ocratic government, as it exists in England, France, and the United States, can
survive Prussian m ilitarism .” In a similar vein, Lodge, in a letter to G eorge Otto
Trevelyan, described the war as “the last great struggle o f dem ocracy and freedom

54 "Colonel Roosevelt's New Crusade," Literary Digest, LII (June 3, 1916), p. 1618.
Quoted in Knock, To End All W ars, p. 61.
55 Henry Cabot Lodge. W ar A ddresses. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917. Page 39.
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against autocracy and militarism, and it will succeed, I firmly believe, as the North
fighting in the same cause succeeded against the South.” 56
Lodge realized that though he could not swing popular opinion in favor o f the
Allied cause w ithout a great deal o f effort, he could work to bring the United States more
in line with his way o f thinking. This he did by reiterating the need for manly behavior in
international affairs. As Lodge said in a speech at the unveiling o f The Soldier’s
M onum ent in Brookline, MA, in 1915:
The one dom inant question is w hether we believe ... that there are rights and
duties and faiths in defense o f which men should be prepared to fight and give up
their lives in battle.57

The debate, then, boiled down to the question of whether there was such a thing as a
“man” that was too proud to fight, or whether that decision im m ediately meant that that
person was no longer a “m an” at all but a coward.
It was this line that Lodge followed in the preparedness debate. Lodge had no
great desire to rush the United States into armed combat; he believed, rather, that
American security relied on its military strength, a strength that could keep the United
States from actually entering into any conflict. This was a very sim ilar view to that of
Theodore Roosevelt, who, famously, urged the United States “to speak softly and carry a
big stick.”58 Lodge had been appalled by W ilson’s handling o f the M exican crisis; he
saw W ilson as trying to use a ‘stick’ that he didn’t have, and Lodge interpreted H uerta’s
intransigence with W ilson as a result o f the M exican’s realization that W ilson was

56 Q uoted in W idenor, Henry Cabot L odge, p. 217.
57 Lodge, W ar A ddresses, p. 54.
58 Theodore Roosevelt, “National Duties," in American Ideals. The W orks o f Theodore
R oosevelt, vol. XIII, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926.
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bluffing. A stronger military, however, would provide the muscle to back up American
diplomacy - M exican as well as European. The military, after all, was the stick behind
the softly spoken language.59
W ilson’s response to the Lusitania sinking, that there were times when a nation or
a man was “too proud to fight,” cam e therefore as the final confirm ation for Lodge that
W ilson was “the most dangerous man that ever sat in the W hite H ouse.” As Lodge wrote
to Roosevelt in M arch o f 1915, he “never expected to hate anyone in politics with the
hatred I feel towards W ilson.”60 The idea o f being “too proud to fight” went against
everything that m asculinist and imperialistic men like Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt
believed in. As W illiam W idenor points out, “ [Lodge] and Roosevelt were convinced
that W ilson and [Secretary o f State] Bryan ‘were temperam entally incapable of
conducting an honorable policy toward the w ar,’ that their course of conduct made a
mockery o f the ‘“ whole international code of gentlemanly behavior’ which had been the
essence” o f R oosevelt’s foreign policy.61
W ilson did not do much to change L odge’s perceptions. His demeanor, always
righteous and ministerial, was particularly so in terms o f foreign policy, and this
particularly irked Lodge, who viewed W ilson’s policies as inept and fumbling. The
com bination o f W ilson’s arrogance and his inability to recognize the validity of other
perspectives, led Lodge to declare on the floor o f the Senate that
when the President is approaching a new subject, the first thing he does is make
up his mind, and when his mind is made up the thoughts which in more ordinary

59 For a discussion o f this, see W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 215-216.
60 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, M arch 1, 1915, in Selections From the
Correspondence o f Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. 1884-1918. New York,
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925.
61 W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 195
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mortals are apt to precede the decision or determination o f a great question are
excluded; information upon the new subject is looked on as a mere
im pertinence.62

Despite W ilson’s ministerial performance, Lodge and TR were also unwilling to
concede W ilson the moral high ground. As W idenor points out,
Roosevelt and Lodge believed that W ilson, in his preoccupation with keeping the
country out o f war and in assuming a morally neutral position was destroying the
A m erican public’s rather tenuous sense o f duty and obligation toward the
international community.63

This choice o f a “morally neutral” position was the key to the dispute; Lodge and
Roosevelt had a different sense of morality, one that was rooted in their very different
conceptions of how men (and nations) ought to behave. At the bottom o f their conflict
was the question o f which model of masculinity should be used as the basis for foreign
policy.
Roosevelt and Lodge used the issue o f preparedness as the means to promote their
model of masculinity. The Republican Party was looking to the election of 1916 as a
means of taking back the momentum in the political debate, and the issue o f preparedness
seem ed to be the perfect platform. Lodge, Roosevelt and others portrayed W ilson and the
Democrats as the party of weakness, or rather as “the party o f subm ission.”64
W ilson needed to counter this political threat, and co-opting their preparedness
line, W ilson called for “reasonable” preparedness, hoping thereby to neutralize the
Republican threat while not alienating the progressive internationalists and the socialists

62 Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 63rd Congress. 3rd Session,
1915. Page 3358.
63 W idenor, H enry Cabot Lodge, p. 211
64 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 62.
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who had enabled him to win election in the first place. He was not entirely successful, in
part because this half-way position went against the manly ethos that he had staked out
before.
Though W ilson was able to counter the Republicans effectively, his choice to
com prom ise on the preparedness issue by meeting the Republicans halfw ay created
additional opposition within his own constituency. Jane Addams w arned him o f the loss
o f credibility that a military build-up would have in Europe, while Lillian W ald helped
found an "Anti-M ilitarism Committee," which later developed into the Am erican Union
A gainst M ilitarism .65 M ore importantly, however, was the resignation o f W illiam
Jennings Bryan, W ilson’s Secretary of State.
B ryan’s break with W ilson came in June of 1915, as the result o f W ilson’s
adm onishm ent o f the Germans following the sinking o f the A rabic; Bryan w anted the
President to take a less confrontational tone with the German government, and state that
any ships that sailed into the war zone did so at their own risk. B ryan’s resignation could
have caused real political trouble; Bryan had been the Democratic nominee for President
three times, spoke for the American mid-W est on a number o f im portant issues, and most
im portantly now, spoke for prominent American pacifists groups such as the W om an’s
Peace Party and the AUAM when he protested actions that he believed would bring the
US closer to war.66

65 For an extended discussion o f the response to W ilson, and the creation AUAM , see
Knock, To End All W ars, p. 63.
66 For perspctives on Bryan, there are several biographies. Paolo Coletta's three volume
W illiam Jennings Bryan. Lincoln: University o f N ebraska Press, 1969, is excellent. The
best one volume biography is Louis W. Koenig, Bryan: A Political Biography o f W illiam
Jennings B ryan. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1971. For his resignation, see Coletta's second
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B ryan’s resignation encouraged the anti-war movement, w hich was already
growing rapidly. Despite the resignation o f his Secretary of State, there were many who
continued to view W ilson as an ally; part o f this was due to the fact that the Republicans
were perceived to be worse. Eugene Debs, the prom inent socialist and candidate for
president, spoke for many when he warned that if the United States was draw n into the
European conflict, Roosevelt, Lodge and others would “transform the Am erican nation
into the most powerful and odious military despotism on the face o f the earth.” M ax
Eastman, editor o f The M asses, and a member of the AUAM , m et with W ilson, and came
away with the impression that W ilson was on his side. W ilson, Eastm an wrote, “always
referred to the Union Against M ilitarism as though he were a m em ber o f i t ... I believe
that he sincerely hates his preparedness policies.”67
W ilson’s “reasonable” preparedness played out well during his re-election
cam paign in 1916. W ilson ran on a platform o f continued progressive legislation,
neutrality in the European war and “reasonable preparedness.”

The slogan o f the

campaign, which summed up the ultimate reason for W ilson’s re-election, was “He kept
us out of war.”
W ilson did believe in the importance of beefing up A m erican defense capabilities;
in fact, W ilson was moving towards a vision for collective security, and part of his plan
required the use o f American power. The centrality of collective security, and the
importance o f American power to that plan, was made clear in a speech W ilson made to
the Senate on January 22, 1917. Setting the stage for the speech, W ilson announced that

volume, W illiam Jennings Bryan: Progressive Politician and M oral Statesm an. 19091915. pp. 329-361, and Koenig, Bryan, pp. 502-552.
67 Quotes in Knock, To End All W ars, pp. 64, 67.
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the warring powers o f Europe had agreed to an American request for a statem ent of their
war aims, and since they were willing to state their terms for peace, it made sense that the
US do so as well.
W ilson stated that the creation o f a body that would guarantee the collective
security o f nations was essential:
In every discussion of the peace that m ust end this war it is taken for granted that
peace must be followed by some definite concert of pow er w hich will make it
virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overw helm us again.

Furthermore, despite American neutrality,
it was inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in
that great enterprise ... No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include
the peoples o f the New W orld can suffice to keep the future safe against war.

The power behind this collective security would grow out o f the efforts for preparedness
that W ilson was pushing.
It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor o f the
permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force o f any nation ... that
no nation, no probable com bination of nations could face or withstand it.68

Because an eventual peace must be a collective peace, W ilson argued, the outcome of the
war must not be punitive or humiliating. “Only a peace between equals can last," W ilson
claimed, and so the peace must be a “peace without victory.”
This speech is important for a num ber of reasons. First, it makes clear the central
importance of collective security to W ilson’s view of international relations. From this

point on, the concept o f a “concert o f pow er,” or a league of nations, was central in
W ilson’s view o f the post-war world. Second, it was clear that W ilson had taken the step
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and codified his vision o f the manly ideal in foreign policy, and em bodied it in the web o f
security that the “concert o f power” was going to create. W ilson found security in the
collective, and danger in the lone-w olf m asculine ideal favored by Roosevelt and Lodge.
Needless to say, Roosevelt, Lodge and Beveridge disagreed; while W ilson’s
speech met with a great deal o f acclaim outside o f the Republican party, the defenders of
ram pant m asculinity saw W ilson’s conception o f “peace without victory” as another
indication o f weakness and cowardice. As Theodore Roosevelt sneered, “Peace without
victory is the natural ideal of the man too proud to fight.”69
The “Peace W ithout Victory” speech highlights the opposition o f the two
conflicting paradigms o f manliness. W ilson sought to promote the m anliness o f restraint,
o f law and order, the manliness o f the Covenant and the Constitution. Men, W ilson
believed, belonged in society, where checks upon their free will contributed to their
security. Similarly, a nation belonged in a sim ilar society, where collective security
would ensure peace. Roosevelt and Lodge, on the other hand, wanted to preserve
independent action, beef up the muscularity of the US, and swing the big stick to
guarantee American rights.
W ilson, at this point, seemed to be winning the argument. His re-election in
Novem ber said as much. W ith the support o f Progressives, and with the Republican
challenger, Charles Evans Hughes, distancing him self from R oosevelt and his attacks on
the Kaiser, it was clear that W ilson controlled the debate. Furthermore, by com bining
progressivism and peace, W ilson was able to position him self as a modern "man of

68 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 112.
69 Knock, To End All W ars, p. 113.
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peace," and embody, through his performance on the election trail, a ministerial
masculinity that meshed well with his political message.
W ilson may have won re-election by running as the man “who has kept us out of
war,” but this did not last for long. On January 3 1st, Germany announced that it would
begin unrestricted submarine warfare the next day, which meant that any ship, neutral or
belligerent, found in the war zone, was liable to be sunk without warning. W ilson
responded with the breaking o f relations with Germany on February 3rd. W hile a debate
raged over the arming o f American merchantmen, a series o f events brought the crisis to
a head.
The first event was the news o f the Zim m erm ann Telegram , which became public
on M arch 1st. The telegram was itself a message sent by the German Secretary o f State
for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zim m erm ann to the Germ an Embassy in Mexico. The
m essage had been intercepted by the British government, and passed (with a certain
am ount of glee, no doubt) on to Wilson. The message instructed the Germ an diplomats
to offer assistance to M exico in the case of a war between the US and Germany, and to
promise Germ an aid, including armaments, so that M exico could “recover the lost
territories o f Texas, New M exico and Arizona.”70
Following shortly after the telegram were the sinkings of five more American
merchant ships. W ilson was now forced to act; his Cabinet voted unanim ously to support
a declaration of war. As a result, W ilson called a special session of Congress. W hen
Congress met on April 2, 1917, W ilson asked that they recognize that a state o f war

70 For more on this moment, see Arthur S. Link, W ilson: Cam paigns for Progressivism
and Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 342-346
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already existed between the United States and Germany. Describing the German U-boat
cam paign as a “cruel and unmanly business,” W ilson went on to state that this

is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken
... but the ships of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and
overwhelm ed in the waters in the same way ... The challenge is to all m ankind.71

Having laid out the threat, W ilson proceeded to discuss the remedy. "We are glad,"
W ilson stated,
now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus
for the ultimate peace o f the world and for the liberation o f its peoples ... The
world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested
foundations o f political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve.72

W ilson’s goal of making the world “safe for dem ocracy” became one of his career
defining sentences, and as such is worth considering alongside his ‘peace without
victory’ speech of January 22. Both speeches go against the prevailing Rooseveltian
construction o f masculinity; the idea of fighting, not to win, but to bring about a
condition of equality and balance went against the boy culture o f Roosevelt and others.
As Roosevelt explained in his essay titled “The American Boy,” “every good boy should
have it in him to thrash the objectionable boy as the need arises.” Similarly, Germany
needed to be thrashed, and “peace without victory” w ould not suffice as a thrashing.73
But m aking the world “safe for dem ocracy” was not really the solution either.
Lodge and Roosevelt saw American involvement in the war as the result o f German
militarism on the one hand, and American weakness on the other. Now that the US was

71 Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates o f the 65th Congress. 1st Session.
Vol. 55, Part I, pp. 102-104.
72 ibid.
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involved, both men wanted to see the US crush their opponents. As W illiam W idenor
points out, Lodge “never once considered the possibility of a war o f limited objectives.”74
R oosevelt and Lodge, looking back to the days o f the C ivil W ar, saw conflict in
terms o f w hat W idenor calls a “holy w ar.” The end o f the Civil W ar, which repudiated
the planter elite that had caused the war, was a good model for Lodge. Lodge believed,
for exam ple, that his party stood “for unconditional surrender and com plete victory just
as G rant stood.”75 M aking the “world safe for dem ocracy,” or restoring the balance of
pow er in Europe was not a clear enough goal, and would not justify the loss o f American
life. D espite their objections, however, both Lodge and R oosevelt supported W ilson’s
declaration o f war, and on April 6th, 1917, it became official: the U nited States had
com m itted itself to a war in Europe for the first time.
W ith the nation at war, W ilson needed to define American w ar aims. In a speech
to Congress on January 8th, 1918, W ilson presented Congress with what became known
as the " 14 Points." A further developm ent o f the ideas he had expressed previously, such
as the “concert of powers” and the concept of “peace without victory,” the 14 Points
codified W ilson’s view of the post-w ar world, and made central his hope for an enduring
collective security apparatus.
The first of the 14 Points called for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at,”
which w ould prevent the type o f secret diplomacy that had created a world war from a
single shot. The second point called for “ absolute freedom of the seas,” and in doing so
addressed the Am erican casus belli. The third point required “the rem oval, so far as

73 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Am erican Boy,” in The Strenuous L ife, p. 136.
74 W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 276.
75 W idenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 284.
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possible, o f all econom ic barriers,” and the establishm ent of free trade; the goal here was
to create econom ic bonds that would facilitate international cooperation. The fourth
point called for a reduction o f armaments “to the lowest point consistent with domestic
safety,” and the fifth “a free, open minded, and absolutely im partial adjustm ent o f all
colonial claim s,” based on the principle o f self-determination. This w ould help promote
international security and spell the end of colonialism and hence great-pow er rivalry.76
The next eight points dealt with specific land and boundary issues, nam ely the
negotiation o f borders in central Europe and the M iddle East, and how they should be
determ ined after the break-up o f the Austro-Hungarian Em pire and the O ttom an Empire
after the war. But the final point, and the most im portant part o f W ilson’s program read
as follows: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants
for the purpose o f affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial
integrity to great and small states alike.”77
The idea for a League of Nations had been in the back o f W oodrow W ilson’s
mind for many years. He had worked on the idea in terms o f the Pan-A m erican Pact, and
he had been influenced in his goal by groups such as the W om an’s Peace Party, and the
American Union Against M ilitarism, which had sought to institute a perm anent body
which could mediate between warring nations.78
The 14 Points served as W ilson’s centerpiece, and he was able to use them as an
incentive for peace; when published, the docum ent gave incentive to the warring nations
to lay down their weapons. The Germans, in particular, faced with a renew ed Allied

76 Address to Congress, Papers o f W oodrow W ilson, vol.45, pp. 534-539.
77 ibid.
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assault, saw possibility in a Peace settlement based on the 14 Points; in fact, they made
that one o f the conditions for the armistice.79 A ssured that the docum ent would serve as
the basis for any peace, the Germans agreed to lay dow n their arms. The war ended at the
eleventh hour o f the eleventh day of the eleventh m onth of 1918.
N ovem ber of 1918 also brought the m id-term elections for Congress. During the
course o f the past two years, W ilson had not handled the political aspect well. He had
m anaged to alienate his form er supporters, such as the pacifists and the socialists, by
means o f repressive prosecutions for disloyalty under the Espionage act, and through the
harassm ent of their journals (such as The M asses) by the Postm aster General. He had also
given strength and determ ination to his adversaries by refusing to consult with or include
any o f their number in his thoughts or negotiations. The mid-term elections o f November
1918 were therefore catastrophic for W ilson; he had called for a referendum on his
policies, and he was met with an apparent rejection. The result o f the m id-term election
was the loss of Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. W ilson was
going to have to submit his vision for a lasting peace, a peace based on his particular
construction of masculinity, to men who were convinced that international affairs were
rooted in a different model.80
Before that could happen, though, the Peace Treaty needed to be composed.
W ilson decided to attend the Peace conference in Paris in person so as to supervise the
transform ation o f the 14 Points into an instrum ent for lasting peace. W ilson made a
tactical and political mistake by not including any prom inent R epublicans in the

78 Thomas K nock’s book, To End All W ars, from which I have quoted widely, is the
definitive source for the development o f W ilson’s collective security thought.
79 Knock, To End A ll W ars, p. 166.
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American Comm ission to Negotiate Peace. W ilson was certainly not going to make
things easy for himself, or for the treaty that he put so much faith in.
W ilson was received by the people o f Europe like a savior; the other members of
the “Big Four,” G eorge Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and O rlando Vittorio, were
not quite so enthusiastic. Leery o f W ilson’s idealism, the leaders o f the European powers
were not convinced that they should give up on the balance o f pow er system that had kept
the peace for so long. Clem enceau in particular was dubious. M ocking W ilson’s saintly
persona, he said “G od gave us the Ten Com m andm ents and we broke them. W ilson gave
us the 14 Points - we shall see.” Despite many com prom ises, W ilson’s 14th point, the
section that had originally called for the creation o f a “general association o f nations,”
eventually became the central part of the League o f Nations covenant, and was codified
in the very first section o f the Versailles Peace Treaty, which was signed on June 28,
1919. The first 26 articles o f the Peace Treaty were the 26 articles o f the League
Covenant.
The peace that W ilson had worked for in Paris was one that required nations to
act as individuals within an agreement similar to those that he had developed in many
different circumstances since his youth. This agreement, though guaranteeing the
individual freedom, also bound the members to act for the com m on good. This idea is
classic W ilson - it goes back as far as his childhood.
The use o f the word ‘covenant’ in the “Covenant of the League o f N ations,” for
exam ple, automatically puts the docum ent into the tradition that W ilson began when he
drew up a covenant with his friend Charles Talcott. In that “solem n covenant,” W ilson

80 See Knock, To End All W ars, p. 167-187
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and his friend agreed to direct “ all their powers and passions for the work o f establishing
the principles we held in com m on.” 81
W hile there is an interesting continuity in W ilson’s thinking, the problem was that
W ilson’s principles were not actually held “in com m on;” there were many who did not
agree with W ilson’s dream o f a League of Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge was one o f these
people. L odge’s objections to the League o f Nations were many, and profound, but it is
not an oversim plification to state that they were rooted in the issue o f national
sovereignty; he objected to the possibility o f the U nited States becom ing involved in
foreign wars through no choice o f its own.
W ilson’s goal of an enduring peace was dependent on nations giving up certain
individual actions and submitting themselves to the authority o f the collective. In urging
this kind of approach, W ilson was flying in the face o f recent developm ents in American
culture. It was all well and good to be part of a collective, but the Am erican rhetoric of
struggle and com petition held that the American man should do what was necessary to
rise to the top, to becom e the leader of that collective.82
W e can take one exam ple from popular sports. At the turn of the century, football
was being urged as a sport in which men at elite educational institutions (H arvard and
Yale, W est Point and Annapolis) could dem onstrate their worth through leadership; the
football game had becom e a m etaphor for life in an increasingly com petitive society, and
the quarterback was the equivalent o f a general, a business leader, a president. If the

81 M ulder, The Years of Preparation, p. 56.
82 There are so many exam ples, but the stories of Horatio Alger, Jr. are as good as any.
One o f Alger's most famous stories, Struggling Upward, or Luke Larkin's Luck.
(Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1890) illustrated how hard w ork and manly qualities,
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League o f Nations were a team, as W ilson argued, then Henry C abot Lodge wanted to be
the quarterback.83
There were m ajor differences between Lodge and W ilson on the issue of
manliness and foreign policy, so it was no surprise that when W oodrow W ilson returned
from Europe, on July 8, 1919, with the com pleted Covenant, he cam e back to a political
stand-off with the Republican party. The opposition to the League o f Nations Covenant
was led by Lodge, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
W ilson and Lodge had clashed often regarding foreign policy, and the debate over the
League o f Nations was only the latest installm ent o f an ongoing battle o f wills. Lodge
had originally begun to despise W ilson through his handling o f the crisis in Mexico,
originally over the issue of recognizing Huerta, and later over the occupation of
Veracruz.84
Lodge had begun his opposition to W ilson early, beginning to rally the troops at
home while W ilson was still in Paris negotiating the Treaty. Lodge had been one of the
thirty-nine senators who had signed a letter in February rejecting the League “ in its
present form ,” and his opposition had not softened. W ilson subm itted the Treaty, which
contained the Covenant of the League o f Nations, to the Senate two days after his return,
and Lodge, promptly locked the treaty up in the committee.

mixed with a bit o f luck, raised a young man above his contem poraries to a position of
leadership, responsibility, and wealth.
83 For football as m etaphor for American life at this time, see K im Townsend, M anhood
at H arvard, p. 102-103. For an excellent look at the role of football in turn o f the century
A merica, see M ichael Oriard's Reading Football: How the Popular Press Created An
Am erican Spectacle. Chapel Hill: University o f N orth Carolina Press, 1993.
84 For an excellent extended discussion o f Lodge's views o f W ilson and the peace
process, including the League of Nations Covenant, see W idenor, H enry Cabot Lodge, p.
266-348.
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Lodge had serious ‘reservations’ about the treaty. W hile he did not want the
United States to withdraw from the world (Lodge was too much of an im perialist for
that), he did want the US to maintain freedom o f independent action, and not be in the
position o f having its international affairs dictated by the other m em bers o f the League.
Lodge’s opposition to the Treaty rested prim arily on his interpretation o f Article X,
which stated that
The members o f the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all
members o f the League. In case o f any such aggression or in case o f any threat or
danger o f such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this
obligation shall be fulfilled.

This guarantee, which was backed by the threat o f collective action, was the heart of
W ilson’s plan for the future of world peace, but it was also the central objection for
Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge saw a loss o f sovereignty and a blow to C ongress’s power,
defined in Article 1, Section 8 o f the Constitution, to declare war. Lodge was also aware
o f the Foreign Relation C om m ittee’s pow er to delay passage o f the Treaty, and he
convened endless discussions and debates on the problems inherent in the Treaty and the
Covenant itself.
Frustrated and enraged by L odge’s tactics, W ilson decided to take his case
directly to the Am erican people, so as to avoid com prom ises with Lodge, and so as to
increase the pressure o f the electorate on their elected representatives. W ilson embarked
on a speaking tour of the American W est, traveling more than nine thousand miles by
train, and delivering thirty-seven speeches in twenty-two days. The texts o f these
speeches on the W estern Tour, as it cam e to be known, are w orth studying closely, for
they indicate the way that W ilson saw the League, and his extended explications of the
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reasoning behind the Covenant and the Treaty are eloquent of his world view. This view,
the speeches show, was rooted in a particular kind of m asculine paternalism , and indicate
how W ilson’s ow n conception o f manliness, rooted in the m inisterial model that his
father had provided to him , shaped his view o f leadership, and his view o f how the world
should best be reorganized. In fact, W ilson collapsed at the end o f the tour; hence it
makes sense to think o f the W estern Tour as the beginning of the end o f his life, and of
his political power. The tour, then, shows W ilson at his zenith, the m om ent where he was
able to com bine politics and morality to the greatest effect. It also provides us with an
exam ple o f W ilson at his m ost righteous - the most like his father.
One of the speeches that highlights W ilson’s particular com bination of ministerial
m asculinity and political morality is the one he gave Septem ber 8, 1919 at the Coliseum
in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In the speech he advocated acceptance o f the Versailles
Treaty and the League o f Nations Covenant, but the language that he used indicates an
underlying concern with m asculinity and American morality.
W ilson began his speech by discussing the nature of the men who had fought the
war in Europe, and how they had arrived in France
with the look of Am erica in their ey es... the feeling that penetrates every
American, that there is a great future, that a man can handle his own fortunes, that
it is his right to have his place in the world, and that no man that he does not
choose is his master.
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These men, W ilson continued, had fought to bring about a new Europe, “not merely ... to
defeat Germ any; [America] was seeking to defeat everything that G erm any’s action
represented, and to see to it that there never happened such a thing again.”85
W hat Am erican men had been trying to do, W ilson argued, was to redeem
civilization, to make sure that physical force would be replaced by m oral force, and
thereby make armed conflict obsolete:
That is exactly what is attempted in this treaty. I can not understand the
psychology o f the men who are resisting it. I can not understand w hat they are
afraid of, unless it is that they know physical force and do not understand moral
force. M oral force is a great deal more powerful than physical. G overn the
sentim ents o f mankind, and you govern mankind. Govern their fears, govern their
hopes ... and the whole thing sways like a team.86

The team metaphor was a popular one in the early twentieth century, as sports
teams were seen as models of the new masculinity. Here, in W ilson’s construction, the
team is brought together by the rule of law; law replaces combat, as moral force replaces
physical force, but this important transformation happens under the rubric o f a masculine
identity.
That does not mean that there is no room for physical force; W ilson explained the
im portance o f this in an interesting anecdote:
Did you ever see a family that hung its son’s yardstick or ledger or spade up over
the mantelpiece? But how many o f you have seen the lad ’s rifle, his musket, hung
up! W ell, why? A musket is a barbarous thing. The spade and the yardstick and
the ledger are the symbols o f peace and o f steady business; why not hang them
up? Because they do not represent self-sacrifice. They do not glorify you. They
do not dignify you in the same sense as the m usket.. ,87

85 W oodrow W ilson, Addresses of President W ilson. W ashington: G overnm ent Printing
Office, 1919. p. 82.
86 ibid., p. 88.
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W ilson, ever eager to spread the lessons of Christianity, was em phasizing the value of
self-sacrifice. The musket belonged over the mantel because it represented the service
that men needed to do to bring about a new and better world. The sacrifice that W ilson
was describing here, though, was not the sacrifice of Christian m eekness, o f turning the
other cheek. Rather it was a sacrifice made to the stirring strains o f “O nw ard Christian
Soldiers.”
A week later, in Portland, Oregon on Septem ber 15, 1919, W ilson had the
opportunity to elaborate even more on his construction of international masculinity. He
did this, interestingly, by quoting Henry Cabot Lodge:
Nations must unite as men unite in order to preserve peace and order. The great
nations must be so united as to be able to say to a particular country, ‘you must
not go to w ar,’ and they can say that effectively when the country desiring war
knows that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresistible.88

Nations are like men - the analogy here is one with which we are very familiar. It
is the same analogy that Roosevelt described in his famous “National D uties” speech
eighteen years earlier; namely that as a man acts within the nation, so must the nation act
in the world. W ilson must certainly have quoted Lodge with relish; W ilson must have
loved the opportunity to have Lodge speak for him, and in praise of the League of
Nations.
W ilson claim ed L odge’s words for his own because W ilson believed, ju st like
Lodge, that “nations m ust unite as men.” In fact, W ilson believed that nations behave as
men not merely in unity, but in every possible instance; it was because o f this conviction
that W ilson believed that a group of nations (such as the League) would be able to

87 ibid., p. 89
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enforce peace in much the same way that men do, with the W ilsonian caveat that the
collective be backed up by a force behind peace which is “irresistible.”
W rapping up his speech in Portland, W ilson called upon the audience to make a
covenant with him, so that the Promise o f the League will be redeem ed, and “ so that men
shall always say that American soldiers saved Europe and A m erican citizens saved the
world.”89
Once again, W ilson reiterated the masculinity o f Christian sacrifice, the use of
force as a means to a higher purpose; but more importantly, W ilson constructed national
action as manly behavior. This trope of national manhood was a constant on W ilson’s
W estern Tour, as it had been throughout his career, and was, as we have seen, indicative
of his mode of thought. W ilson, like Lodge (whom he quotes) and Roosevelt (who set up
the earlier analogy), saw foreign policy in the guise of manly interaction. The limits of
W ilson’s vision are the limits of how men actually behave.
But W ilson was an optimist. Eight days before he forced to give up his tour on
account of poor health, on September 17th in San Francisco, W ilson concluded his talk
with the following words:
My fellow citizens, I believe in Divine Providence. If I did not, I would go crazy.
If I thought the direction of the disordered affairs of this world depended on our
finite intelligence, I should not know how to reason my way to sanity, and I do
not believe that there is any body of men, how ever they concert their pow er or
their influence, that they can defeat this great enterprise o f divine mercy and
peace and good will.90

88 ibid., p. 208.
89 ibid., p. 217.
90 ibid., p. 252.
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Despite his faith in providence, W ilson was unable to win the argument for the
League o f Nations. It seems that there was “a body of m en” who were able to “concert
their pow er” in such a way that W ilson’s argument did not carry the day. These men, led
by Henry Cabot Lodge, were able to carry the day in large m easure because their
alternate, com peting vision of the conjunction o f masculinity and US foreign policy was
stronger and m ore com pelling than that of Woodrow Wilson. W ilson may have tried to
co-opt Lodge’s construction of masculinity and apply it to support his view of the League
of Nations Covenant, but he was not successful.
For all his talk o f Divine Providence, and the manly sacrifice o f Christian soldiers
who fought for a higher ideal and a League of Nations, W ilson was not able to make a
convincing case that his mid-nineteenth century construction o f A m erican manliness
would work as a model for how men and nations should behave at the beginning o f the
1920s.
But after the G reat W ar ended in 1918, there was an opportunity for American
com m itm ent to collective security. American resources and m ilitary power had proved to
be the decisive power in the European war, and this was recognized at the time. While
American diplom atic tradition, in the form of W ashington's Farew ell Address, argued
against the com mitment, the reality, recognized by many Americans, was that the United
States had already been drawn into one European conflict, and could be again.
Though tradition was a powerful argument, W ilson was ultim ately unable to
convince the American people o f his vision for the League o f N ations because Lodge and
Roosevelt were able to control the terms o f the debate; W ilson, operating under a
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previous generation’s masculine ideal, was unable to convince the population at large that
collective security was the answer to A m erica’s foreign policy needs.
The debate over the Versailles Peace treaty illustrates in the clearest possible
fashion the difference between the W ilsonian ethos o f masculinity and that of
Rooseveltian manliness as articulated in the code o f the “ strenuous life.” W ilson, as we
have discussed, hoped to bring the world together in a League o f N ations, an organization
that would function to control and guide individual nations in the sam e way that a
congregation or a classroom would function; bullies and sinners w ould be dealt with, and
the collective would stay secure. The success of the organization w ould depend on the
ability of the collective to channel its behavior in a particular way; for W ilson, the
exam ple to follow was that o f a man who had self-control, who could restrain him self and
his passions, and who could lead and/or educate the rest of the world in how to achieve
peace, an era o f no more wars. W ilson believed that nations behaved ju st as men
behaved; accordingly, “nations must unite as men unite,” and through this new unity
create a “ world safe for dem ocracy.”
Lodge, the carrier of the Rooseveltian banner after T R ’s death in January of 1919,
saw the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations covenant in essentially manly terms as
well, only he saw it as a threat to the independence o f the United States. Lodge described
his opposition to the League in a letter to W illiam E. Borah, Senator from Idaho, and
explained that his plan was to "emasculate [the League] as much as possible."91
Lodge, like Wilson, clearly saw the League in manly guise; the nature of
international relations was identical to that o f manly interpersonal relations, and conduct
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o f those relations was dependent on men acting like men. The em asculation men makes
it impossible for them to perform manly duties such as fatherhood; similarly, the
"emasculation" o f the League would make it impotent, weak, unmanly, and not worthy of
respect, nor even able to com m and the respect, o f strong American men.
By pursuing the "emasculation" o f the League, Lodge was striking a blow at a
construction of international masculine perform ance that was at odds with his own. By
attacking a treaty that em braced collective security, a treaty based on a brotherhood of
nations, Lodge believed that he was preserving the opportunity for independent action by
the United States; he was acting in accordance with the Rooseveltian construct of "the
strenuous life" which preached the values of manly struggle and com petition, as opposed
to the ideals of com munality and brotherhood that were W ilson's ideal national
masculinity.
While Lodge may have succeeded in defeating the League, it was a pyrrhic
victory; history has not been kind to Lodge, and the words that Oswald G arrison Villard
are expressive of the attitudes o f many:
Men will read his books, a few his speeches; ... [N]ever will it be truthfully
claimed for him that he broadened the range o f American idealism, or brought the
achievem ent o f our ideals an hour nearer, or advanced in any way the brotherhood
of m a n .92

A concern for the "brotherhood o f man" was not Lodge's model, however; it was
W ilson's. Perhaps it is fitting that Lodge be m easured according to W ilson's model of
national masculinity, since W ilson was found wanting according to Lodge's.

91 Letter from Lodge to W illiam E. Borah, February, 1919, in John M cC ook Roots, "The
Treaty of Versailles in the U.S. Senate," quoted in W idenor, Henry C abot Lodge, p. 308.
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Similarly, it is fitting that W ilson quoted the words of Henry Cabot Lodge in one
o f his final speeches o f the tour, for the two men shared a central key belief, namely that
nations behaved like men, and that manly action was the key to a successful foreign
policy. W hen W ilson quoted L odge’s statem ent “that nations m ust unite as men unite,” it
is the perfect exam ple o f the two m en’s similar approach to foreign affairs.
W here they differed, though, was in the decision of which construction of
manliness to adhere to. L odge’s and Roosevelt’s construction won out in the end, and
W ilson’s belief in the m asculinity o f collective security, self restraint, and Christian
moralism, like the League o f Nations which it produced, went dow n in defeat.
Yet W ilson’s belief in collective security, rooted as it was in the mid-nineteenth
century masculinity that he learned from his father, returned many years later in the form
o f the United Nations. It seems, then, that W oodrow W ilson was born both forty years
too late and forty years too early.

92 Oswald Garrison Villard, "Henry Cabot Lodge - A Scholar in Politics," The Nation,
No. 119 (N ovem ber 19, 1924), p. 541. Quoted in W idenor, Henry C abot L odge, p. 350.
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CONCLUSION

“REA L M EN W ANT TO GO TO TEH ER A N :”
THE PERSEV ERA N CE OF M ANLY FOREIGN POLICY

The G reat W ar was an entirely new experience, a radically different kind o f war
than the Spanish-A m erican W ar of 1898. Though Roosevelt dem onstrated genuine
courage in his Cuban “charge,” that kind o f independent military adventurism was not
possible in France in 1917. The mechanized, impersonal violence o f trench warfare
transform ed men into cannon fodder and killing machines. The industrial approach to
com bat made wholesale slaughter possible, with the result being tragedies such as the
Battle of the Somme, where the British Army suffered nearly 60,000 casualties in a single
day. 1 W hile men like Theodore Roosevelt had agitated for A m erican involvem ent in the
Great W ar, when his own son died following an air battle, he w ent into a depression from
which he never recovered.2
W orld W ar One was a decisive event for all of the individuals in this study.
W oodrow W ilson had a stroke, and died trying to impose his peace on the world, a peace
that the United States ultimately wanted to have nothing to do with, shocked as it was
over the intransigence and unwillingness o f Europe to turn its back on the kind o f politics
that started the w ar to begin with. John Reed went to Russia in 1917 to cover the Russian

1 For more on the Battle o f the Somme, see John Keegan, The First W orld W ar. New
York: Knopf, 1999, pp. 286-299.
2 See N athan M iller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life. New York: W illiam M orrow, 1992, p.
562.
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Revolution, and eventually died there, unable to bring about his vision o f international
brotherhood.
Am erican women finally won the vote in 1920, a victory that was in large
measure due to the end o f their opposition to the war, and their patriotic work during the
conflict. As Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones pointed out, women's suffrage leaders, m ost notably
Carrie Chapm an Catt, had proposed a deal to W oodrow Wilson: "if he w ould support
votes for women, they would drop their pacifist principles and support the Am erican war
effort." This deal finally enabled the passage o f the Nineteenth Amendm ent. The logic
that traded pacifism for women's suffrage made perfect sense with regard to the
perspective on foreign policy offered by Jane Addams and others discussed earlier.
W om en won the vote not because they were the same as men, but because they were
different, and therefore able to provide government with a different perspective on social
and political issues than that provided by men.3
W .E.B. Du Bois, however, saw no victory at home, despite victory abroad, and
grew increasingly concerned over African A m ericans’ chance for full equality in the
United States. Du Bois cam e to realize that "playing the man" had not worked for
A frican-Am ericans in W W I any better than it had worked in Cuba or in the Philippines;
Blacks were no more respected, or welcomed as citizens, after the Arm istice than they
were before the war.
For many, the title o f Ernest Hemingway's novel A Farew ell to Arms sums up the
response o f the United States to the G reat War. The First W orld W ar generated a sense of

3 See Rhodri Jeffreys Jones, Changing Differences: W omen and the Shaping of
Am erican Foreign Policy, 1917-1994. New Brunswick: Rutgers U niversity Press, 1995,
p. 11.
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exhaustion among a 'lost generation' whose rejection of idealism and m ilitarism was
driven by a revulsion for the waste of hum an life that the Gilded A ge conception of
national masculine performance had wrought. Yet the connection betw een masculine
performance and foreign policy was never broken; even Hem ingway rearticulated it in
For W hom the Bell Tolls and To Have and H ave N ot, works that feature protagonists
who find themselves drawn into larger global conflicts as a result o f their ethos of manly
performance.4
W hile the myth o f an American ‘farewell to arm s’ was established, the connection
between manliness and nationalism articulated so well by Theodore Roosevelt was
perpetuated by such Gilded Age institutions as the Boy Scouts and patriotic
organizations. As Cecilia O'Leary has pointed out, "[ajfter W orld W ar One, right wing
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion prom oted a 'virile
Christian nationalism ,1each claiming to be the exclusive arbiter o f true A m ericanism ."5
The connection between masculinity and strenuous national perform ance remained
linked.
While the carnage of W orld W ar I may have led to a "farewell to arms" for some
men, the connection between the manly ideal and national duty was merely downplayed
during the 1920s and 30s. In reality, the connection between manly action and foreign

4 Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to A rm s. New York: Scribner, 1929; To Have and
Have N ot. New York: Scribner, 1937; For W hom the Bell T olls. New York: Scribner,
1940. To Have and Have N ot, and For W hom the Bell Tolls w ere m ade into films,
starring Humphrey Bogart and Gary Cooper respectively, w hich w idened their impact,
and made their m asculine m essage more powerful, shaping m asculine ideals of
performance through the allegory o f national masculinity. See To H ave and Have Not,
Howard Hawks, Director, W arner Brothers, 1944; and For W hom the Bell Tolls, Sam
Wood, Director, Paramount, 1943.
5 O'Leary, To Die F or, p. 244.
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policy was not broken; it was more subdued, but resurfaced later am ong another
generation of Am erican men.
Similarly, fundam ental US foreign policy doctrines that had their origins in the
masculinity o f the G ilded Age rem ained in effect. These policies include such
cornerstones o f Am erican foreign policy as R oosevelt’s interpretation o f the M onroe
Doctrine, and the use o f force in the Caribbean and Central A m erica in the m anner
pioneered by Wilson. As the 20th Century wore on, it became clear that the precedents
created by the masculinist policies o f these two men continued to shape US foreign
policy.
Immediately after the G reat W ar, though, the United States tried to achieve its
goals without conflict. W arren Cohen has described the foreign policy o f the 1920s as a
time o f "empire without tears;" an era o f American economic grow th and global empire,
but without the conflict that had marked the previous decade. The Caribbean
interventions and troop landings that marked the inter-war years (U. S. troops were
dispatched to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua) were rooted
equally in the traditions o f m asculine nation perform ance and econom ic im perialism;
both policies, as discussed earlier, are rooted in the "gilded age' construction of
masculinity.6

6 W arren I Coheri, Em pire W ithout Tears: America's Foreign Relations. 1921-1933. New
York: M cGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987. For an overview of A m erica foreign policy in Latin
America, and the attitudes and goals that lay behind the frequent A m erican interventions,
See W alter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central A m erica.
Second Edition, New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.
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The decade's foreign policy approach, which has also been called "independent
internationalism ,7" speaks to the conception o f the m asculine foreign policy o f the era:
men, like nations, should (in this American construction) rem ain independent, but in
times of crisis, should be free to bind together to face a com m on threat. In this way,
independent internationalism is the odd com bination o f the opposing national m asculine
policies o f W ilson and Roosevelt; the right to independent action preserved, even as the
freedom to jo in in collective action is secured.
W arren Cohen explains that "[i]n the 1920s the United States attem pted to pursue
an independent policy, com prom ising frequently to cooperate with other nations for
specific purposes." W hile Cohen admits that the American hesitation to bind itself to
international organizations may seem "timid" now, "what is really striking is the
increased participation o f the United States in major developm ents around the world,
compared with the role the nation played in 1 917."8 W hat struck Cohen as "timid" was
actually the downplaying o f the masculinist rhetoric o f U.S. foreign policy, rather than
any hesitance in the pursuit o f American econom ic expansion.
But this rhetoric o f m asculine national performance becam e explicit with the
beginnings of U.S. involvem ent of the Second W orld War. As the situation in Europe
began to appear more threatening, many American intellectuals began to fear for
American interests. Among these were Lewis M umford, a well-know n w riter and
cultural critic, who in 1939 published a book with the title M en M ust A ct.9 The title lays

7 “Independent Internationalism ” is Joan H off’s term, used to describe the policies of
Herbert Hoover. See her H erbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive. Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., pp. 168-179.
8 Cohen, Em pire W ithout T ears, page 17.
9 Lewis M umford, M en M ust A ct. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com pany, 1939.
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out M um ford's argum ent succinctly. M um ford sought to reach across the decades to
connect with Theodore Roosevelt's preparedness argument, and the construction of
Am erican manliness that justified US involvem ent with the First W orld War. "Time
changes nothing: men m ust act." 10
It becom es clear that the "Men" in M umford's title and argum ent are
interchangeable with "the United States." In the preface M umford writes, "The United
States must be ready to act alone," while in his concluding chapter, "Democracy M ust
Dare!" he reiterates a Rooseveltian sense o f national duty:
That which the soldier gives with quiet desperation on the field o f battle must
becom e the com m onplace gift o f the day: every mechanic, every clerk, every
farmer, every housewife, writer, scientist, artist, inventor, industrialist, business
man m ust dedicate him self to the larger task o f upholding our dem ocratic
civilization ... The goal cannot be counterm anded; but the conditions for
achieving it are inexorable: men m ust a ct.11

It is worth noting that in his equating men with the nation, he also includes the
"housewife" as a member of the larger category "men;" women, M um ford argues, need to
play the same manly role that men do in the fight against fascism and totalitarianism.
The perform ance of m asculinity is essential for M umford; men and women, and clearly
nations as well, become manly through the perform ance of particular actions. Lewis
M um ford is reiterating the Rooseveltian masculine analogy o f "as man is to nation, so is
the nation to the world."
The end o f the Second W orld W ar did not mean the end o f the masculinist trope
o f national manhood. During the Cold W ar, the “containm ent” policy dedicated the
U nited States to a “long term, patient but firm and vigilant containm ent of Russian

10 M umford, M en M ust A ct, p. 8.
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expansive tendencies.” 12 The result o f this long term dedication was a focus on
maintaining that policy; accordingly there was a great deal of rhetoric on the need for the
U nited States to stand tough - to be firm - in short, to act like a man. Frank Costigliola
argues that G eorge Kennan's "Long Telegram ," a docum ent that served as a blueprint for
Cold W ar foreign policy, was rooted in Kennan's gendered view o f the US-Soviet
contest. As Costigliola explains, the "Long Telegram" reveals Kennan's "linkage of
virility with involvem ent with Russia," a connection "in which he casts him self as the
male lover and Russia or the Russian people as the feminine beloved." W ith his
portrayals o f the Soviet governm ent as a "jealous lover" who keeps the Russian people
captive, it is not surprising the Kennan's writings "fostered feelings that delegitimated
cooperation with the Soviets."13
The Cold W ar argum ent as articulated in the foundational writings of Kennan and
other policy makers shaped the national debate over Vietnam. American action in
Vietnam was rooted in the classic definition o f manly national performance. As Robert
Dean argues in Imperial Brotherhood: G ender and the M aking of Cold W ar Foreign
Policy, many o f the most im portant policy makers during the Vietnam era shared a
com m on conception o f manly behavior, as well as a belief in the importance of
exercising American pow er abroad. Dean argues that
The men who cam e to pow er in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had
been form ed by a series o f institutions which glorified em pire while officially
denying its existence. Boarding schools, Ivy League universities, elite men's

11 M umford. M en M ust A ct, pp. 172-173.
12 George Kennan, “ Sources o f Soviet Conduct,” in American D iplom acy. Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1985, p. 119.
13 Frank Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration: Gender, Pathology, and
Em otion in G eorge Kennan's Form ation o f the Cold War," Journal o f Am erican H istory,
vol.83, No. 4, (M arch 1997), pp. 1309-1339.
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clubs, and volunteer m ilitary service provided explicit lessons in the performance
o f a class-based "manliness" as means to and justification for p o w e r.14

The best exam ple o f the "performance of class based manliness" had been set by
Theodore Roosevelt some sixty years earlier. The problem was that Roosevelt's Gilded
Age m asculine code was untenable in the Vietnam era, as it had proved to be in the
trenches o f the G reat War. As Dean points out, this foreign policy o f m asculine
perform ance was responsible for the debacle in Southeast Asia, for "[t]he politics of
m anhood crucially shaped the tragedy o f Vietnam ."15
Furtherm ore, the cultural debate within the United States during the Vietnam W ar
reflected the gendered discourse which underlay it. The discourse o f masculinity can be
seen in the tension between films such as The Green Berets and The Deer H unter, which
portrayed manliness in diam etrically opposite ways. Revisionist post-V ietnam films such
as Rambo: First Blood. Part II continued this connection by articulating the argument that
American defeat in Vietnam was due to a lack of manly effort. Sylvester Stallone's
portrayal o f Rambo illustrates the popular connections between military duty, American
identity, foreign policy and strenuous masculinity. It can be heard in the different
arguments for masculinity made in songs such as “Fortunate Son” by Creedence
Clearwater Revival and “The Ballad of the Green Berets” by Staff Sgt. Barry Sadler.
Cinem atic and musical critiques of the Vietnam W ar were but a part o f the
upheaval o f the late 1960s and early 1970s, for this was also an im portant time for
advances in Civil Rights for African and Hispanic and Native Americans, as well as for

14 R obert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the M aking o f Cold W ar Foreign
Policy. Amherst: U niversity o f M assachusetts Press, 2001. Page 242.
15 Dean, Im perial Brotherhood, p. 243.
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women and gay men. But despite the challenges to Cold W ar constructions o f gender
represented by Stonewall and national debate over the ERA, m asculine approaches to
foreign affairs survived the Vietnam War, and the 1970s. Carol Cohn has described how
nuclear deterrence theory during the 1980s was conceived and expressed in gendered
term inology. The arms race, she suggests, was rooted in "missile envy;" the language
used to discuss the strategy o f deterrence as well as the weapons them selves is redolent of
m asculine imagery. Citing lectures on nuclear weapons, she lists the sexualized language
o f nuclear strategy, which included such terms as
vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep
penetration, and the com parative advantages o f protracted versus spasm attacks or what one military adviser to the National Security council has called "releasing
70 to 80 percent of our m egatonnage in one orgasmic w hum p."16

This kind o f language, Cohn has argued, "can be construed as a deadly serious
display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race." This
language, o f course, is similar to the masculinst language of Roosevelt and his colleagues
from earlier in the century. Cohn made this connection as well; writing in 1987, Cohn
viewed the gendered language of nuclear strategy as the result o f a foreign policy tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union which had ultim ately becom e a
"competition for m anhood."17
Cohn’s discussion of the language used during the Reagan-era indicates the
continued viability of the conception of foreign policy as m asculine perform ance, even as
the Cold W ar itself cam e to an end. The legacy of the Cold W ar "com petition for

16 Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational W orld of Defense Intellectuals, Signs 12
(Sum m er 1987), pp. 687-718.
17 ibid., page 696.
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masculinity" can be seen in foreign actions undertaken by the U nited States during the
Bush and Clinton administrations. A t a time when the policy o f containm ent was no
longer quite applicable, yet had not been replaced by a similarly coherent foreign policy
logic, masculine competition served as a basis for international action. W hile the Bush
administration's decision to com m it the United States to force invading Iraqi troops out of
Kuwait in 1990 -91 ("Operation Desert Shield" and "Operation D esert Storm") was
couched in the terms o f liberation, and the Clinton administration's continuation of the
intervention in Somalia in 1992 ("Operation Restore Hope") was conceived as a
humanitarian action, both were articulated using the rhetoric o f masculinity.
During the conflict in Kuwait and Iraq, the focus of A m erican ire was the Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein. In a speech made at the Pentagon on A ugust 15, 1990, President
George Bush spent much of what was supposed to a policy speech attacking Hussein's
character, and listing his evil deeds: Saddam is
the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children o f his own
country; who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million
Moslems; and who now plunders Kuwait. 18

Saddam Hussein was not individually killing men women or children, or invading
or plundering Kuwait, but in Bush's language and in his rhetoric Saddam Hussein and
Iraq had become synonymous, with the man standing in for the nation. The initial
reaction of Bush's Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was that "it was far too personal an
attack, harsh and overdone, ratcheting up the rhetoric too much." B ut it was personal for

18 Bob W oodward, The C om m anders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Page 282.
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Bush; in a meeting between the President and Prince Bandar o f Saudi Arabia, Bush stated
that "I give my word o f honor" that the United States would "see this through."19
Clearly, while Bush conflated Hussein with Iraq, he also saw him self as the
United States, or at least as its manly champion. The idea o f a President giving his
"personal word o f honor" to com m it hundreds o f thousands o f A m erican soldiers, and
billions o f dollars from the treasury is outrageous - foreign policy should not com e down
to personal animosity and the anthropomorphizing o f international relations. But for
President George Bush, the US needed to act like a man, and in a warrior's guise.
For the Clinton adm inistration, the foreign policy of manly com petition was
performed in the costum e of the humanitarian, though not without conflict. "Operation
Restore Hope" was a mission to bring stability to the Horn o f Africa, particularly
Somalia, in the wake o f decades o f chaos and Civil War. Clinton found him self needing
to articulate US policy aims, and focused on Somali "warlords" as the creators of the
•

•

crisis.

20

The language of the Somali conflict, particularly the use o f the term "warlord,"
reiterates the dialectic of savagery and civilization that was so com m on during the turn of
the previous century, the era of Theodore Roosevelt. In fact, the tensions between the US
and Somali tribal chieftains is redolent of a famous episode in M orocco that occurred
during Roosevelt's presidency. The seizure of Ion Perdicaris and his stepson Cromwell
Varley by a local M oroccan warlord named Ahmed ben M ohamm ed el Raisuli was but

19 W oodward, The C om m anders, pp. 282, 241.
20 For exam inations of Clinton's Somali policy that bear this out, see Thom as H.
Henriksen, Clinton's foreign policy in Somalia. Bosnia. Haiti, and N orth K orea ,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, and Jonathan Stevenson, Losing M ogadishu:
Testing U.S. Policy in Som alia. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
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one m ove in what was a larger play by Raisuli for pow er and prestige. Roosevelt sent a
cable that cut through what had begun to seem like extended hostage negotiations: "We
want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." W hile Roosevelt was dealing with a kidnapping,
and Clinton was attempting to deal with a humanitarian crisis, the sense o f personal
outrage and frustration are similar, and grow out o f the same belief in a manly code of
foreign policy.21
And now, most recently, the debates and the anxiety that m arked the lead-up to
the Second Iraq W ar have illustrated the continued existence o f the belief in the
im portance of masculine performance in US foreign policy. The tensions between the
United States and the volatile area of the M iddle East increased trem endously as a result
o f the terrorist attacks on Septem ber 11, 2001, and recent foreign policy has been aimed
at dealing with terrorist threats, and the nations that sponsor terrorism and terrorist
groups. Among the nations targeted by the United States were A fghanistan and Iraq,
while North Korea and Libya were also subjects of concern.
Not surprisingly, the model for the interventionist anti-terrorist policy of the Bush
adm inistration is manly performance. As Newsweek magazine reported in August of
2002, "[wjhile still wrangling over how to overthrow Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the Bush
adm inistration is already looking for other targets." W hile the search for terrorist targets
can be rationalized as national security, the rationalization put forw ard by an official

21 For a good discussion o f the Perdicaris "hostage crisis," see Edm und M orris, Theodore
R ex. New York: Random House, 2001, pp. 323-338.
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close to the administration explained that "[e]veryone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men
want to go to Tehran."22
The implication is that an Am erican intervention in Iraq would not be anything
remarkable, not an action that would prove national manhood. An invasion or other
military action against Iran, a nation which many people have a lingering feeling o f
resentm ent towards because o f the Iran hostage crisis o f 1979-80, however, would be an
action that would showcase Am erican manly resolve and "muscle." Similarly, the
decision makers, those responsible for launching such an action, would also be proving
their masculinity, their own status as "real men" by directing the United States into a
hazardous foreign policy area.
That a belief in masculine perform ance underlies the Bush adm inistration's
foreign policy has been noticed by critics and allies alike. Furtherm ore, there have been
frequent analyses that have linked the Bush adm inistration's foreign policy to the
im perialist drive o f the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In a New York Times
M agazine cover story from January 2003, titled "The Burden," M ichael Ignatieff, of the
Kennedy School o f Government at Harvard, argues that the United States is a modern
day im perial power, with particular responsibilities. In his conclusion, Ignatieff argues
that "[t]he case for empire is that [the United States] has becom e, in a place like Iraq, the
last hope for dem ocracy and stability alike." Ignatieff s argum ent in favor o f American
intervention echoes the American exceptionalist logic of Roosevelt and Beveridge, while
the very title o f the piece, "The Burden," is a direct quote from Rudyard Kipling's "White
M an's Burden," written as a warning to the United States following the Spanish American

22 "Beyond Baghdad: Expanding the Target List," Newsweek, A ugust 19, 2002, vol. 140,
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War. The Times' cover is even more blunt: "The American Empire," it screams in red,
white, and blue, "Get Used to It." Contem porary foreign policy is firmly rooted in the era
o f Roosevelt.23
The historian Jackson Lears sees parallels between the foreign policy o f today and
that o f Roosevelt and Beveridge as well. Discussing Bush's use o f the word "crusade" to
describe the war on terrorism, Lears connects Bush's crusade to A lbert Beveridge's
foreign policy, specifically the conception o f "manifest destiny." W hile many listeners,
particularly in Arab nations, were appalled by the use o f the term "crusade," Lears argues
that religious foreign policy language has a long tradition. A t the end o f the nineteenth
century, Lears points out, "Senator A lbert Beveridge and other im perialists had made
M anifest Destiny a global project, insisting that had 'marked' the Am erican people to lead
in "the redem ption of the world."24
As I pointed out earlier, this language is rooted in a gendered and class-based
power structure, and reflects a particular set o f upper class white male gilded age beliefs,
among them the belief in independent manly action. The colum nist M aureen Dowd,
writing the day before the invasion o f Iraq, saw in George Bush's foreign policy the
triumph of what she has called "the foreign policy o f I." Contrasting the coalition built
by the first President Bush for the first Iraq war with the second Bush's determ ination to
engage in unilateral action, Dowd argues that Bush and his advisers "have no interest in

#8, p. 8
23 M ichael Ignatieff, "The Burden," The New Y ork Tim es M agazine, January 5, 2003.
24 Jackson Lears, "How a W ar Became a Crusade," The New York Times, M arch 11,
2003, p. A 29.
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working within a m ilitary coalition: "They see the international 'we' as an im pedim ent to
... destiny. The Bush doctrine is dom inated by 'the big I.'"25
The masculinity and the individualism o f American foreign policies have been
noticed by allies o f the United States. M em ber nations of NATO, Norway for example,
have found that they need to tailor their policies to the masculine perform ance model. In
a New York Times article, Norwegian M inister of Defense Kristin K rohn Devoid
explained why she has adjusted Norwegian m ilitary planning to A m erican needs: "Hey,
it’s not much fun if you are the last one picked to play on the team." By remodeling
Norway's defense capabilities to fit into the U nited States' international operations,
Devoid argues, Norway "can play with the big boys." It is m asculine language such as
this, particularly the language o f the masculine playing field, indicative o f a particular
value system and thought process, that has made Devoid a favorite o f Secretary of
Defense D onald Rumsfeld, and a leading contender for the role o f NATO's secretary
general.26
D evoid is clearly making a wise tactical choice, for the United States views other
nations through the lens o f gender, and assigns value based on the m asculine performance
of its foreign policy. W here tiny Norway, with a defense minister that the Times refers to
as "GI Jane," has been able to play the m asculine role convincingly, France and Germany
have been having a harder time.
Recent tensions between the U nited States on the one hand and Germany and
France on the other are rooted in the European opposition to the war in Iraq, but this

25 M aureen Dowd, "The Perpendicular Pronoun," The New York Times, M arch 19, 2003,
p. A 27.
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opposition is understood in terms o f gender. Though both France and G erm any opposed
the intervention, it was France that received the majority o f A m erican disapprobation,
while Germany was able to maintain civil relations with Bush administration. W hy the
difference? Because, as Irwin W all argues, Americans have "this stereotype that France is
a feminine co u n try ."27
W hat is so rem arkable about this discussion about the relative masculinity of
particular nations is how common and open such views are. A N ew York Times article
titled "For Am ericans, It's French Sissies Versus Germ an He-M en" sums up the
perception succinctly. France is viewed as a woman, "La Belle France," the producer of
luxury goods such as wine and perfume which American have long viewed as feminine.
Germany, on the other hand, "is the fatherland, its spike helmets retooled into the sleek
insignia of cars like the M ercedes and BMW." 28
The gendering o f Germany and France as male and female is the result of US
foreign policy, and is rooted in a belief in the importance of "playing the man."
Depicting France as a woman, Robert Paxton, an historian at Colum bia University
argues, is "an Am erican stereotype and an American strategy. There are elements in our
culture that the Bush [administration] can play on in stereotyping France as feminine."
Frank Costigliola agrees, arguing that by describing France as feminine, it becom es easier
for the United States, as a masculine power, to "delegitimize French points o f view."29

26 M atthew Brzezinski, "Who's Afraid of Norway?" The N ew York Times M agazine,
A ugust 24, 2003, p. 24-27. Pages 27, 26.
27 Nina Bernstein, "For Americans, It's French Sissies Versus G erm an He-M en," The
New York Times, Septem ber 28, 2003, p. W K 5.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
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The linkage between m asculine performance and foreign policy appears to be
getting stronger, then, rather than w eaker as 2004 draws to an end. 2004 was an election
year, and once again foreign policy was a major election issue, and the debate about
A merican international relations was frequently couched in terms o f manliness. The
Republican incumbent, George W. Bush, was able to w in re-election in large measure
because he was able to convince the electorate that he would do a better jo b prom oting
national security than his opponent, Democratic candidate John K erry.30
That G eorge Bush, who successfully avoided serving in Vietnam, could convince
the Am erican electorate that he was better suited to handle defense issues than John
Kerry, who was a decorated Vietnam veteran, is remarkable. That Bush could be
perceived as the better foreign policy president, in the face o f daily rem inders that the
conflict was going badly, is alm ost hard to believe. W hat was the factor that convinced
the American electorate to look past poor results in managing the military conflict, and
re-elect the President?
The key to B ush’s electoral success rested on his perform ance o f military
manhood. B ush’s linkage of m asculine performance and foreign policy rhetoric
mimicked Theodore Roosevelt, who changed costum e as he was preparing to do manly
deeds, such as his buckskin suit which he used in the Dakotas, and his Brooks Brothers
uniform in Cuban campaign. For Bush, the sartorial shift happened aboard the USS

30 W hile the election is a recent event, and a definitive history o f the election has yet to
be written, and increasing number o f articles are being published in new spapers and
journals that illustrate the decisive importance o f national security issues to voters. See,
for exam ple, Louis Menand, “Permanent Fatal Errors, The N ew Yorker, D ecem ber 6,
2004, pp. 54-60.
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Lincoln, where he donned a flight suit to proclaim victory (prem aturely, it turns out) in
Iraq.31
This performance o f masculinity, though controversial, indicated the length that
President Bush was willing to go to prove that he was the right man for the W hite House.
The election very quickly became a contest that rested on different constructions of
masculinity. Additionally, because the election took place during a war, the connection
between masculinity and foreign policy becam e central to both the Dem ocratic and
Republican campaigns.
In the campaign for the Presidency, the Democratic Party needed to prove that it
could be as manly as the Republicans. Democratic candidate H oward Dean tried to
change the perception that Republicans "are the party of strength and we're the party of
weakness." As James Traub points out, Democrats are exchanging "'mushy
multilateralism' in John Kerry's phrase for what Senator Joe Lieberm an calls ’muscular
m ultilateralism .1" 32
This attempt at re-branding was challenged from the other side of the political
divide, as the Republican party worked to prevent the Democrats from becom ing more
manly. Conservative com mentators breathed new life into C hristopher M atthew s’ 1991
article for The New Republic that famously described the D em ocratic Party as the
“M ommy Party,” as opposed to the Republican “Daddy Party.”33 C alifornia Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger, star o f many macho action movies, chim ed in by describing

31 Anne E. Kornblut, “Bush Proclaims A V ictory,” The Boston G lobe, M ay 2, 2003, p.
A l.
32 James Traub, "The Things They Carry," The New York Times M agazine, January 4,
2004
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Democrats opposed to Republican econom ic policies as “girlie m en.”34 The Fox News
web site went so far as to post a falsified news story about John K erry’s m asculinity; the
article, posted on Fox News cam paign trail page titled “Trail T ales,” featured a quote,
supposedly by Kerry but actually written by Carl Cameron, that had the Democratic
candidate explaining “I ’m m etrosexual - h e’s a cow boy.” The article w ent on to explain
that a “m etrosexual is defined as an urbane male with a strong aesthetic sense who spends
a lot o f time and money on his appearance.” 35
W hat was at stake in this political positioning, o f course, was both candidates
ability to convince the electorate that they had the necessary qualities to conduct an
effective foreign policy. The tenor o f this manly foreign policy debate was even noticed
across the Atlantic. In The Econom ist, a weekly published in London, the editorialist
Lexington published an article titled “It’s M an ’s W orld.” “L et’s call it the testosterone
election,” Lexington begins, before continuing with a discussion o f both parties attempts
to claim the manly high ground, including a mention o f Schw arzenegger’s “girlie man”
quote and K erry’s accusation that Bush was “playing dress-up” on the deck o f the
Lm co/n.36
But what follows next in Lexington’s article is a point m issed by many political
pundits during the cam paign - the candidates’ positions on the conflict in Iraq are more

33 Christopher J. M atthews, “Parenthood: The M ommy Party and the Daddy Party,” The
New Republic, M ay 20, 1991 (vol. 204, No. 20), p. 15.
34 John M. Broder, “Schwarzenegger Calls Budget O pponents “G irlie M en,” Los Angeles
Times, July 19, 2004, p. A 1 1.
35 The original story was posted at w ww .foxnews.com /story/0,2933,134166,00.htm l on
O ctober 1, 2004. The site has since been modified, and in the place o f the story is an
apology. Quotes are from the website before it was altered.
36 Lexington, “ It’s A M an’s W orld,” The Economist, A ugust 7, 2004 (Vol. 372, No.
8387), p. 42.
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sim ilar than dissimilar. As Lexington explains, “the macho posturing is not just
posturing; it also says something about both candidates and A m erica’s state o f m ind.”
W hat it says is that Americans want a man in the W hite House who will exercise a manly
foreign policy. Both men, Lexington continues, “are vying for leadership o f a country
that, for all the quibbles, is reconciled to the use o f ‘hard ’ m ilitary pow er.” Accordingly,
both men and both parties agree on the essential im portance o f m asculine foreign policy.
W hat becam e clear during the election was that United States foreign policy will
continue to be m arked by constructions o f m asculinity that have their roots in the era of
Theodore Roosevelt. In fact, the foreign policy debate shows signs o f being dominated
more by the gender performance than by national security concerns; acting manly has
becom e more im portant than achieving policy goals. "Americans prefer a message that is
'strong and wrong' to one that is 'weak and right,"' form er President Bill Clinton has
argued.37 Until the linkage between m asculine perform ance and foreign policy,
articulated so convincingly by Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues at the beginning of
the twentieth century is broken, the United States will be limited in its foreign policy
options, and will be forced to continue to "play the man."

37 Quote from a speech made by form er President Bill Clinton to the D em ocratic
Leadership Council, New York University, D ecem ber 3, 2002. See A dam Nagourney,
“Clinton Says Party Failed M idterm T est Over Security Issue,” in N ew York Times,
D ecem ber 4, 2002, p. A l.
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